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The availability of a wide range of branded products makes the selection of the right 
type of good a difficult process.  This is particularly true in the case of goods whose 
characteristics consumers do not have complete information about, which they can 
only learn about after purchasing (experience goods).  A trade mark quality guarantee 
facilitates consumers’ choice by sending quality signals.  It also enables a trader of 
branded goods to differentiate the quality of his goods from those of his competitors.  
Accordingly, trade mark protection is said to enhance economic efficiency, and thus 
the production of quality goods, and reduce consumer search costs.  In order for this 
to work, however, among other conditions, the trader must maintain consistent quality 
over time and across consumers.  Otherwise, trade mark protection will enhance 
artificial product differentiation, and thus distort competition. To date, despite its 
profound significance, the quality guarantee is seen as performing an economic 
function that trade mark law is ill equipped to deal with.  As a result, this function is 
not enforced under trade mark law. 
 
Contrary to mainstream thinking, this thesis argues that the quality function of a trade 
mark should be recognised and enforced through trade mark law.  What is at stake is 
far from insignificant: it is about bridging the ever increasing gap between the legal 
rationales for trade mark protection and the economic consequences of this protection 
in practice.  The thesis is also about how consumers should shape their relationship 
with trade marks and what role law should play in constructing that relationship.  By 
giving independent legal substance to the quality function, trade mark law encourages 
a trader to improve the quality of his goods instead of simply improving the 
persuasive or advertising value of the mark, which, in turn, enhances artificial product 
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A trade mark facilitates consumer purchasing decisions among experience goods.  It 
also encourages traders to produce and maintain quality products.1 That is why trade 
mark protection is said to foster economic efficiency and thereby the production of 
quality goods as well as to (and deleted) reduce consumer search costs.  Achieving 
these goals, however, requires that the traders of branded goods maintain a consistent 
quality across time and for all consumers.2 The significance of quality maintenance is 
particularly evident in the case of marks with a reputation.  Satisfaction on the basis of 
a reputation or an image should never become separate from the product to which the 
mark is attached.3 This could convert branded goods into status symbols even where 
such status does not necessarily match any real improvement in quality of the 
products to which the mark is affixed.4 In the short run, because consumers will be 
less interested in the quality and the price of the goods, the protection of the mark will 
excessively expand the monopoly power of the trade mark owner.5 In the long run, 
this could encourage traders to improve the advertising and persuasive value of their 
marks instead of maintaining and improving the quality of the product in question. 
This could severely undermine the economic benefits of trade mark protection.6  
Despite its importance to consumers and the process of competition, the quality 
function is not properly protected.  It is viewed as an economic function that may not 
be enforced under trade mark law.7 It has been argued that the importance of 
                                                
1 W Landes, and R Posner, ‘Trade Mark Law: An Economic Perspective’ (1987) 30 J L and Economics 
268- 271; N Economides, “The Economics of Trade Marks” (1988) 78 TMR 523- 532; M Pugath, The 
International Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2004) 36-
34. 
2 Landes and Posner (n 1) 269- 270. 
3 R Holzhauer, ‘Jenever and Jumping Wild Cats’ (2002) III The Economics of Intellectual Property 
420; G Stigler, ‘The Economies of Information’ (1961) 69 J of Political Economics 213; Pugath (n 1) 
36- 39; Economides (n 1) 523. 
4 A Griffiths, ‘A Law-and-Economics perspectives on trade marks’ in L Bently, J Davis, and J 
Ginsburg, (eds) Trade Marks and Brands, an Interdisciplinary Critique (CUP, Cambridge 2008) 253. 
5 Holzhauer (n 3) 415, 420; see in general R Smith and R Lusch, ‘How Advertising can Position a 
Brand’ (1976) 16 J of Advertising Research 37. 
6 Pugath (n 1) 36- 39; Economides (n 1) 523. 
7 Case 16/74 Centrafarm v. Winthrop [1974] 2 CMLR, para 22; Case I ZR 85/71 Francesco Cinzano & 
Cie GmbH v Java Kaffeegeschäfte GmbH & Co. [1974] 2 CMLR 21, para 11; Advocate General 
Opinion in Case C- 119/75 Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v Terranova Industrie C. A. Kapferer & Co. 
[1975] 2 CMLR 482 AG 490- 493; Advocate General Opinion Capotorti in Case 102/77 Hoffmann-la 
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enforcing the quality function under trade mark law is unnecessary because a trader 
cannot risk reducing the quality of his branded goods without risking the loss of 
business.  According to this view, market forces alone are sufficient to discipline 
traders who provide an inconsistent level of quality, and thus there is no need to 
enforce this function by law.8 Further, the concept of quality is heavily regulated 
under many legal norms such as consumer protection law which is believed to be 
better equipped to deal with such a matter.  Consequently, the quality function of the 
trade mark is not seen as inherently worthy of protection.  
It is against this backdrop that this thesis aims to tease out the different legal strands 
concerning the enforcement of the quality function, seeking both to analyse the 
current state of the law and to provide a reference point for potential problems and 
solutions as they arise.  As such, it is pertinent to ask: why is it important to enforce 
the quality function of the mark?  What is the legal nature of this function?  Does 
trade mark law sufficiently protect the quality guarantee?  Should this function be 
enforced under trade mark law? Why not?  The reader must remember however that it 
is beyond the scope of this study to address all aspects of the enforcement of the 
quality function. That is why the protection of that function in the fields of unfair 
competition, comparative advertising and consumer law (as examples) will not be 
addressed. 
This thesis is divided into five chapters and a conclusion.  These can be viewed as two 
parts.  The first (chapters 1-3) examines two major points.  Firstly, it analyses the 
legal and economic rationales for trade mark protection.  It underlines the importance 
of enforcing the quality function if trade mark protection is to promote competition 
and reduce consumer searching costs.  Secondly, taking the economic and legal 
rationales of protection into account, part one provides an inside view as to whether or 
not the quality guarantee is properly protected under Article 5(1) and (2) of Directive 
                                                                                                                                       
Roche & Co. AG and Hoffmann-la Roche AG v Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutischer 
Erzeugnisse mbH [1978] 3 CMLR 217 AG 6; Scandecor Development AB v Scandecor Marketing AB 
& Others, [2001] 2 CMLR 30; F Beier, ‘Territoriality of Trademark Law and International Trade’ 
(1970) 1 IIC 63.  Beier contributed to the original proposal of the European Trade Mark Directive as an 
adviser to the Commission. 
8 Landes and Posner (n 1) 268- 271; R Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (7th edn, Aspen Publishers, 
New York 2007) 370. 
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2008/95 (former Directive 89/104),9 (and Article 9(1) of Regulation 207/2009 (former 
Regulation 40/94).10 In this regard, our discussion will be restricted mainly, but not 
solely, to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (the Court).  On many occasions, 
the Court has considered the question of quality when determining the question of 
trade mark protection.  Despite this fact, the Court’s attitude concerning the 
enforcement of the quality function is far from clear. 
Part two (chapters 4 and 5), firstly, critically reinvestigates the Chicago law and 
economics movement and its impact on the enforcement of the quality function under 
trade mark law.11 The focus will be on highlighting the limitations of market forces in 
encouraging traders to maintain the quality of their goods as anticipated by the 
Chicago School.  Keeping this in mind, chapter 5 then compares the scope of the 
satisfactory quality test that underpins section 14 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act as 
amended (as a leading example), with that of the quality guarantee under trade mark 
law.  The goal is to investigate whether there is a quality regulation gap between 
consumer law and trade mark law.  
Accordingly, chapter one provides an outline of certain background matters that will 
make the following chapters easier to follow.  We begin by looking at the history and 
functions of trade marks with the quality function firmly in mind.  We then examine 
the economic and legal rationales of trade mark protection.  The focus will be on 
identifying the legal and economic contexts in which the protection of trade marks 
enhances the production of quality goods and reduces consumer search costs.  
The second chapter considers whether the quality guarantee is properly protected 
under the doctrine of the trade mark subject-matter (under Article 5(1)).  The aim is to 
build an accurate picture of how the principle of restricting the protection of the trade 
mark to its essential function should be implemented if trade mark protection is not to 
distort competition and artificially divide up markets between Member States.  To this 
end, and building on our results in chapter one, we question whether, in principle, the 
enforcement of the origin function enhances competition per se or whether this 
                                                
9 Directive 89/104 has been repealed and replaced, with renumbering but no change of substance by 
Directive 2008/95 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks [2008] 
L299/25. 
10 [2009] OJ L 78/1. 
11 Landes and Posner (n 1) 268- 271; Posner ( n 8). 
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depends on the ability of the trade mark owner to maintain the quality of his/her 
branded goods.  Put differently, this chapter investigates whether the act of not 
maintaining quality distorts competition and increases consumer search costs even if it 
is committed by the trade mark owner and how the Court of Justice has tackled such a 
concern.  This serves as the starting point for assessing the legal possibility of 
requiring not only parallel traders but also trade mark owners themselves to maintain 
the quality of their goods.  Taking international exhaustion as an example, we finally 
consider whether the enforcement of the quality guarantee under the essential function 
doctrine, and thus Article 5 (1), is biased toward traders. 
In chapter three, we move on to consider the protection of the quality function under 
the dilution doctrine (under Article 5(2)).  Given the fact that dilution is about 
protecting the investment of a trade mark owner, and thus the protection of 
consumers’ interests as to quality issues is not a priority, this chapter examines 
whether reputable marks are granted too much protection and thus excessive 
monopoly.  Considering the ECJ ruling in Copad v Christian Dior,12 this chapter 
investigates the risks of not taking the broader legal and economic rationales for trade 
mark protection into account when expanding the protection of a trade mark’s 
intangible aspects such as its selling power or reputation.  To this end, chapter three 
critically scrutinises Schechter’s argument that the uniqueness of the trade mark 
should constitute ‘the only rational basis for its protection’.13 To test the sustainability 
of Schechter’s notion of protection, we ask whether economic efficiency or trade 
mark efficiency should be the purpose of trade mark protection.  Keeping the legal 
and economic rationales of trade mark protection in mind, this chapter highlights the 
importance of putting the concept of dilution in the context of the relationship 
between a trade mark’s reputation and a product.14 This chapter also analyses the risk 
of doing otherwise and hence transforming consumers from being of a quality bias to 
become a brand bias. In this case, a trade mark becomes an anti-competitive tool.  As 
such, despite the fact that dilution is mainly about protecting the investment of the 
trade mark owner, this chapter examines whether the question of quality maintenance 
                                                
12 C- 59/08 Copad SA v Christian Dior Couture SA [2009] ETMR 40, paras 24- 26. 
13 F Schechter, ‘The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection’ (1927) 40 Harvard L Rev 831. 
14 Case C-349/95 Loendersloot v George Ballantine [1998] ETMR 10, para 22; Case C- 10/89 SA Cnl-
Sucal v Hag, [1990] 3 CMLR 571, para 13; Case C-427/93 Bristol-Myer Squibb v Paranova [1996] 
ETMR 1, para 43. 
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must be taken into account when shaping trade mark protection under the dilution 
doctrine.  
After exploring the significance of maintaining consistent quality and whether this 
function is protected under Article 5(1) and (2), we move on to investigate why the 
quality function is not sufficiently protected .  To this end, chapter four critically 
examines how exactly the Chicago law and economics movement has come to the 
conclusion that consumers can rely on the proprietor of a trade mark having an 
economic interest in maintaining the value of his mark, and thus not to allow the 
quality of the goods sold under his banner to decline, which obviates the need for 
legal enforcement.15 The Chicago School or what we might call the Chicago 
‘deregulation’ approach has profoundly influenced the enforcement of the quality 
function under trade mark law.  That is why this chapter is dedicated to exploring two 
extremely important questions.  Firstly, whether the Chicago approach to law and 
economics has exaggerated the role of market forces, and thus minimised the need for 
legal intervention to enforce the quality function under trade mark law.  Secondly, 
whether the statement that trade marks always convey a consistent quality message is 
an accurate one. 
The Chicago deregulation approach is based on a game-theoretic analysis used to 
predict the outcome of lawmaking using information about the preferences of 
individuals.16 According to this theory, policymaking is treated as a game of 
strategy.17 The Chicago model of quality enforcement is based on three assumptions: 
perfect competition, individual rationality and wealth maximisation.  This chapter will 
investigate the interplay between these assumptions and quality maintenance.  To 
assess the credibility of the Chicago hypothesis, the chapter will consider whether 
seeking to retain long term profits means that traders will always maintain the quality 
of their goods.  To clarify this point, practical examples including the latest financial 
crisis and the Toyota 2010 recall, will be used.  
                                                
15 Landes and Posner (n 1) 268- 271; Posner ( n 8). 
16 C Camerer, Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction (Princeton University 
Press, New Jersey 2003) 5; M Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory (OUP, Oxford 2004) 1- 4; K 
Binmore, Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction (OUP, Oxford 2007) 2. 
17 D Law, ‘Introduction: Positive Political Theory and the Law’ (2006) 15 J of Contemporary Legal 
Issues 1- 4; D Smith, J Banks, Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference (Michigan University 
Press, Michigan 1999) 1- 25; Osborne (n 16) 1- 4. 
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The concern as to the need for enforcing the quality function under trade mark law 
requires tackling a final question.  Assuming that, despite its importance, the quality 
guarantee is not properly protected under Article 5(1) and (2) of Directive 2008/95 
(and Article 9 (1) of Regulation 207/2009) and that market forces are not a sufficient 
assurance that traders will not reduce the quality of their goods, this does not prevent 
the fact that quality issues are still heavily regulated under consumer protection law, 
particularly section 14(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.  Furthermore, when we say 
enforcing the quality function under trade mark law, what do we mean by quality?  
After all, apart from the concept of ‘satisfactory quality’, which underpins section 
14(2), the term ‘quality’ cannot be clearly defined and thus measured, let alone 
enforced. 
By investigating whether the rationale of quality regulation under trade mark law is 
different from that under section 14(2) of the Sale of Goods Act, the final chapter of 
this thesis tackles the above concerns.  The quality of two satisfactory goods may vary 
significantly.  Keeping this in mind, the focus in chapter five will be on whether the 
test of satisfactory quality reflects quality divergence between satisfactory and 
substandard goods only or if it counts also for quality differences between satisfactory 
goods.  Recognising the difference between good and extra quality products requires 
identifying a standard or standards against which the concept of satisfactory or 
excellent quality can be measured.  Given the number of goods available in the 
market however, this task is almost impossible.  For this reason, in this chapter, no 
attempt will be made to define quality.   
The concluding part of this thesis will show however that it is still possible to enforce 
the quality guarantee under trade mark law without the need to provide a clear 
definition as to what good or extra quality might mean.  
Finally, during the course of writing this thesis, the Lisbon Treaty has come into 
effect.  The European Court of Justice (the ECJ) is now referred to as the ‘Court of 
Justice’.  Trade Mark Directive 89/104 and Regulation 40/94 have been replaced by 
the codified version of Directive 2008/95 and the codified version of Regulation 
207/2009 with renumbering but no change of substance.  When dealing with cases 
already concluded, we will continue to refer to Directive 89/104 and Regulation 40/94 
which were used by the ECJ (now the Court of Justice) in all the cases discussed in 
 7 
this work.  We believe this makes life easier for the reader.  However, when 
presenting our own argument, we will refer to the Court of Justice (the Court) and the 
new codified version of the Trade Mark Directive 2008/95 and Regulation 207/2009.   
 8 
 
CHAPTER ONE: TRADE MARK PROTECTION: BACK TO BASICS 
 
 
One of the most important functions of a trade mark is to enable the individual to 
identify a product as ‘satisfactory and thereby to stimulate further purchases by the 
consuming public’.1 The quality function signifies to a consumer that all goods 
bearing a given mark are of a certain quality.  Trade mark protection is said to 
encourage traders to manufacture and sell quality goods and to provide information 
about those goods.2 In order for that to work, marks must, on the one hand, be 
protected and, on the other, the traders must maintain the quality of their branded 
goods over time and for all consumers.3 While the scope of the protectable subject 
matter of the trade mark right has been constantly broadened, the quality guarantee is 
yet to be properly enforced.  
 
This chapter is introductory.  It lays the foundations for the discussion that follows. 
To this end, it provides a brief history of trade marks with particular reference to the 
role of the quality guarantee in the creation of the essential function of the mark, a 
badge of origin.  Secondly, it considers the ways in which the legal protection of 
marks is justified.  By examining the economic and legal rationales of trade mark 
protection, this part highlights the significance of enforcing the quality guarantee if 
the law is to achieve its goals.  The chapter ends with an introduction to the legal 
background that informs and constrains trade mark functions in general and the 
quality guarantee in particular.  This final part also serves as an introduction to the 
chapters that follow. 
1. History of Marks 
 
Examining the history of trade marks serves two intertwined goals.  The first 
explains the roots and meanings of the social practices attached to the activity of 
affixing marks to goods.  The second reflects the evolution of the law to illustrate the 
                                                
1 F Schechter, ‘The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection’ (1927) 40 Harvard L Rev 818. 
2 W Landes, and R Posner, ‘Trade Mark Law: An Economic Perspective’ (1987) 30 JL and 
Economics 269- 271. 
3 Ibid, 267- 269. 
 9 
changes in the nature and scope of trade mark functions.  Indeed, the change in the 
ways traders and consumers perceive the role of a trade mark has significantly 
influenced the development of the law to expand the scope and level of legal 
protection for trade marks.4 As we progress through this part, one fact will become 
apparent: the quality guarantee has played a significant role in the development of 
the origin function or what is known as the essential function of a trade mark.    
1.1 The Early Phase 
 
Anthropological and historical findings indicate that the use of trade marks in trade is 
as old as trade itself.  Despite the fact that the legal protection of marks is fairly new, 
the concept of marking goods for various purposes predates written history. 
Examples of branding can be seen in cave paintings in South-Western Europe which 
depict branded animals, which might be traced back to the Stone Age and Early 
Bronze Era.5 The goals of these marking techniques, however, are constantly 
changing and are likely to remain a dynamic and changing field of legal debate.  
1.2 The Proprietary Mark  
 
Early trade marks were mainly used to protect personal property from theft and loss 
(the proprietary mark).  Ancient cultures used small graphic designs to brand 
livestock6 cattle7 and pottery.8 This technique served to identify the owner of the 
marked animals as well as to assist the illiterate who came into contact with the 
                                                
4 G Ruston, ‘On The Origin of Trade Marks’ (1955) 45 TMR 127, 128; for further information see F 
Schechter, The Historical Foundations of the Law Relating to Trade-Marks (Columbia University 
Press, New York 1925); see also T Drescher, ‘The Transformation and Evolution of Trade Marks- 
from Signals to Symbols to Myth’ (1992) 82 TMR 301, 309- 321; L Bently, and B Sherman, 
Intellectual Property Law (3rd edn, OUP, Oxford 2009) 711- 414. 
5 Ruston (n 4); for further information see Schechter, (n 4); Drescher (n 4); W Cornish, and D 
Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Compright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights (6th edn, Sweet 
and Maxwell, London 2007) 606; P Torremans, Intellectual Proprty Law (5th edn, OUP, Oxford 2008) 
366- 371; J Davis, Intellectual Property Law (3rd edn, OUP, Oxford, 2008) 1- 20, 187- 191. 
6 Schechter (n 4) 26; Bently and Sherman (n 4) 711- 713; D Kitchin and others Kerly’s Law of Trade 
Marks (14th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2005); R Annand and H Norman, Blackstone’s Guide to 
the Trade Marks Act 1994 (Blackstone Press, London 1994) 1- 32; E Rogers, ‘Some Historical Matter 
Concerning Trade Marks’(1910) 9 Michigan L Rev 29- 43; J Brian, ‘Historical Trademarks: In Use 
Since . . . 4,000 B.C.’ (2002) INTA Bulletin Archive. 
7 Drescher (n 4) 301- 309. 
8 Ruston (n 4). 
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livestock.  Despite the fact that the proprietary mark was not a trade mark in the 
modern sense, it set the stage for the development of modern trade mark law.9 
 
The significance of the proprietary mark was further enhanced by the increase in 
trade in the ancient world.10 The act of selling and buying goods expanded over large 
areas, particularly in Egypt11 and, in later stages, in the Roman Empire,12 where 
traders had to travel long distances and in so doing exposed their goods to the risk of 
piracy and theft.  But, branding techniques were not the only methods used to 
designate the ownership of animals or products.  Other devices, such as monograms 
and heraldic tools, were also used.13 
 
Branding for the sake of indicating property was not the only notable trade mark 
forerunner.  Even at that early stage, marking practice was used to identify other 
aspects of a product, including but not limited to, the quality of materials and 
craftsmanship.14 According to Brian, the roots of this ‘quality’ factor can be traced 
back to the pre-historic era, approximately 6000BC, where examples of ‘quarry 
marks’ (marks used to indicate the source of the materials (stones) used in building) 
and ‘stonecutters’ signs’ (usually painted or carved into the stone) were discovered in 
building materials used in Egypt.15 Similar examples were also discovered in ancient 
buildings in Syria, Greece, Israel and Turkey.  The Roman builder used a similar 
technique by stamping bricks or tiles to indicate the source and quality of the 
material used on the building or to identify the person who made it or used it.16 This 
technique was important because some brick and tile makers used to wait for their 
goods to dry up for two or more years before sale.  That is why the quality of these 
bricks was very good and it was important for the owner or the users of those bricks 
to identify this fact.17 In other words, the ancients were interested in ensuring the 
                                                
9 Schechter (n 4) 34. Schechter argued that a proprietary mark is not a trade mark at 20. 
10 Drescher (n 4) 309- 310. 
11 Ruston (n 4) 130. 
12 Ibid, 135. 
13 Brian, Lohnes, &Albertson (n 6); Bently and Sherman (n 4) 711- 713; see also Kitchin and others (n 
6); Annand and Norman (n 6). 
14 Brian, Lohnes, & Albertson (n 6). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Rogers (n 6) 29- 32; Brian, Lohnes, & Albertson, (n 6). 
17 Ibid. 
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quality of goods or material by identifying the source (origin) or the maker of these 
materials.  In that period, therefore, the quality of the goods was ensured by tracing 
its maker: its origin.  
1.3 The Production Mark 
 
With the rise of guilds during medieval times, trade marks were used for a different 
purpose.  Guilds had control over who could make certain goods or provide certain 
services.18 Every trader or manufacturer was managed by a guild comprising a 
federation of master craftsmen.  Guilds were also concerned with ensuring that the 
quality of their goods was satisfactory.19 To achieve this goal, guilds enforced their 
members to apply particular marks to their goods.  Every trader was obliged to affix 
a certain mark to his goods, the one he obtained from the guild.  This, in turn, 
allowed any sub-standard product to be traced back to its origin (its maker).  Thus, 
the use of the production mark was compulsory to indicate the maker of the good in 
question.20 The use of the production mark also helped guilds to ensure the 
dominance and monopoly of their businesses in a particular town or area.  Guilds 
were able to identify and prevent foreign goods from being sold in their territories.21 
This policy allowed guilds to enjoy an unchallenged trade monopoly in their local 
cities.22 At the same time, this meant that all trade marked products belong to the 
local guild and, at the same time, they were assumed to maintain some sort of 
production uniformity.  Such a production control policy was a very important step 
from the buyers’ perspective since it allowed them to have a very primitive 
‘medieval quality’ function.23 However, the rules of guilds were mainly intended to 
regulate the relationship between traders rather than to regulate the relationship 
between the traders and their customers.24 During the medieval era, trade was mainly 
                                                
18 Schechter (n 4) 40, 78; Drescher (n 4) 311. 
19 Bently and Sherman (n 4). 
20 Schechter (n 4) 38; Drescher (n 4) 311. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Schechter (n 4) 40; see also Drescher (n 4) 312, 313, 313- 320 
23 Ibid. In China, Greece and Rome marks were also used to  convey information about, inter alia, the 
manufacturer of goods, ownership, source of materials, time of stamping and, in some cases, even the 
name of the trader who bought the products and then sold them in other markets. The main objectives 
of providing this sort of information were to specify the source of goods, their origin, and their 
quality; see Rogers (n 6) 29- 33. 
24 Schechter (n 4)  40; Drescher (n 4) 311, 312, 313, 313- 320. 
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local. Traders usually kept a close relationship with their customers.  This close 
proximity meant that customers did not have to rely on the production mark to check 
the quality of goods.  They were in a good position to personally know the local 
trader and, therefore, to build reasonable expectations about the specifications of his 
products. That is why the role of the production mark in ensuring the quality of 
goods was not significant.25  
 
To sum up, in the medieval era the purpose of trade mark use was to enforce the 
rules of the guild which included, inter alia, monitoring the quality of the branded 
goods.26 With the advent of the industrial revolution however, the concept of trade 
mark use had once again changed and to this we shall turn our attention. 
1.4 The Modern Phase: The Interplay between the Quality and Origin Function 
 
The advent of the industrial revolution had a significant impact on the development 
of trade mark functions.  The economic wealth accumulated during the revolution 
gave marks a new role: they became national and international competitive tools. 
During the industrial revolution, some traders were able to produce goods in massive 
quantities.  The use of canals and railways as efficient methods of transportation 
resulted in new methods of distributing goods.27 In turn, this enabled traders to 
further expand their trade on local, national and international levels.  This expansion 
of trade meant that traders started to sell their products outside their local areas.  At 
the same time, they started to advertise their goods by reference to their trade 
marks.28  
 
Trading at national and international levels meant that consumers had access to a 
wider range of products imported from all over the world.  Without being able to 
identify the source of those ‘foreign’ products, it was difficult to establish any idea 
about their quality.29 To overcome this issue, purchasers started to rely on marks 
                                                
25 Schechter (n 4) 41. 
26 Ibid, 40, 78. 
27 C Pickering, Trade Marks in Theory and Practice (Hart Publishing, Oxford 1998) 39. 
28 S Diamond, ‘The Historical Development of Trademarks’ (1975) 65 TMR 281. 
29 Drescher (n 4) 321; Pickering (n 27); Schechter (n 4) 129- 134. 
 13 
affixed to goods as indications of the source (the origin).  As time passed by, 
consumers started to associate certain marks with particular manufacturers, and in 
turn a certain level of quality.30 At this period, trade marks became indicators of 
origin and thus signs from which consumers could assume consistency of quality.31 
According to Schechter, this change in the role of trade marks was first developed in 
the cloth and cutlery industries.32 It is in these industries where the ‘evolution of the 
trade mark from a mark of origin to a mark of quality and hence from a liability to an 
asset’ took place.33 This important transformation was the result of using a particular 
municipality by some traders who had become known for their excellence and 
quality.  Over time, this quality was identified and repeatedly purchased through the 
attached trade mark.34  At this stage, consumers started to realise that some marks 
might indicate a desirable quality as well as the defects of the products to which they 
were attached.35  
1.5 Trade Marks as Marketing Tools 
 
Around the beginning of the twentieth century, another important change in the role 
of trade marks took place.  With the availability of a wide range of interchangeable 
products, traders started to advertise and package their products more often.36 
Reinforced by advertising, it is believed that, as time passed by, some marks became 
valuable assets in their own right.37 They were able to convey some sort of emotional 
allure to consumers by virtue of their distinctiveness or appeal, not as a result of 
assumptions of origin or quality.38 According to Drescher, it is thought that some 
marks were able to raise a desire for a product regardless of any assumed assumption 
about its quality.  In doing so, the role of the trade marks changed from being 
indicators of origin (and thereby quality) to marketing tools.39 This new role gave 
                                                
30 Ruston (n 4) 134- 135. 
31 Schechter (n 4) 78. 
32 Ibid, 79- 147. 
33 Ibid,78. 
34 Ibid,78- 79. 
35 Ibid,79- 147. 
36 L Stephen, Patents, trademarks and related rights: National and International protection (Mass: 
Harvard Up, Cambridge 1975) 967. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Bently and Sherman (n 4) 712.  
39 Drescher (n 4) 301, 309- 321. 
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marks a profound competitive and commercial significance.40 The change in the 
function of trade marks was described thus:  
Take water and sugar: they are commodities. Process them into cola drinks, 
and you have products. Market and promote them into COCA –COLA and 
PEPSI- COLA:  you have brands.41 
 
Recently, trade marks have taken on a new function.  Under this role, they provide 
consumers with an identity.42 When a consumer purchases an Ipod touch, for 
instance, he is actually buying an experience which helps to construct his identity.  In 
this context, the trade mark becomes something much more than the product to 
which it is attached or its reputation for quality.  Instituted through the presentation, 
marketing, advertising, and packaging, it becomes a brand, an image and a way of 
life.43 
2. Why the Quality Function? 
 
A considerable amount of debate has been devoted to the question of trade mark 
functions.  What are those functions and how much protection should they be given? 
There are a number of different aspects of this debate that have been explored in the 
academic literature.  This thesis however focuses exclusively on one aspect: whether 
the enforcement of the quality function of the mark is in compliance with the 
underlying rationales for trade mark protection.  
 
This part raises two related inquiries.  First, how important is the quality function for 
both traders and consumers?  Secondly (and closely related to the former point), why 
should marks be protected in the first place and why this protection relate to the 
quality guarantee?  The importance of the quality function for consumers and traders 
is not difficult to ascertain.  It enables a trader of branded goods to differentiate the 
quality of his goods from those of his competitors.44 In this context, the protection of 
the trade mark is said to encourage the trader to produce and sell high quality 
                                                
40 Pickering (n 27) 38- 42. 
41 The Economist, ‘The Year of the Brand’ 24 Dec. 1988, 101; Schechter (n 4) 129- 135. 
42 Drescher (n 4) 301, 309- 321. 
43 J Litman, ‘Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age’ (1999) 108 Yale LJ 
1717. 
44 Landes and Posner (n 2) 269- 271. 
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products hence deriving economic efficiency.  In the same way, the quality function 
enables a consumer to have expectations as to the quality of a given product.  The 
consumer may rely on the trade mark’s reputation to speed up a purchasing decision.  
This is said to reduce searching costs.  In order for that to work, however, two 
conditions have to be established.  First, a trader must maintain the quality of his 
branded goods over time and across consumers, otherwise the mark increases rather 
than decreases searching costs.45 Second, the cost of searching for the right trade 
mark must be cheaper than the cost of searching for the desired attributes of the 
goods in question.46 Promoting and maintaining consistent quality is what actually 
ensures that the protection of the mark does not enhance artificial product 
differentiation and artificial partitioning of markets. 
 
However, we have already addressed that some marks became an asset by 
themselves through advertising, not through the quality of the product to which they 
are affixed.47 This change is particularly important in the case of marks with a 
reputation where some marks have become a silent ‘salesman’ that could sell a 
product regardless of its origin or associated quality.48 Such a new development 
raises concerns about the welfare of consumers and the wider policy of the law.  If a 
consumer purchases a product because it is sold under a particular brand not because 
of its quality, the protection of the mark might increase artificial product 
differentiation, thus distorting competition and increasing rather than decreasing 
consumer searching costs.  To clarify this point, two factors must be considered: 
firstly, we need to understand why marks are protected and the cost of this protection 
and, secondly, we need to identify the economic context in which this protection can 
be justified. 
 
2.1 Why should Marks be Protected? Introduction  
 
                                                
45 Ibid, 267- 269; R Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (7th edn, Aspen Publishers, New York 2007) 
391- 392. 
46 I Png, and D Reltman, ‘Why are some products branded and others not?’ (1995)38 JL and 
Economics 219. 
47 Page, 14. 
48 See in general Bently and Sherman (n 4) 714. 
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Trade mark protection can be justified on many grounds.49 But one of the most 
persuasive arguments is that trade mark protection is justified insofar as it 
encourages traders and manufacturers to produce and sell high quality goods and to 
provide information to consumers about the attributes of those goods.50 It is against 
this particular justification that this thesis aims to tease out the different legal strands 
concerning the quality guarantee and its implications for the development of the law. 
 
The argument that trade mark protection encourages traders to produce and sell high 
quality goods and thereby reduces consumer searching costs is based on the idea that 
without trade mark protection there would be under-production of quality goods.51 
Manufacturing a trademarked quality product costs time and money.  The value of 
the mark in facilitating purchasing decisions depends on the information or 
reputation the mark conveys about the manufacturer of particular branded goods. 
Once the reputation of the mark is established, consumers will be willing to pay 
higher prices for the goods sold under the mark for greater assurance of consistent 
quality.52 However, replicating someone else’s mark is easier and cheaper than 
creating a new one.  The stronger the reputation of the mark is, the greater the 
temptation to duplicate it.  Without legal protection, competitors can profit from the 
quality reputation consumers associate with the original mark by selling their own 
products under the mark for cheaper prices.  If the products sold under a mark vary in 
quality, consumers will not be able to rely on it as a sign of consistent quality.  In the 
long run, this will damage the reputation of the mark and, in turn, destroy it.  This 
also means that the trader of trademarked quality goods (the investor) will not be 
able to recover his investment in the mark.  In this context, protecting trade marks 
means enabling the investor to recoup his investment.53 Thus, trade mark protection 
enhances the welfare of consumers by providing them with a greater range of quality 
products.  At the same time, it fosters competition by enabling traders to recoup their 
                                                
49 For example, marks should be protected to prevent a third party from unjustly enriched by taking 
advantage of the mark or its reputation. Trade marks protection can also be justified under ethical 
grounds. Ibid, 4, 715- 721. 
50 Landes and Posner (n 2) 268- 273. 
51 Ibid, 269- 271. 
52 Id. 
53 Ibid, 267- 273. 
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investment and thereby encourages them to support the production of quality 
goods.54 
 
The protection of marks, however, is not cost free.55 Trade mark protection enables 
the owner of trade mark rights an exclusive right to use his mark in certain cases.     
This exclusivity grants the owner of the mark a degree of monopoly over the use of 
this mark.  The question of how much protection trade marks should be given 
depends on the cost of trade mark protection: the greater monopoly the exclusivity of 
a trade mark right generates, the more costly trade mark protection becomes.  To this 
we shall turn our attention. 
 
2.2 The Interplay between the Cost and the Scope of Trade Mark Protection 
 
There is an inherent tension between the concept of trade mark protection, promoting 
competition and reducing consumer searching costs.  Competition policy seeks to 
increase consumer welfare by fostering competition and, thereafter, maintaining 
prices at a marginal cost.  Trade mark protection means granting a limited monopoly 
right to the owner of the mark.  The problem is that the goals of promoting 
competition and reducing consumer searching costs are inherently inconsistent with 
the essence of branding goods.56 After all, the notion that trade mark protection 
reduces searching costs is based on the theory of perfect competition.  In a 
competitive market, it is assumed that information is needed for both traders and 
consumers.  Information also can be transferred easily and accurately.57 Hence, 
information about the price of a given product and its substitutes will be available for 
everyone.  A trader in this case cannot increase the price of his/her branded goods as 
consumers may switch to similar but cheaper products. 
 
                                                
54 Id. 
55 E Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (8th edn, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge 1962); R Brown, ‘Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols’ 
(1948) 57 Yale LJ 1165. 
56 G Ramello, ‘What is in a Sign: Trademark Law and Economic Theory’ (2006) 20 J Economic 
Surveys 556. 
57 R Whish, Competition Law (5th edn, Lexis Nexis, London 2003) 2. 
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By stark contrast, the idea of branding goods implies ‘that products will be highly 
differentiated’ and this differentiation is ‘essential for their ability to support 
detective meanings, identities or status attributes’.58 Therefore, there is an unending 
tension between the goals of branding goods and enhancing perfect competition.59 As 
one observer points out, a trade mark operates in two completely separate levels of 
distinctiveness which have to be considered.60 On the first level, the mark tells a 
consumer about the existence and origin of a branded good identified by a certain 
trade mark or the so-called ‘absolute' informational effect.  At the second level, the 
mark encourages the consumers to perceive a particular branded good as different 
from all others similar substitutes.  This is termed the ‘differential informational 
effect’.61 This feature is usually referred to as the distinctiveness of a trade mark.  
 
Let us take the Mercedes brand as an example.  On the one hand, the mark Mercedes 
tells consumers that all cars sold under the mark are made by or, under the control of, 
Mercedes.  On this level, the mark tells consumers about the origin or the source of 
Mercedes’ cars.  On the other hand, the mark also encourages consumers to perceive 
Mercedes’ cars as different from all other similar or identical cars.  As noted 
before,62 the distinctiveness of a mark (in this example Mercedes) is said to have a 
value that is not necessarily related to the origin or the quality of the cars sold under 
the mark Mercedes.  In this case, it is the mark which sells the cars, and as a result, 
the quality of the cars sold under the mark becomes less significant.  This, in turn, 
means that the Mercedes mark has moved from being a brand among other brands to 
being a brand that is better than all others brands.  In this case, the cost of protecting 
Mercedes becomes high because it expands the monopoly power of the trade mark 
owner.  Ramello observes that: 
If the differential distinctiveness effect prevails, that specific sign [Mercedes] 
will take on for consumers a uniqueness that transforms it from a “sign 
                                                
58 J Aldred, ‘The economic rationale of trade marks: an economist’s critique’ in L Bently, J Davis and 
J Ginsburg, (eds) Trade Marks and Brands, an Interdisciplinary Critique (CUP, Cambridge 2008) 
278. 
59 Ramello (n 56) 556. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid, 557.  
62 See pages, 14- 16. 
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among signs” to a “sign above other signs”, a situation referred to as 
“salience” or “brand awareness” in marketing.63 
 
Clearly, while a trade mark provides consumers with information about the origin of 
a particular product, it encourages them to believe that everything sold under the 
mark is unique in comparison with other substitutes available in the market.  The 
latter minimises the role of marks in promoting competition and reducing consumer 
searching costs. 
 
In a nutshell, trade marks protection might create deadweight costs such as monopoly 
or excessive competition.  Reinforced through advertising, a trade mark could create 
a spurious image of high quality which deflects consumers from lower price 
substitutes of equal or even higher quality (in the present discussion, this could 
happen under the second level of distinctiveness or under the differential 
informational effect).64 
 
However, the question of distorting competition by generating monopoly depends, to 
a large extent, on how much market power the owner of the trade mark rights can 
exert.  The question of exerting market power is closely related to the other question 
of how much protection marks should be given.  The more market power a trade 
mark right generates, the wider the monopoly the owner of the trade mark right 
enjoys and the more costly trade mark protection becomes.  That is why it is useful to 
examine whether the protection of marks generates monopolies.  
 
2.3 Trade Mark Rights and the Question of Market Power 
 
Generally speaking, the exclusive nature of a trade mark right does impose some 
costs.  Examples include the costs of transferring, enforcing and, more importantly 
preventing others from using the same or similar signs.65 As the scope of the trade 
mark subject matter increases, traders are increasingly enforced to seek different 
names, shapes or packaging for their goods.  This imposes extra cost on all traders of 
                                                
63 Ramello (n 56) 557. 
64 Landes and Posner (n 2) 274. 
65 Ibid, 273- 275. 
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branded goods, in particular the newcomers.66 The question to be raised therefore: 
does the extra cost imposed on traders help the owner of trade mark rights to exert 
market power? 
 
Trade mark law provides the owner of a trade mark right with control over the use of 
his mark in connection with goods or services.  However, it must be remembered that 
the law does not give an exclusive control over the sale of particular goods or 
services.  The act of granting an exclusive use to a trade mark itself does not generate 
a monopoly.  To create a monopoly, a trade mark must be treated in combination 
with the goods as a product in its own right.67 
 
The exclusive nature of a trade mark right and the extra cost it imposes, therefore, do 
not enable the owner of the right to exert monopoly power within a market.68 The 
question of exerting market power has to be considered keeping in mind all types of 
identical or similar products which consumers might treat as substitutes.  The 
question of whether a consumer will switch from one product to another if the price 
of the first is raised is everybody’s guess.69 This depends on a number of factors such 
as the advertising value of the mark70, its selling power or reputation, the information 
available to the consumer and the way he utilises this information.71 
 
Because of the lack of certainty as to the impact of the trade mark right in generating 
market power, it is very difficult to establish the proper scope of trade mark 
protection.72 One way out of this dilemma is to examine the best economic context in 
which the protection of the trade mark can be justified.  By doing so, we identify 
scenarios in which the protection of marks is likely to promote or to distort 
                                                
66 Bently and Sherman (n 4) 716. 
67 P Behrendt, ‘Trademarks and Monopolies: Historical and Conceptual Foundations’ (1961) 51 TMR 
853. 
68 Cornish and Llewelyn (n 5) 40. 
69 Ibid, 41. 
70 Id. 
71 For information about the deficiency of consumers in utilizing information see A Tversky, and D 
Kahneman, ‘Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’ in D Kahneman,  P Slovic, and A 
Tversky, (eds) Judgment Under Uncertainty (CUP, Cambridge 1982) 143. 
72 Cornish and Llewelyn (n 5) 41. 
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competition.  To this end, we need first to examine the economic role of trade mark 
law.  
3. The Economic Role of Trade Mark Law 
 
While we have already briefly addressed why trade marks should be protected,73 this 
section introduces, with more details, some new issues yet to be considered.  In this 
part, we ask four questions.  The first three serve to identify scenarios where trade 
mark protection is less costly and thereby is less likely to have anti-competitive 
effects.  The last question (question 4) identifies the context(s) in which trade mark 
protection is likely to have anti-competitive effects. 
These questions are: 
1. What is the role of trade marks in promoting competition? 
2. What is the role of trade marks in reducing consumer searching costs? 
3. How much protection should be given to the quality guarantee and, in which 
context, if the protection of marks is to achieve its goals, i.e. promoting 
competition and reducing consumer searching costs?  
4. What is the economic cost of protecting marks in gross? 
 
3.1 The Role of Trade Marks in Promoting Competition 
 
According to Chicago economists,74 trade mark protection enhances competition by 
encouraging traders to manufacture and sell high quality goods thus deriving 
economic efficiency.  Landes and Posner argue that a firm has an incentive to 
promote a trade mark only if it is able to maintain consistent quality.75 In order for 
that to work however, trade marks must be protected and must not be duplicated.  As 
this topic was dealt with previously, it is not necessary to look at it again here.76  
Instead, we will focus on the role of the quality guarantee in promoting competition.  
This can be explained by way of example. 
 
                                                
73 Page, 14. 
74 Landes and Posner (n 2) 265- 309. 
75 Ibid, 270. 
76 Page, 14. 
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Consider the following: a firm wants to promote a trade mark, say X.  This requires 
spending a huge amount of money on issues such as maintaining and improving the 
quality of products sold under the mark, services and advertising.  It is thought that 
the promoter of X mark is unlikely to develop and maintain a strong trade mark 
reputation unless he is able to maintain the quality of products sold under his mark.77 
This assumption is based on the idea that the lack of quality consistency will render 
the mark X useless.  X’s quality inconsistency means that it does not provide reliable 
information to consumers.78 Hence, it does not facilitate their purchasing decisions.   
Given the fact that consumers pay more for branded goods in a clear exchange for a 
quality assurance, they will be unwilling to pay more for products sold under X mark 
than for the unbranded ones.  If this happens, X’s promoter will not be able to 
recover his investment in the mark.  This by itself is said to discourage the owner of 
X mark to develop a trade mark reputation in the first place unless he is able to 
maintain the quality of goods sold under the mark.   
 
The previous argument is best described by George Akerlof in his article ‘The 
market for ‘LEMONS’’ where he argues:  
There are many markets in which buyers use some market statistic to judge 
the quality of prospective purchases. In this case there is incentive for sellers 
to market poor quality merchandise, since the returns for good quality accrue 
mainly to the entire group whose statistic is affected rather than to the 
individual seller. As a result there tends to be a reduction in the average 
quality of goods and also in the size of the market.79  
 
 Akerlof highlights the interaction between quality heterogeneity, asymmetric 
information and the risk of producing low quality products.80 Once a trade mark’s 
reputation has been established, consumers will reward firms with a good reputation 
with a repeat purchase and punish those with a bad reputation by not buying their 
products.  This is termed by Landes and Posner as a ‘self-enforcing’ feature of a 
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trade mark.81 The impact of this switch policy is thought to encourage traders to 
maintain and improve the quality of their goods.  
 
That is why trade mark protection is said to foster competition and thereby economic 
efficiency by encouraging traders to improve and maintain the quality of their 
branded goods.82  
 
3.2 The Role of Trade Marks in Reducing Consumer Searching Costs 
 
In order to understand how a trade mark reduces consumer searching costs, imagine 
that you went to purchase a laptop made by Apple Macintosh and the latter had no 
brand name.  In this case, you would have to ask for a laptop made by an American 
company called Apple Macintosh.  To do this, you should remember first who made 
the laptop and its specifications.  This requires you to remember a lot of information.   
Instead, you can simply ask for a MacBook13.83 The task of purchasing a laptop 
becomes even more complicated if Apple Macintosh makes more than one type of 
laptop.  An important purpose of trade marks is to associate easily recognizable and 
memorable names, such as MacBook13, with information relating to sellable 
products.84 So, if you have a positive experience with Apple Macintosh and you want 
to buy the same laptop or a similar one or if another product made by Macintosh has 
been recommended to you by a reliable source, instead of investigating the attributes 
of all goods to determine which one is equivalent to what you want, you can simply 
choose a faster and less costly method by identifying the relevant mark and buying 
the corresponding product.85  
 
 In other words, a trade mark summarises the specifications of a product in a few 
memorable words, such as MacBook13.  The mark tells the consumer that the 
attributes of the branded goods are likely to be the same as that of the mark he 
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enjoyed before.  This is said to save the consumer time and money.86 By identifying 
the source of a product and its quality, a trade mark enhances resource allocation 
through increasing consumer information and, therefore, reducing searching costs. 
Thus, the protection of trade marks is justified under the ground that it encourages 
‘firms to produce products of desirable qualities even when these are not observable 
before purchase’.87 
3.3 The Importance of the Quality Guarantee in Promoting Competition and 
Reducing Searching Costs 
 
As noted, trade marks perform a variety of economic functions.88 Examples include 
the origin, quality and advertising function.  This raises a question: is there a key 
function that without it the protection of trade marks would not achieve its economic 
goals?  Put differently, can a trade mark perform exclusively as a badge of origin or 
advertising tool and still promote competition and reduce consumer searching costs? 
When making a purchasing decision, the consumer who wants to buy a quality 
product usually faces two choices.  The first is to purchase an unbranded product and 
accepts the fact that this product might be cheaper, but its quality might not be 
guaranteed.  Hence, he himself has to search to find unbranded yet reliable quality 
products.89 Or the consumer can pay a premium for a branded good in exchange for 
an assurance of quality.90 That is why the consumer whose time is valuable is likely 
to buy a branded product in a clear exchange for quality.  In return for this time 
saving, he pays a premium.91 Consumer information theory reveals that where 
quality is a big concern, the consumer buys branded goods for premium grades.92  
This is because trade marks convey valuable information about the quality of a 
product where quality is an important factor and where other sources of information 
are costly.93  
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A trade mark is important, therefore, because of the reliability of information it 
conveys about the quality of a given product.  Consumers perceive a trade mark as a 
sign of consistent quality.  This consistency signal, nevertheless, can be conveyed 
through a trade mark reputation or its selling power.  When a consumer purchases a 
branded good, he perceives the reputation of the mark or its selling power as a sign 
of honesty, reliability and, in some cases, technical efficiency.  As time passes by, 
these priceless emotional aspects, the reputation of the mark or its selling power, 
might become the mark’s strongest component which attracts the loyalty of 
consumers.94  
 
That is why if the trade mark is to remain an economically viable tool, the protection 
of the trade mark or its selling power must always be understood and linked to the 
specifications of the branded goods in question.  Otherwise, the protection of the 
mark will enhance artificial product differentiation.  After all, producing and 
maintaining a consistent quality product is what justifies the protection of a trade 
mark.  Landes and Posner argue that trade marks reduce consumer purchasing errors 
only insofar as they denote consistent quality.95  
 
However, it has to be remembered that the trade mark does not solely function as a   
mere source of information as suggested by Landes and Posner.96 Rather, it conveys 
many other messages that might negatively influence its original role and, therefore, 
upset its economic benefits.97 These messages include creating a spurious image of 
singularity, reputation, social status or a prestigious way of life.  If the decision of the 
consumer to purchase a branded good is mainly based on the quality of the product, 
the benefits of the mark in reducing searching costs is almost guaranteed.  In this 
case, trade mark protection is less likely to increase artificial product differentiation.  
If the consumer chooses a product not only because of its quality but because of its 
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aura of luxury, as an example, the importance of the mark in reducing searching 
costs becomes less significant.98 
 
In a nutshell, trade marks may indeed perform a variety of functions.  However, the 
economic benefits of trade mark protection can only be secured if the protection of 
the mark is related to its role in enhancing the production of quality goods.  But as 
we explained before,99 a few conditions have to be established if the benefits of trade 
marks are to be guaranteed.  
4. Trade Mark Success: What are the Criteria? 
 
The economic success of a trade mark in promoting competition and reducing search 
costs depends on three factors.  Firstly, a consumer has to have a good memory to be 
able to recall the experience he associates with the mark in issue.  Secondly, marks 
should be properly protected.  Thirdly, the owner of the mark must maintain a 
consistent level of quality.100 
 
4.1 The Ability of a Consumer to Recall the Mark 
 
In order for a trade mark to facilitate a consumer’s purchasing decision, he has to 
have a good memory (an experience).  Past experience helps the consumer to predict 
the likely outcome of a current consumption choice.101 If the consumer enjoys a 
product sold under the mark, he will purchase goods sold under the same mark again.     
Purchasing the goods sold under the same mark saves the consumer time and money 
where he does not have to investigate the attributes of all products he wants to 
purchase regularly.  It could be argued that a fairly good memory is sufficient for the 
consumer to recall the mark and its associated features.  Therefore, the vast majority 
of consumers qualify for this condition.102 
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 4.2 Legal Protection 
 
The second condition for trade mark success is legal protection.103 There is a wide 
range of evidence that indicates that marks are sufficiently protected.  Under 
Directive 2008/95104 (the Directive) and Regulation 207/2009105 as well as national 
and international laws, trade marks enjoy a great deal of protection.  As to the proper 
scope of this protection, however, the law does not always provide a clear answer.106 
The Directive evidently recognises the origin function of the trade mark so that 
consumers can differentiate the product of one undertaking from those of another 
undertaking.107 The Directive also protects the mark with a reputation even where 
there is no risk of public confusion.108 A close look at case law reveals a similar 
picture.  On many occasions, the Court of Justice has increased the scope and level of 
trade mark protection.  In Davidoff v Gofkid and later on in Adidas-Salomon v 
Fitnessworld,109 the ECJ expanded the protection of the mark with a reputation in the 
case of similar and dissimilar goods and without the need to establish confusion.  In 
Arsenal Football v. Matthew Reed,110 the ECJ made it clear that a third party’s use of 
a sign which affects or is liable to affect the functions of the trade mark, in particular 
its essential function, may not be tolerated under Article 5(1) (a). 
 
These are merely a few examples which indicate that trade marks are extensively 
protected.  Expanding the scope of rights conferred on the trade mark owner has been 
one of the most significant developments of trade mark law.  For some, the act of 
expanding the scope of trade mark rights has gone too far, to the extent that it has 
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been described as ‘the death of common sense’.111 Given the increased expansion of 
the trade mark subject matter, some argue that trade mark law seems to confer ‘a 
form of quasi-copyright protection which protects traders rather than consumers’.112 
 
4.3 The Protection of the Quality Function 
 
The quality guarantee is enforced via the protection of the essential function of the 
mark, a badge of origin.  On many occasions, the Court of Justice held that the 
essential function of the mark is to guarantee to consumers the origin of the goods.113 
In Intel v CPM,114 the Advocate General pointed out that linking goods or services to 
a source of supply, whether the original producer or a commercial intermediary, is a 
significant function of a trade mark.  Interestingly, the Advocate general used the 
word significant instead of essential to describe the origin function of the mark.  This 
is important because soon after the Intel case, the ECJ expanded the scope of the 
trade mark’s essential function.  In L'Oréal v Bellure, the UK Court of Appeal 
requested clarification as to the circumstances under which the trade mark proprietor 
can rely on Article 5(1) (a) of Directive 89/104 (replaced by Directive 2008/95) to 
prevent the use of his mark when such a use does not impair the essential function of 
the mark as a badge of origin.115 In particular, the ECJ was asked to issue a 
preliminary ruling on the application of the infringement criteria set forth in Article 
5(1) (a) and (b) of the Directive.  This request was submitted in connection with the 
use of L'Oréal’s mark on a so-called comparison list used by the defendant.  The ECJ 
pointed out that a trade mark: 
functions include not only the essential function of the trade mark, which is to 
guarantee to consumers the origin of the goods or services, but also its other 
functions, in particular that of guaranteeing the quality of the goods or 
services in question and those of communication, investment or 
advertising.116(Emphasis added)  
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This is a clear recognition of the importance of the quality guarantee.  However, 
there is a structural uncertainty in the law relating to the enforcement of that 
function.  For instance, does the protection of the quality function through the origin 
one mean that the quality function is to be considered when addressing the scope of 
trade mark protection under the essential function of the mark?  Or might it mean 
that the protection of the quality function comes into play not only when the origin 
function is affected but also when it is not?  Considering the rulings of the ECJ in the 
field of parallel importation in general and in the L’Oréal v Bellure in particular, the 
latter interpretation seems more likely (the quality function should be protected 
against uses that do not necessary affect the essential function of the mark).  But 
even in the L'Oréal v Bellure, the ECJ did not explain how the quality function could 
be enforced.  The ECJ could have created more legal certainty if it had given a more 
precise guideline in its decision regarding the ways to enforce the mark’s other 
functions, in particular guaranteeing the quality.  It remains to be seen whether this 
new interpretation could open the door for granting more legal substance to the 
quality guarantee.  And it is here that the low–visibility issue of the connection 
between the form and scale of protection and what the law originally tries to protect 
come into play. 
 
To sum up, apart from the quality function, it can be argued that trade mark functions 
are sufficiently protected.  Hence, the second condition for trade mark success is also 
satisfied.  
 
 4.4 Maintaining Quality  
 
The third condition and, probably, the most important aspect of trade mark success is 
the quality function.117 In fact, some argue that the quality guarantee is (by far) much 
more important than the origin one.118 A mark that only performs the origin function 
cannot be considered a trade mark after all.  Schechter argued that ‘marks 
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designating ownership are not trade-marks at all but merely proprietary marks, which 
may or may not incidentally serve to designate the origin or the source of the goods 
to which they are affixed’.119  
 
The trade mark must convey a consistent quality message if the protection of the 
mark is to stay economically viable.120 As noted, if the effect of artificial product 
differentiation that may result from trade mark protection is to be minimised, all 
protectable components of the mark including its selling power or reputation must 
also be linked in some shape or form to the quality of the branded goods.121 This is 
not to suggest that the mark should perform solely as a quality indicator.  Rather, it is 
about highlighting the risk of protecting the reputation of the mark or its selling 
power regardless of the quality of the product to which it is affixed.  In this case, 
instead of improving the quality of branded goods and thereby fostering economic 
efficiency, traders may introduce economically irrational elements to retain the 
loyalty of consumers, which may severely undermine the economic benefits of trade 
mark protection.122 Thus:  
 
Where the reputation of a given brand-name product does not match its actual 
quality, it may lead consumers to commit “errors of commission”, that is 
purchasing the product on the basis of its inflated, or excessively favourable, 
pre-purchase assessment.123 
 
If a trade mark is to reduce consumers’ purchasing errors, its reputation must be 
equal to the actual value of the product in question.  Otherwise, the mark will 
increase rather than decrease searching costs.124 Accordingly, a trade mark is 
economically desirable only where it provides valuable information about the 
differences in quality of various products.125 The lack of quality aspects, therefore, 
would mean that the mark creates an artificial differentiation between two almost 
identical products by providing information that is either irrelevant or confusing. 
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Providing reliable, meaningful and accurate information about quality is what really 
gives trade marks a true economic purpose.126 Pugath argues: 
 
A given trademark will function as an efficient indicator of quality as long as 
its reputation is balanced by its actual value. Trademarks cannot be 
considered efficient indicators of quality when the allocation of resources 
towards ‘reputation’, such as excessive advertising, is at the expense of good 
value.127 
 
Thus, if the protection of the mark including all its intangible elements, such as its 
selling power or reputation, is not linked to the quality of the product to which it is 
attached, the protection of the mark may enhance artificial product differentiation 
and artificial partitioning of markets.  This is because it is easier for a trader to invest 
in the advertising value of the mark rather than to improve the quality of the product 
to which it is attached.  If the role of the quality function is ignored, as time passes 
by, the advertising value of the mark would almost certainly increase at the expense 
of other much more economically viable elements such as the quality of the branded 
goods.  Given the fact that enhancing economic efficiency and therefore the 
production of quality goods is what really justifies the protection of the mark, the 
protection of the quality guarantee should be the benchmark against which the 
success of the mark can be measured.   
 
After examining the scenarios in which trade mark protection is less likely to distort 
competition and the conditions that have to be established if the benefits of marks are 
to be secured, we turn our attention to the last question in this part (question four).128 
This question identifies the economic context in which trade mark protection is likely 
to distort competition. 
4.5 Trade Mark Protection in Gross: An Economic Analysis 
 
Some argue that the intangible aspects of a trade mark such as its selling power or 
reputation should be protected separately from the product to which it is attached.129     
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According to this view, the protection of the mark can be economically justified on 
grounds other than enhancing the production of quality products.  If the previous 
argument is economically sound, then it must be shown that protecting the intangible 
aspects of the trade mark benefits society and the process of competition.130 Chicago 
economists Becker, Murphy and Gleaster adhere to the view that: 
Trade marks can turn products into symbols of status even if this is not 
matched with any improvement in quality or other characteristic. Some neo-
classical analysts have argued that this capacity contributes to social welfare 
through reducing the cost of satisfying a demand for social status.131  
 
The previous argument is based on the George Stigler and Gary Becker principle, de 
gustibus non est disputandum.132 This principle means preferences are accepted at 
face value thus disagreements about matters of taste cannot be objectively resolved 
no matter what their content or origin.133 Hence, it is partially impossible to establish 
whether consumers’ preferences are wrong or whether their preferences can make 
them worse off.  The direct result of this conceptual economic possibility is that we 
are unable to define what makes a consumer better off.134 This is because it is 
difficult to question ‘observed choices as running counter to true preferences, at least 
in all practical cases, since observed choices provide the only reliable information 
about preferences: they reveal preferences’.135 This is because ‘observed choices 
define preferences and preferences define what makes the individual better off’.136 
 
 In the context of a trade mark-consumer relationship, this means that the mere 
willingness to pay a premium for branded goods means that consumers are better off 
even if they purchased a product under the persuasion of advertising, where branded 
goods are usually associated with artificial components and not with real and 
economically  valued features.137 According to this narrow interpretation, consumers 
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will be better off even if their desires have been satisfied through advertising rather 
than through improving the specifications of branded goods.  In reality however, it is 
difficult to prove that consumers can benefit from paying for the intangible attributes 
of trade marks.  A trade mark’s intangible attributes such as its selling power or 
reputation might satisfy social needs (although economically speaking those needs 
are artificial) for some customers but, at the same time, they impose negative 
pressures on others.138 The satisfaction of a customer for having a certain branded 
product that conveys social status is clearly outweighed by the dissatisfaction of 
those who are unable to have the same product.  Thus, a trade mark’s artificial 
attributes do not increase social welfare.139 The argument to protect the mark 
regardless of its role as a quality indicator fails to appreciate the economic meaning 
of benefit.  It is not healthy for social welfare to simply stimulate ‘new wants and 
then satisfy them’ since it is well-known that human ‘happiness lies in narrowing the 
gap between what we have and what we want’.140   
 
Introducing artificial elements to a consumer-trade mark relationship enables traders 
to associate trade marked goods with mental images which in return enable them to 
compete in perception advertising.  This creates three drawbacks for trade mark 
protection; as Economides puts it:  
Competition in perception advertising may result in a larger number of brands 
at equilibrium than is optimal…The tie in produces an allocative distortion… 
Resources are wasted in the effort to link desired mental images with 
advertised goods.141   
 
Therefore, from an economic point of view, if marks are to promote competition and 
reduce searching costs, the question of protection should always be linked to the 
economic value of the product in question.142 Otherwise, trade mark protection 
expands the monopoly power of the trade mark owner.143 In some extreme cases, 
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‘when the consumer buys everything which goes under the trademark, regardless of 
what product is covered by the trademark flag, at that point the trademark is turned 
into an anti-competitive weapon’.144 That is why ‘satisfaction on the basis of 
goodwill or image of the producer should never become satisfaction with the 
producer, abstract from the products’.145 Therefore the: 
 
Process of the creation of the selling power of a brand should not… be 
translated into an exclusive right for the trademark owner, but should be left 
to the pressure of the competitive forces of the marketplace.146  
 
For this reason, in its memorandum on the Creation of a Common Market, the 
Commission pointed out that there are:  
Objections to an extension of the exclusive right of the holder of a trade mark 
to protection against any other use, that takes place without a valid reason… 
Such a rule would entail that the monopoly of the legal owner would expand 
beyond the proper goal of the trade mark protection.147   
 
Considering the fact that enhancing economic efficiency and thus the production of 
quality goods is the main justification for trade mark protection, the enforcement of 
the quality function should be at the heart of the law.  Furthermore, any expansion of 
trade mark protection must be implemented within the context of differentiating 
products and services and should not be granted to the selling power of the mark or 
its reputation unless these intangible aspects are clearly linked to the specifications of 
the branded goods in question.  
 
After examining the economic role of trade mark law, our next task will be to 
investigate the legal justifications for trade mark protection. 
5. Justifications for the Legal Protection of Trade Marks  
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This part explores the legal context in which trade mark functions are protected.  The 
question of trade mark protection has been hotly debated.148 It concerns the context 
in which trade mark functions should be protected: should these functions be 
protected per se or should such a legal privilege rest on whether such a protection 
contributes to the broader economic objectives of the law itself (promoting 
competition and reducing consumer searching costs).  The debate as to the goal of 
protecting a property is not new.  Some eight hundred years ago the philosopher 
Thomas Aquinas argued that ‘positive right’ (ius positivum) can be considered fair 
and legitimate providing it contributes to general wellbeing.149 Likewise, private 
property is fair providing that it enhances the interest of the public.150 Thus, if we are 
to truly understand the policy underpinning trade mark protection, we should ‘go 
well beyond what one might call the “mere” right of property - the registered trade 
mark, or the goodwill - and the “mere” guarantee of origin’.151 As such, it involves 
balancing the ‘interests of the public in having a wide range of choice in products but 
also in not being deceived’ and, at the same time, the ‘interest of the producer or 
trader in preserving his goodwill’.152 In this thesis, we restrict our discussion to the 
role of trade mark protection in promoting competition and reducing consumer 
searching costs or what we might loosely call the ‘public interest’.  
5.1. The Subject Matter of Protection 
 
Trade mark protection should contribute to the process of competition.  This view is 
in line with the explanations the European Commission provided for the 
establishment of the European trade mark system.153 In its memorandum, the 
European Commission clarified the reasons behind the creation of a community 
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system of trade mark law and its main objectives.  The Commission made it clear 
that when determining the legal form of the law, the objectives of the EU Treaty 
must be born in mind (Replaced by the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, TFEU).154 In accordance with Article 3 (3) (ex 
Article 2) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), the Union has the task of 
promoting, inter alia, ‘sustainable development of Europe based on balanced 
economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy’. 
Article 3 also calls for the establishment of the internal Market.155 This goal was 
further emphasised by the preamble of the TFEU which calls for the abolition of 
obstacles between Member States to ‘guarantee steady expansion, balanced trade and 
fair competition.156 The protection of trade mark is said to facilitate the achievement 
of these goals by enabling consumers to differentiate the product of one undertaking 
from those of other undertakings.157 The Commission then went on to argue that:  
[T]o an economic system directed towards the needs of consumers, trade 
marks are thus indispensable. They play an important role in the public 
interest in the distribution of goods and services, and should therefore be 
given legal protection.158 
 
 The Commission came to the conclusion that the lack of a uniform system of trade 
mark protection throughout the Community would have a harmful impact on both 
traders and consumers.159 A Community trade mark system, therefore, was likely to 
have a positive impact on both the creation of a free market for goods and, at the 
same time, could ensure fair competition as required by the Treaty.160 An EU trade 
mark system would contribute substantially to the harmonious development of 
economic activities, and a continuous and balanced expansion of the standard of 
living in the Community.161 
 
                                                
154 Ibid, para 8; see the Treaty (n 152). 
155 The Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2008] C 115/13. 
156 Memorandum on the Creation of an EEC Trade Mark (n 147) para 9; see also recital 3 of the   
Treaty (n 152). 
157 Memorandum on the Creation of an EEC Trade Mark (n 147) paras 10- 12. 
158 Ibid, 13. 
159 Ibid, 17- 18. 
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Therefore, the fundamentals of a trade mark system should be implemented keeping 
the objectives of the TFEU firmly in mind.  To this end, trade mark law must serve 
all related parties, including consumers.162 Further, in order to sustain the stated 
objectives of the Treaty,163 the trade mark system must:  
[B]e based on the unitary and autonomous character of the EEC trade mark, 
and includes rules which guarantee the free movement of goods and so 
promote competition between products marketed by the owner of the trade 
mark or marketed with his agreement.164  
 
Finally, the European trade mark system must be effective and modern to 
accommodate the interests of the public and traders alike.165 Trade marks, therefore, 
can be considered one of the important tools for the achievement of the objectives of 
the Treaty.  They are considered an essential part of undistorted competition.166  
 
In a nutshell, the aim of trade mark protection is to stimulate competition between 
suppliers of goods and services to the consumer’s advantage in the Community by 
allowing competitors to highlight objectively the merits of the various comparable 
products while, at the same time, prohibiting practices which may distort 
competition, be detrimental to competitors and have an adverse effect on consumer 
choice. 
5.2 Trade Marks as Essential Elements of a System of Undistorted Competition 
 
From the preceding part,167 we concluded that trade mark protection is mainly 
intended to promote competition and thereby the interest of consumers.  The Trade 
Mark Directive 2008/95 and Regulation 207/2009 support such an interpretation.  
The preamble of the Directive provides that the goal of trade mark protection is to 
promote competition within the Union.168 Recital two of the Regulation provides that 
                                                
162 Ibid, 52, 53. 
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164 Memorandum on the Creation of an EEC Trade Mark (n 147) para 45. 
165 Ibid, 55- 56. 
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barriers to free movement of goods and services should ‘be removed and 
arrangements be instituted which ensure that competition is not distorted’.169 
 
On many occasions, the Court of Justice has held that trade mark protection enhances 
competition.170 In HAG II, the ECJ upheld the role of marks in a system of 
undistorted competition.  The ECJ pointed out: ‘with regard to trade mark rights, it 
should be observed that such rights constitute an essential element of the system of 
undistorted competition which the Treaty aims to establish and maintain’.171 The ECJ 
added that undertakings should attract and retain the loyalty of customers by the 
quality of their goods and services.172 This could only be made possible by means of 
distinctive signs which allowed them to be identified, the ECJ added. 
 
In Merz,173 the ECJ came to the same conclusion.  More importantly, the ECJ pointed 
out that traders may gain consumers’ loyalty by the quality of their goods and it is 
here where the exclusivity of trade mark rights can be justified.  The ECJ pointed out 
that: 
…trade mark rights constitute an essential element in the system of 
undistorted competition which the Treaty is intended to establish. In such a 
system, undertakings must be able to attract and retain customers by the 
quality of their products or services, which is made possible only by 
distinctive signs allowing them to be identified.174 
 
Thus, the essence of trade marks protection is to enable traders to differentiate the 
quality of their branded goods and thereby promote competition.  This goal is a key 
factor in justifying trade mark protection.  
 
Recently, the Court of Justice emphasised the need for balancing trade mark rights in 
a way that enables the mark to fulfil its essential role in the system of undistorted 
competition which the TFEU seeks to establish and maintain.175 Striking such a 
                                                
169  Regulation 207/2009(n 105). 
170 CNL-Sucal v Hag (n 166) para 13. 
171 Ibid. 
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balance however is not straightforward.  This task depends, to a great extent, on the 
protection of trade mark functions, in particular the quality guarantee.  As already 
explained, despite its role in promoting competition and reducing consumer 
searching costs, the quality function is yet to be properly protected.176 
5.3 Whose Interest should be Taken into Account when Shaping Trade Mark 
Protection: The Trader, the Consumer or Both? 
 
Trade mark law is clearly trader-centred.  Does this mean that the interest of 
consumers under the law is a secondary consideration?  The answer is no.  The 
influence of the interests of consumers on the development of trade marks is clearly 
noticeable.177 That is why the interests of consumers should be taken into account 
when considering the question of trade mark protection.  The first recital of Directive 
2008/95 (the Directive) pays special regard to the ‘Treaty establishing the European 
Community and in particular Article 95 (now Article 114 TFEU) thereof’.178 The 
introduction of Article 114 (ex Article 95) was a giant leap towards recognizing the 
interests of consumers under the Treaty.  The Commission stressed the point that the 
approximation of laws affecting the internal market must be based on a high level of 
consumer protection.  Article 114 (3) reads: 
The Commission, in its proposals envisaged in paragraph 1 concerning 
health, safety, environmental protection and consumer protection, will take as 
a base a high level of protection, taking account in particular of any new 
development based on scientific facts. Within their respective powers, the 
European Parliament and the Council will also seek to achieve this objective. 
 
Article 114, however, is not the only Article that emphasises the importance of 
recognising the interests of consumers under the TFEU.  Other legal provisions such 
as Articles 5 (1) of the TEU and 12 of the TFEU (ex Article 153 (2) EC) have major 
implications in that direction.  Article 12 reads: ‘consumer protection requirements 
shall be taken into account in defining and implementing other Union policies and 
activities’. 
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Hence, recognising the interests of consumers in general is key to achieving the 
objectives of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as stated in 
Article 3.  Recognising these interests under the Directive is a step in the correct 
direction. Indeed, the Directive is an essential part of the approximation process 
outlined in the Treaty and, therefore, should be interpreted accordingly.  The main 
objective of the harmonisation process initiated under the Treaty is to strengthen 
competition and public interest since it is understood that fragmentation might not be 
in the consumers’ best interests179 and this is particularly true in the case of the law 
of trade marks.180 Hence, the interests of both consumers and traders should be taken 
into account when shaping the scope and form of trade mark functions.  
 
6. Does the Quality Function have a Place under Trade Mark Law? 
 
Considering the importance of enforcing the quality guarantee in promoting 
competition and reducing consumer searching costs,181 a question should be raised: 
does trade mark law provide an exclusive list of functions that trade marks should or 
should not perform?  Next we examine the protection of trade mark functions under 
the law. 
6.1 Trade Mark Protection: The Law 
 
 Under Directive 2008/95 (the Directive) and Regulation 207/2009 (the Regulation), 
the definition of trade mark functions can be interpreted in different ways.  Article 2 
of the Directive (corresponding to Article 4 of the Regulation) sets out the 
fundamental criteria required for a sign to be registered by describing the mark as 
any sign capable of being represented graphically.182 Examples include, words, 
designs, letters, numerals the shape of goods or of their packaging: as long as these 
signs are capable of distinguishing the products or services of one undertaking from 
                                                
179 See in general Articles 2, 3, 5, and 26 (ex Article 14) of the TFEU (n 152). 
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those of other undertakings.183 Recital 11 of the Directive provides that a trade mark 
may perform a variety of functions.  It reads:  
…the protection afforded by the registered trade mark, the function of which 
is in particular to guarantee the trade mark as an indication of origin, is 
absolute in the case of identity between the mark and the sign and goods and 
services; whereas the protection applies also in case of similarity between the 
mark and the sign and the goods or service.184 (Emphasis added) 
 
The use of the word ‘in particular’ can be interpreted as meaning that the Directive 
does not provide an exclusive list of functions trade marks can perform.185  
 
Article 5 of the Directive (and the corresponding provisions of the Regulation) sets 
out the rights of a trade mark proprietor.186 Article 5 reads:  
1. The registered trade mark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive rights 
therein. The proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having 
his consent from using in the course of trade: 
(a) any sign which is identical with the trade mark in relation to goods or 
services which are identical with those for which the trade mark is 
registered; 
(b) Any sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the trade 
mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the 
trade mark and the sign, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part 
of the public, which includes the likelihood of association between the 
sign and the trade mark;  
2. Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall be entitled to 
prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of 
trade any sign which is identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in relation 
to goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is 
registered, where the latter has a reputation in the Member State and where 
use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental 
to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark.187 
 
Next we explain these provisions with more details. 
6.2 Trade Mark Protection under Article 5(1) of Directive 2008/95 
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Article 5(1)(a) confers on the proprietor of a trade mark the right to prevent all third 
parties from using an identical sign to the trade mark in relation to goods or services 
which are identical with those for which the trade mark is registered.  In this case, the 
protection afforded to the mark is absolute.  Under Article 5(1)(a), many factors have 
to be taken into account before establishing a successful infringement claim.  The 
mark must be used in the course of business in relation to the goods or the services in 
issue.188 Further, the conflicting marks must be identical.  The goods or services also 
must be identical. 
 
Under Article 5(1)(b),  if the sign is similar to a trade mark and is used in relation to 
goods or services which are identical or similar to those for which the mark is 
registered, the test of confusion has to be established.189 Recital 11 of the preamble 
of the Directive 2008/95 provides that the appreciation of confusion test depends on: 
… numerous elements and, in particular, on the recognition of the trade mark 
on the market, of the association which can be made with the used or 
registered sign, of the degree of similarity between the trade mark and the 
sign and between the goods or services identified. 
  
The likelihood of confusion must therefore be appreciated globally, taking into 
account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case.190  
 
It has to be recognised that the owner of a registered mark enjoys an absolute right to 
prevent competitors from using his sign. Infringement might occur regardless of the 
“knowledge, the intention or the derivation” of the infringers.191 The owner also does 
not have to establish damage on his part since he enjoys the right to establish a 
successful infringement claim although his registered mark has not been used.192 
 
As to the scope of trade mark protection under Article 5, the Commission has 
repeatedly stressed the importance of interpreting the law strictly.  Trade mark 
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protection should not unduly hamper competition. Applying a restricted approach 
when interpreting the law would be in the interests of the proprietor, who might be a 
defendant or plaintiff, his competitor and the consumer.193 
6.3 Trade Mark Protection under Article 5(2) of Directive 2008/95 
 
 Article 5(2) of Directive 2008/95 permits Member States to provide extra protection 
for marks with a reputation.194 Under this Article, the mark is protected for its 
distinctive character including its reputation.195 Under Article 5(2), preventing public 
confusion as to the source of goods might not be the first priority.  The first priority 
is to protect the goodwill of the mark.  Article 5 (2) provides protection for the 
identity of the mark.  It is intended to prevent the dilution of a trade mark’s value 
regardless of consumer harm.196 Hence, confusion is not required.  That Article is a 
clear recognition of the fact that the function of the mark with a reputation is much 
more complicated and symbolic than a mere badge of origin.197 The interpretation of 
Article 5 (2) however is not straightforward. It requires the act of trade mark use to 
take unfair advantage of, or to be detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of 
the mark.  
 
The ECJ extended the protection of Article 5(2) even in the case of similarity 
between marks attached to goods or services.  The ECJ has repeatedly stated that 
Article 5(2) must be invoked against competitors.  The ECJ held that: 
Where a Member State exercises the option provided by Art.5 (2) of the 
Directive, it must grant to the proprietors of marks with a reputation a form of 
protection in accordance with that provision.198 
 
 The ECJ justified its decision stating that Article 5(2) must cover both similar and 
dissimilar goods and services, otherwise famous marks will be treated less 
favourably in the case of similar goods than in the case of dissimilar.  
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 Some argue that the ECJ has missed the essence of anti-dilution law by expanding 
the scope of Article 5 (2).  The aim of the dilution provisions is to provide extra 
protection for reputable marks only where the test of confusion is difficult to 
establish.  Therefore, if the ECJ wants to expand the scope of Article 5(2), it should 
expand the scope of the confusion test as well.  MacCarthy argues that: 
Marks with a “reputation” do not receive “less” protection under the explicit 
language of Directive Articles 4(4) (a) and 5(2) they receive more protection. 
When the goods or services of the contesting parties are competitive or 
similar, then the traditional confusion-based rules apply to their broadest and 
most robust extent. If the mark is so strong as to have a “reputation”, then in 
cases of competitive or similar goods or services that mark should have no 
difficulty prevailing under the traditional confusion-based rule of law. There 
should be no need to switch gears and invoke the extraordinary remedy of an 
anti-dilution law.199  
 
Cornish and Llewelyn describe the attitude of the Court of Justice regarding the 
expansion of the scope of Article 5 (2) to similar goods and services as a 
‘breathtaking example of judicial lawmaking: despite the words of the provision 
being clearly (and admittedly) to the contrary’.200  
6.4 Articles 6 and 7 of Directive 2008/95: Restraining Trade Mark Rights   
 
Articles 6 and 7 of Directive 2008/95201 are the other side of the coin to Article 5. 
Both articles lay down the limits of the powers of a trade mark proprietor.  Article 6 
sets out the circumstances in which the owner of the trade mark right may not 
prohibit third parties from using the trade mark, either because they are individual 
signs or for specific uses.  For reasons of commercial policy, Article 7 prevents the 
trade mark owner from compartmentalising the intra-Community market by erecting 
barriers to the free movement of goods.202  
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Article 6 reads: 
1. The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit a third party from using, 
in the course of trade, 
(a) his own name or address; 
(b) indications concerning the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, 
geographical origin, the time of production of goods or of rendering of the service, or 
other characteristics of goods or services; 
(c) the trade mark where it is necessary to indicate the intended purposeofa product 
or service, in particular as accessories or spare parts; 
provided he uses them in accordance with honest practices in industrial or 
commercial matters 
2. The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit a third party from using, 
in the course of trade, an earlier right which only applies in a particular locality if 
that right is recognized by the laws of the Member State in question and within the 
limits of the territory in which it is recognized. 
 
Article 6  of Directive 2008/95  seeks to reconcile the fundamental interests of trade 
mark protection with those of free movement of goods and freedom to provide 
services in the Common Market in such a way that trade mark rights are able to fulfil 
their essential role in the system of undistorted competition.203 Put differently, the 
aim of Article 6 is to set up a balance between the interests of the owner of the trade 
mark right in having a monopoly and those of his competitors.204   
  
Similarly, Article 7 of Directive 89/104 (exhaustion of the rights conferred by a trade 
mark) shapes the limits of trade mark rights within the framework of the law.  
It reads: 
…The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation 
to goods which have been put on the market in the Community under that 
trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where there exist legitimate reasons for the 
proprietor to oppose further commercialisation of the goods, especially where 
the condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put on 
the market. 
 
Article 7 prohibits the holder of a trade mark from  relying upon the exclusiveness of 
the trade mark right to prohibit the marketing in a Member State of goods legally 
produced in another Member State.  Permitting such an act would be inconsistent 
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with one of the essential objects of the Treaty: establishing the single market.205 In 
BMW Nederlan BV v Ronanl Karel Deenik,206 the aim of Article 7 was thoroughly 
addressed.  The European Court of Justice held that Article 7 seeks to: 
…reconcile the fundamental interests of trade mark protection with those of 
free movement of goods and freedom to provide services in the common 
market in such a way that trade mark rights are able to fulfil their essential 
role in the system of undistorted competition which the Treaty seeks to 
establish and maintain.207 
 
Article 7, therefore, is mainly intended to reconcile the rights of the owner of a 
registered trade mark with the essential goals of the law.208 
 
Trade mark law provides general guidance as to trade mark functions and the 
interests that should be taken into account when protecting those functions.  Hence, it 
is down to the Court of Justice to explain whether the quality function should be 
protected and, if so, in which context and why.  This is addressed below.   
7. Trade Mark Functions: A Quality Perspective 
 
The final part of this chapter focuses on the enforcement of the quality guarantee 
under Article 5(1) and (2) of Directive 2008/95 209 (corresponding to Article 9 (1) 
and (2) of Regulation 207/2009).210 The goal is to identify fields of interests where 
the enforcement of the quality function raises cause for concern.  Under Article 5, the 
protection of the quality function reveals two distinctive trends.  The first is under 
Article 5(1).  This tends to favour restriction of trade mark protection to its essential 
function, a badge of origin.  Under this restricted approach, the enforcement of the 
quality function seems to be the most controversial in the field of trade marks 
exhaustion.  The second trend tends to favour the expansion of trade mark protection 
under Article 5(2).  The focus here is on expanding the scope and the level of trade 
mark protection regardless of the quality of the product to which the mark is 
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attached.  Next, we briefly explore the controversies surrounding the enforcement of 
the quality function in these two fields.   
 
7.1 The Quality Function under Article 5(1) of Directive 2008/95 
 
 Under Article 5(1) of the Directive 2008/95, the protection of the trade mark is 
restricted to its essential function, a badge of origin.211 The roots of this approach are 
not difficult to trace back.  In its Memorandum on the European Trade Mark 
Directive, the European Commission pointed out that:   
Any regulation of trade mark law depends ultimately on the functions which 
are attributed to the trade mark. Both economically as legally the function of 
the trade mark as an indication of origin is paramount… From this basic 
function of the trade mark are derived all the other functions which the trade 
mark fulfils in economic life. If the trade mark guarantees that the 
commercial origin is the same, the consumer can count on a similarity of 
composition and quality of goods bearing the trade mark; and the advertising 
value of the trade mark requires that between the trade marked goods and the 
owner of the trade mark there is a definite legal relationship.212 
 
As to the interpretation of the quality guarantee and, while emphasizing the 
importance of the quality function for consumers, the Commission did not perceive 
this function as inherently worthy of protection.  The Commission provided that: 
Although the quality function predominates in the mind of the consumers and 
the publicity function predominates in the mind of the producers, so far as the 
legal aspect is concerned the decisive criterion is the function of the mark as 
an indication of origin. Only if the proper purpose of the trade mark is 
maintained, namely to distinguish the trade marked goods from goods of 
different origin, can it fulfil its further roles as an instrument of sales 
promotion and consumer information; and only then does the trade mark right 
perform its function of protecting the proprietor against injury to the 
reputation.213  
 
The Commission called for the restriction of trade mark protection to its essential 
function (a badge of origin).  The Commission pointed out that: 
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Only if protection is confined to the traditional and generally acknowledged 
function of the trade marks as an indication of origin, will the legal position 
be compatible with the principle of the free movement of goods.214  
  
However, under this origin-oriented form of protection, the interpretation of the 
quality function varies significantly.  This variation can be clearly seen in the field of 
parallel importation where the enforcement of the quality guarantee differs 
depending on whether the act of violating the trade mark right has taken place inside 
the European Union or outside it. 
 
7.2 Different Spheres, Different Interpretations: Trade Mark Exhaustion as an 
Example  
 
 The reason why the enforcement of the quality function inside the European Union 
is different from that outside the Union is that the Court of Justice implemented the 
principle of Community exhaustion.215  
 
Inside the European internal market, the quality function is secured via the origin one 
and rarely has any independent legal significance.  This is despite the fact that the 
Court seems willing to adapt a broader view of the origin function which indicates 
not only the source of goods or services but also its quality.216 In a number of limited 
cases, the quality function is seen as inherently worthy of protection because the 
protection of the mark does contribute to the objectives of the law by enabling 
traders and consumers to differentiate the products of one undertaking from those of 
other undertakings.217 However, the enforcement of the quality function can only be 
initiated by the trade mark owner against parallel importers providing, among many 
things, that the condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been 
put on the market.  This is despite the fact that the trade mark owner himself is not 
obliged to maintain the quality of his goods.   
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By stark contrast, the quality function of the mark might be invoked against parallel 
importers even where the use of the mark does not affect its essential function.218 A 
trade mark proprietor can repel the importation of cheaper goods from outside the 
Community even where the quality of those goods is identical to those sold inside the 
EU.  Such a policy raises many serious questions about the impact of trade mark 
protection on the principle of free movement of goods hence competition.  In the 
next chapter, all these issues will be thoroughly addressed.  
 7.3 The Quality Function under Article 5(2) of Directive 2008/95 
 
A second interesting trend in relation to the interpretation of the quality function is 
identified under Article 5(2) of Directive 2008/95.  This Article permits Member 
States to extend the protection afforded to marks with a reputation.  Noticeably, even 
under this extended level of protection, the quality function seems to take a back 
seat.  The law seems to be mainly focused on the protection of the investment made 
by a trade mark proprietor rather than on the protection of the interests of all related 
parties including consumers.  Hence, unless the protection of the quality function 
directly affects the rights of the mark owner, the question of quality is not invoked.  
Put differently, consumers’ expectations as to quality issues seem to be ignored 
under Article 5(2). 
 
In Copad v Christian Dior,219 the ECJ went quite far to protect the reputation of a 
trade mark as an indication of quality.  The ECJ found that the quality of luxury 
goods results not just from their physical characteristics but also from their allure and 
prestigious image, which confer on them an aura of luxury.220 This expansion to the 
protection of marks with a reputation however might not be consistent with the 
broader policy of the law.  This is because, as we have already established, protecting 
the quality of goods derived from their prestigious image rather than from their 
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physical characteristics does not enhance competition.221 On the contrary, it could 
increase artificial product differentiation and artificial partitioning of markets.  This 
raises a question as to the extent to which the expansion of the protection of a mark 
with a reputation enhances competition and reduces consumer searching costs.  
These issues will be the topic of the third chapter. 
8. Overview  
 
This chapter shows that the enforcement of the quality guarantee is important if trade 
mark protection is to promote competition and to reduce consumer searching 
costs.222 As noted briefly before,223 the enforcement of the quality function seems to 
be particularly controversial in the field of exhaustion and in the case of protecting 
the intangible aspects of marks with a reputation.  These two areas will be dealt with 
respectively. 
 
Accordingly, the next chapter examines the enforcement of the quality function in 
the case of parallel trade.  Under this field, the Court of Justice established the 
doctrine of a trade mark subject-matter which calls for restricting the protection of 
the trade mark to its essential function, a badge of origin.224 This doctrine has 
profoundly influenced the development of the quality function under trade mark law.  
To this we shall now turn our attention. 
                                                
221 See pages, 23, 31. 
222 Pages, 20- 22, 23, 31. 
223 Page, 47. 
224 Case 16/74 Centrafarm BV v. Winthrop BV [1974] ECR 1183. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE QUALITY FUNCTION UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF 




The first chapter has focused on the importance of recognising and thus enforcing the 
quality guarantee if trade mark protection is to promote competition and reduce 
consumer searching costs.  This chapter is concerned with the factors which impact 
the recognition and thus enforcement of the quality function under Article 5(1), in 
particular the doctrine of trade mark subject-matter.  After analysing the historic 
development of this principle, this chapter, first demonstrates that the quality 
guarantee is not properly recognised under Article 5(1).  Secondly, the chapter argues 
that the interpretation of the quality function under the trade mark subject-matter 
doctrine does not fit easily with the essence of restricting the protection of the mark to 
its essential function.  This lack of harmony seems to favour traders at the expense of 
consumers.  
 
There is an unending tension between the protection of trade mark rights and the 
principle of free movement of goods under the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU).1 In order to prevent the use of these rights to artificially 
partition markets and to maintain price in the Union, the Court of Justice has 
established the doctrine of the trade mark subject-matter.  Under this doctrine, the 
Court has restricted the protection of the mark to its core function, a badge of origin.  
Accordingly, rights that constitute the trade mark subject-matter are protected even if 
such a protection restricts free movement of goods and thereby distorts competition.  
However, rights that do not fall within the boundaries of the trade mark subject-matter 
are not protected.  Examples include the quality guarantee which does not fall within 
                                                
1 For general information see H MacQueen, C Waelde, and G Laurie, Contemporary Intellectual 
Property: Law and Policy (OUP, Oxford 2008) 801; S Maniatis, D Botis, Trade marks in Europe: a 
practical jurisprudence (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2010) 622- 628; W Cornish and D 
Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights (6th edn, Sweet 
and Maxwell, London 2007) 779- 796; C Stothers, Parallel Trade in Europe: Intellectual Property, 
Competition and Regulatory Law (Hart Publishing, Oregon 2007) 1- 25, 331- 366; R Peritz, 
‘Competition Policy and its Implications for Intellectual Property Rights in the United States’ (2007) in 
S Anderman, (ed.) The Interface between Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy (CUP, 
Cambridge 2007) 160- 170. 
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the boundaries of that doctrine.  As a result, consumers’ expectations as to quality 
issues are not protected under trade mark law.2   
 
The idea of protecting the essential function of a trade mark to enable the owner of the 
trade mark right to have full control over the quality of his goods is consistent with 
the economic rationales for trade mark protection.  As noted before, providing the 
trade mark proprietor with an exclusive right over the use of his mark is important if 
the quality guarantee is to be ensured.3 The problem, however, is the lack of legal 
obligations upon the owner to exercise that quality control.  This has contributed to 
the creation of a climate of legal uncertainty.  The very absence of remedies, liabilities 
and enforceability of quality issues under trade mark law is apt to feed legitimate 
doubts over the very existence of the concept of trade mark protection as it is pictured, 
i.e. as a way of promoting competition and thus the production of quality products. 
The pros and cons of enforcing the quality function depend, to a great extent, on the 
context of its use.  For example, opposing the importation of sub-standard goods from 
outside the Union might be easy to defend.  However, keeping the essence of 
restricting the protection of the mark to its core function, opposing the importation of 
genuine branded goods from outside the Union seems very hard to justify.  It is with 
this background that we turn to the topics of this chapter.  What ought to be the proper 
scope of the trade mark subject-matter?  Should the quality guarantee be included 
within the boundaries of that doctrine?  Could the lack of quality enforcement 
contribute to the artificial partitioning of markets between Member States and to price 
maintenance? 
 
This chapter begins by investigating the rationales for establishing the trade mark 
subject-matter doctrine and the impact of this policy on the implementation of the 
quality function.  It then goes on to highlight the importance of the quality guarantee 
in the analysis of the trade mark subject-matter.  This is done in part one and two.  
The third and fourth parts investigate the enforcement of the quality guarantee under 
both the European and international dimension.  It will be argued that the Court of 
Justice has failed to put the essential function of the mark into its wider legal and 
economic contexts.  The Court has carefully crafted the principle of the essential 
                                                
2 Case 16/74 Centrafarm v. Winthrop [1974] 2 CMLR, para 21. 
3 Chapter one, 14.  
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function of the mark to ensure that, despite its protection, trade mark rights are not 
used to distort competition.  By not enforcing the quality guarantee however, the 
former goal cannot be secured unless the traders of branded goods maintain a 
consistent quality.  As discussed in chapter one, quality inconsistency increases 
searching costs and damages competition pre se and regardless of whether the failure 
to maintain quality is due to the trade mark owner’s fault or to a third party.4 In either 
case, trade mark protection enhances artificial partitioning of markets and price 
maintenance, and hence distorts competition.  Ultimately, it will be argued that it is an 
oversimplification to limit our analysis under the doctrine of the trade mark subject-
matter to the essential function of the mark, a badge of origin.  Instead, the author 
proposes that we recognize the independent nature of the guarantee function.  Thus, 
the Court of Justice should explicitly recognise the quality function of the trade mark 
when shaping the scope of trade mark protection.  
 
The disagreement concerning the enforcement of the quality guarantee becomes even 
more evident in the field of international exhaustion.  In the course of establishing the 
trade mark’s essential function, the ECJ held that trade mark protection enhances 
artificial partition of markets and price maintenance if it does not contribute to the 
establishment of the trade mark core function, a badge of origin.5 However, 
considering the ECJ ruling in Silhouette,6 it seems permissible to allow the owner of a 
trade mark right to prevent the importation of genuine goods from outside the Union 
even where the essential function of the mark is not impaired.  
 
This chapter examines the protection of the quality guarantee in relation to parallel 
trade inside and outside the Union.  The focus however is not on the exhaustion of 
trade mark rights.  Rather, the aim is to provide examples where the interpretation of 
the quality function might raise cause for concern.  While leading cases involving the 
question of trade mark exhaustion will be investigated, only issues that are directly 
related to the quality guarantee will be addressed.  
                                                
4 Ibid, 28- 33. 
5 Joined Cases C- 427, 429 & 436/93 Bristol-Myers Squibb and Others v Paranova [1996] ETMR 1, 
para 49. 
6 Case C- 355/96 Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft 
mbH [1998] 2 CMLR, 953. 
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1.1 The Principle of Free Movement of Goods 
 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides provisions for 
both the free movement of goods and the protection of trade marks.7 Article 34 (ex 
Article 28) of the Treaty lays down the grounds for the principle of free movement of 
goods by prohibiting restriction on imports between Member States.  It reads: 
‘[q]uantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having the equivalent effect 
shall be prohibited between Member States’.  
 
In Société d'Importation v Publicité, Advocate General Jacobs explained the guiding 
principle of that article. 
The question then is what test should be applied in order to determine whether 
a measure falls within the scope of Article [34]. There is one guiding principle 
which seems to provide an appropriate test: that principle is that all 
undertakings which engage in a legitimate economic activity in a Member 
State should have unfettered access to the whole of the Community market, 
unless there is a valid reason for denying them full access to a part of that 
market.8 
  
However, Article 36 (ex Article 30) of the TFEU grants some exceptions to Article 34 
where the derogation of the free movement of goods principle can be justified 
providing that such a restriction does not constitute a mean of arbitrary discrimination 
or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.  Article 36 reads:  
The provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude prohibitions or 
restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of 
public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and 
life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures 
possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of 
industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, 
however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on trade between Member States. (Emphasis added) 
 
Article 36 admits derogations from the free movement of goods only to the extent to 
which they are justified for the purpose of safeguarding rights which constitute the 
                                                
7 See Articles 34, 36 and 345 (ex Articles 28, 30 and 295) of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union [2008]	  OJ	  C 115/47; hereinafter referred to as the Treaty or the 
TFEN. 
8 Advocate General Opinion Jacobs in Case C- 412/93 Société d'Importation Edouard Leclerc- Siplec v 
TF1 Publicité SA [1995] ECR 1- 179, AG 41. 
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core function of the rights.9 The second sentence of Article 36 also imposes a 
proportionality requirement where the Member seeking to justify a discriminatory 
measure must not only show that such discrimination does not represent arbitrary 
discrimination and does not unduly restrict trade in the Union but also must show that 
such a discriminatory measure is the least restrictive way of attaining this goal.10 
Article 36 is the exception to the fundamental rule enshrined in Art.34 that goods 
should be able to move freely between Member States.  Art. 36 is to be strictly 
construed as derogation from that basic rule (free movement of goods).11  
 
On the other side of the spectrum, Article 345 (ex Article 295) of the Treaty provides 
that ‘this Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules of Member States governing the 
system of property ownership’.  Hence, in the absence of Community harmonization 
measures, Article 345 provides Members with exclusive competence over intellectual 
property protection.12 The ECJ upheld this fact.  However, in Commission v. United 
Kingdom, the ECJ made it clear that when read with Articles 34 and 36, Article 345: 
…cannot be interpreted as reserving to the national legislature, in relation to 
industrial and commercial property, the power to adopt measures which would 
adversely affect the principle of free movement of goods within the common 
market as provided for and regulated by the Treaty.13 
 
To further explain the tension between trade mark protection and the principle of free 
movement of goods, we must examine the territorial nature of trade mark rights and to 
this we now turn. 
 
1.2 The Tension between Trade Mark Protection and Free Movement of Goods 
 
Balancing the goals of trade mark protection and free movement of goods is easier 
said than done.  As explained before,14 Article 5(1) of Directive 2008/9515 (the 
                                                
9 Advocate General Opinion Sharpston in Case C- 348/04 Boehringer Ingelheim KG and Another v 
Swingward Ltd [2007] 2 CMLR 52, AG 6; see also Case 78/70 Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft 
mbH. v Metro-SB-Grossmärkte GmbH & Co. K.G. [1971] CMLR 631, para 11. 
10 Deutsche v Metro (n 9). 
11 Advocate General Opinion Boehringer Ingelheim KG and Another v Swingward Ltd. (n 9) AG 5; see 
also Case 113/80 Commission v Ireland [1982] 1 CMLR 706, para 7. 
12 For more information about this issue see S Maniatis, ‘Trade Mark Rights- a Justification Based on 
Property’ (2002) 2 IPQ 123. 
13 Case C- 30/90 Commission v. United Kingdom [1992] ECR 1- 829, para 18. 
14 Chapter one, 41- 44. 
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Directive) and Article 9 (1) (a) and (b) of Regulation 207/200916 confer on the 
proprietor exclusive rights which entitle him to prevent all third parties not having his 
consent from using his mark in certain cases.  If left completely unrestricted, the 
owner of a trade mark could, for instance, use his right under Article 5 to prohibit the 
sale of goods put on the market by him or with his consent from being marketed under 
the trade mark in another Member State.  This would negate the principle of free 
movement of goods guaranteed by Art. 34 ( ex Article 28) and would be contrary both 
to the Treaty and to the stated objective of the Directive.17 That is why Article 7(1) of 
the Directive  provides that the trade mark owner’s right to prevent use of the mark 
‘shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods which have been 
put on the market in the Community under that trade mark by the proprietor or with 
his consent’. This is known as the doctrine of Community exhaustion.  In this context, 
Articles 5 (1) and 7(1) counterbalance each other.18 Hence, once the conditions of 
Article 7(1) have been established, the protection of the mark is deemed to have been 
exhausted and the owner cannot use his exclusive right to oppose any further resale of 
goods sold under his mark in the Union.  That is: 
The proprietary rights have been used up. The owner of them has nothing left 
to deploy against further exploitation of the goods. This principle applies not 
only to patents and copyright, but to trade marks as well. So, once the rights 
holder has put protected products on the market or has consented to such 
marketing, he loses all rights to object to further exploitation. This effect is 
indefensible. The rights owner cannot override it by contract. The Member 
States cannot override it by national legislation.19 
 
However, pursuant to Article 7 (2) of the Directive, the principle of Community 
exhaustion does not apply where ‘there exist legitimate reasons for the proprietor to 
oppose further commercialisation of the goods.  Considering the interpretation of the 
Court of Justice to Article 7 (2), it is implicit that the defence of exhaustion is 
intended to apply where the essential function of the mark, a badge of origin, is 
                                                                                                                                       
15 Directive 2008/95 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks [2008] L 
299/25. 
16 Regulation 207/2009 on the Community trade mark [2009] OJ L 78/1. 
17  Directive 2008/95 provides that the Directive is intended to eliminate disparities between the trade 
mark laws of the Member States which may impede the free movement of goods and the freedom to 
provide services and distort competition within the common market. 
18 Opinion of Advocate General (n 9) AG 11. 
19 Case C- 414/99 Zino Davidoff SA v A&G Imports Ltd [2001] ETMR 67, para 32- 33. 
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affected. 20 And it is here that the interpretation of the specific subject-matter of trade 
mark rights or the core function of the right becomes significant.  If the scope of the 
trade mark subject-matter is extended beyond the need to enforce the essential 
function of the mark, the monopoly power of the mark will also expand accordingly 
and, in this case, excessive protection may distort competition.  At the same time, if 
the mark is not sufficiently protected, this would also damage competition by 
discouraging traders to invest on the quality of their braded goods which, in turn, 
minimises the economic efficiency of the market.21 Thus, it is a question of balance. 
In the next part, we examine the manner in which the Court of Justice reconciled these 
conflicting interests. 
1.3 Establishing the Subject-matter of Protection 
  
The Court of Justice repeatedly considered the fundamental question as to the point at 
which the principles of free movements of goods and freedom of competition are to 
be reconciled with the legal protection afforded to trade mark rights.  As an interpreter 
of the TFEU, the Court has been trying the balance the granted rights of a trade mark 
owner under Articles 36 and 345 (ex Articles 30- 295) and the restrictions provided 
by Article 34 (ex Article 28).  To this end, the Court considered the conditions against 
which Article 36 permits the proprietor of a registered trade mark to exercise his 
rights.  To strike the correct balance, the Court of Justice established the doctrine of 
the trade mark subject-matter under which the protection of the mark is restricted to 
its core function. 
 
At a very early stage, the Court of Justice recognised the importance of getting the 
balance right.  In Parke v. Probel the ECJ held: 
…the national character of the protection of industrial property and the 
variations between the different legislative systems on this subject are capable 
of creating obstacles both to the free movement… and to competition within 
the common market.22 
 
To ease the tension, the ECJ pointed out that harmonization of intellectual property 
regimes in the Community can be the answer.  At the time Parke Davis was settled 
                                                
20 C Stothers, ‘Who needs intellectual property? Competition law and restrictions on parallel trade 
within the European Economic’ (2005) EIPR 1- 7. 
21 Chapter one, 14. 
22 Case 24/67 Parke Davis &Co. v. Probel [1968] CMLR 47, para 2. 
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however, there was no harmonization process.23 That is why the Court of Justice 
developed a judicial solution by distinguishing between the existence of a right, which 
is protected under Article 345 of the TFEU, and the exercise of that right.  After 
heavy criticism, the Court developed the principle of the essential function of the 
mark and to this we shall turn our attention. 
 
1.4 The Essential Function of the Mark: The Early Days 
 
In this part we examine the interpretation of the essential function of the mark within 
the boundaries of the trade mark subject-matter doctrine. 
1.4.1 Centrafarm  
 
The European Court of Justice first considered the question of trade mark exhaustion 
and the essence of the trade mark subject-matter in the Community in Centrafarm v. 
Winthrop.24 The facts in this case were as follows.  The American parent of the 
Sterling Winthrop group owned a patent for a urinary infection drug in the UK and 
the Netherlands.  Sterling Winthrop held parallel patents for the drug, ‘Negram’, in 
the UK and Winthrop BV held the right in Holland.  The price of this drug was higher 
in Holland than in the UK.  Centrafarm purchased the patented drug in the UK and 
imported them into Holland without the permission of Sterling.  Centrafarm was met 
by proceedings for infringement of the Dutch patent and trade mark.  In respect of the 
case concerning the trade mark, the ECJ pointed out that under Articles 34 and 36 (ex 
Articles 28 and 30) the specific subject-matter of a trade mark guarantees:  
…that the owner of the trade mark has the exclusive right to use that trade 
mark, for the purpose of putting products protected by the trade mark into 
circulation for the first time, therefore intended to protect him against 
competitors wishing to take advantage of the status and reputation of the trade 
mark by selling products illegally bearing that mark.25 
 
 Still, in order to eliminate any risk of using trade mark rights to establish artificial 
divisions within the Common Market, the ECJ went on to clarify that the concept of 
specific subject-matter does not grant the proprietor the right to prohibit the 
                                                
23 C Seville, EU Intellectual Property Law and Policy (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2009) 321. 
24 Centrafarm v. Winthrop (n 2) para 8. 
25 Ibid. 
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importation of a product which has already been put on the market by him or with his 
consent.26 The ECJ concluded that: 
… the exercise, by the owner of a trade mark, of the right which he enjoys 
under the legislation of a Member State to prohibit the sale, in that state, of a 
product which has been marketed under the trade mark in another Member 
State by the trade-mark owner or with his consent is incompatible with the 
rules of the EEC Treaty concerning the free movement of goods within the 
Common Market.27 
 
In Hag No 1( later on overruled by Hag II), the ECJ added that Article 36 of the 
Treaty permits derogations from the fundamental principle of free movement of good 
only to the extent necessary to safeguarding the specific subject-matter of industrial 
and commercial property.28 The ECJ held that, unlike other industrial and commercial 
property, the exercise of trade mark right affects the free movement of goods between 
Member States and, in addition, it is not limited by time.  In view of that,  
 
…one cannot allow the holder of a trade mark to rely upon the exclusiveness 
of a trade mark right–which may be the consequence of the territorial 
limitation of national legislation–with a view to prohibiting the marketing in a 
Member State of goods legally produced in another Member State under an 
identical trade mark having the same origin.29 
 
 Such an exclusive right, the right to prevent the resale of goods, jeopardises one of 
the essential objectives of the Treaty, namely free movement of goods.  Within the 
boundaries of the single market, information as to the source of goods can be obtained 
via more friendly ways where the impact on the free movement of goods can be 
minimized.30  
 
1.4.2 Hoffmann -La Roche: Developing the Essential Function Principle 
 
 Hoffmann -La Roche is considered the formal birth of the principle of the essential 
function of a trade mark.31 In this case the ECJ developed the specific subject-matter 
of the trade mark including its envisaged essential function.  The facts in that case 
                                                
26 Ibid, 10. 
27 Case 15/74 Centrafarm BV and Another v Sterling Drug Inc. [1974] 2 CMLR 480, para 12. 
28 Case 192/73 Van Zuylen v. Hag [1974] ECR 731, para 1. 
29 Ibid, 2.      
30 Ibid, 14.      
31 Case 102/77 Hoffmann- La Roche and Co AG v. Centrafarm vertriebsgeselschaft Pharmazeutischer 
Erzeugnisse mb H [1978] ECR 1139. 
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were as follow.  A product, “Valium”, was marketed in Germany by Hoffmann-La 
Roche for individual buyers in packages of 20 or 50 tablets and for hospitals in 
batches of five packages containing 100 or 250 tablets.  The British subsidiary 
manufactures the same product in packages of 100 or 500 tablets at considerably 
lower prices than those obtaining in Germany.  Centrafarm imported Valium 
purchased in Great Britain in the original packages which it put up into new packages 
of 1000 tablets and marketed in Germany.  Centrafarm affixed the trade-mark of 
Hoffmann-La Roche together with a notice that the product had been marketed by 
Centrafarm.  Centrafarm also gave notice of its intention to repack the tablets into 
smaller packages intended for sale to individuals.  The ECJ was asked whether it is 
considered an infringement of the mark to deal in marked goods which have been 
repacked, re-marked or otherwise interfered with since the mark no longer indicates 
that the goods are under the control of a single undertaking. 
 
The ECJ first emphasised that trade mark protection shall not restrict trade between 
Member States.32 Then the ECJ held that after having regard to Articles 34 and 36 of 
the Treaty, the specific subject-matter, in relation to trade marks aims in particular, to:  
…guarantee the identity of the origin of the trade-marked product to the 
consumer or ultimate user, by enabling him without any possibility of 
confusion to distinguish that product from products which have another origin. 
This guarantee of origin means that the consumer or ultimate user can be 
certain that a trade-marked product which is sold to him has not been subject 
at a previous stage of marketing to interference by a third person, without the 
authorization of the proprietor of the trade-mark, such as to affect the original 
condition of the product.33 
 
According to the ECJ’s ruling, the essential function of the mark is to identify to the 
consumer or the end user the origin of goods.  This provides the consumer with an 
assurance that the original condition of the products have not been impaired.  In 
another case, when establishing the trade mark’s essential function, the European 
Court of Justice emphasised the need to take the precise scope of the right granted to 
the trade mark owner under that function.34  
 
                                                
32 Ibid, 6- 7. 
33 Ibid, 7.  
34 Case 3/78 Centrafarm BV v. American Home Products [1979] 1 CMLR 326, para 12- 14. 
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Hoffmann- La Roche and Centrafarm (discussed above) present a restricted 
interpretation to the scope of the trade mark subject-matter and thereby its essential 
function.  The essence of this restricted approach is to limit the impact of trade mark 
protection in distorting trade between Member States.  Under this approach, it is 
thought that Article 345 and the exceptions of Article 36 are reasonably balanced 
against Article 34.  For this reason, the ECJ seems reluctant to expand the scope of 
legal protection to any right that is not part of the trade mark subject-matter.35 
 
Considering the significance of providing consistent quality if trade mark protection is 
to promote competition and reduce consumer searching costs,36 it is important to 
investigate the legal status of the quality function within the boundaries of the 
essential function of the mark and to this we shall now turn. 
1.5 Why not Enforce the Quality Guarantee under the Trade Mark Subject-
matter Doctrine? 
 
The doctrine of a trade mark subject-matter deals with the interests of consumers not 
being confused as to the source of goods and services through the enforcement of the 
essential function of a trade mark, a badge of origin.  By identifying the source of 
goods or services, the mark is thought to serve a cluster of economic purposes 
including but not limited to, a guarantee of quality by preventing confusion in the 
mind of consumers.37 Thus, protecting the essential function of the mark is a way of 
assuring consumers that branded goods are produced under the same source and, 
therefore, maintain the same level of quality.38 In this context, the protection of the 
essential function can be regarded as a ‘precondition of investment’ in the mark.39 
 
When shaping the scope of the trade mark subject-matter, the Court of Justice did not 
protect the quality guarantee.  The Court distinguished between the origin and the 
quality functions yet without an adequate explanation as to why it came to that 
conclusion and how the interests of consumers as to quality issues can be protected 
                                                
35 Seville (n 23) 322. 
36 Chapter one, 28. 
37 See in general Maniatis and Botis (n 1) 622- 643. 
38 Cornish and Llewelyn (n 1) 621. 
39 M Senftlenben, ‘The Trademark Tower of Babel- Dilution Concepts in international, US and EC 
Trademark Law’ (2009) 40 IIC 46. 
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under the essential function doctrine.  What is clear however is that consumers’ 
expectations as to the quality function of the mark are not protected under trade mark 
law.  Expectations in matters of quality pertain to the law of competition and criminal 
law, in the case of the branded goods causing damage to the health of the public.40 
Accordingly, raising the expectations of consumers as to a specific and constant 
quality in the product might not be considered as an essential element of the trade 
mark right and, therefore, cannot be protected under trade mark law.41 According to 
Beier, the quality guarantee is no more than an economic function that trade mark law 
should not bother itself with.42 Beier distinguishes between the positive role of a trade 
mark, such as its essential function, a badge of origin, and its negative role, for 
instance, the rights that it gives to its proprietor to restrain the activities of other 
traders encompassed in the specific subject matter within the orthodoxy of trade mark 
law.  However, he identifies one exception where the definition of the essential 
function might be expanded, namely in the case of preventing dilution.  This is 
because such a legal act does not require confusion as to the origin of goods and 
therefore falls outside the boundaries of the essential function.43 Hence, apart from the 
protection of the mark with a reputation, it is perfectly conceivable that the right of 
the owner of a registered mark is restricted to the protection of the essential function 
of the mark, a badge of origin. 
 
Beier’s article has a profound legal impact on the enforcement of the quality function 
under trade mark law.  In Cinzano v Java, the Federal Court of Justice of Germany 
(the Bundesgerichtshof ) held that a ‘trade mark does not have any guarantee function 
in the legal sense, that is, it does not compulsorily guarantee consistent quality of the 
marked goods’.44 In Terrapin v Terranova, the Advocate General Mayras drew 
heavily on Beier’s article (discussed above) when he explained the specific subject-
matter of a mark.  According to Mayras, the function of the mark is not a ‘guarantee, 
for it does not necessarily guarantee consistency of quality of the product so marked’. 
                                                
40 F Beier, ‘Territoriality of Trademark Law and International Trade’ (1970) 1 IIC 48.  Beier 
contributed to the original proposal of the European Trade Mark Directive as an adviser to the 
Commission. 
41 Ibid, 21. 
42 Ibid, 63.  
43 Beier (n 40) 64. 
44 Case I ZR 85/71 Francesco Cinzano & Cie GmbH v Java Kaffeegeschäfte GmbH & Co. [1974] 2 
CMLR 21, para 11. 
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Rather, its function is to indicate the origin of the product.45 Hence, the exclusive 
right of use given by the legislature to the proprietor of the trade mark protects him 
only vis-à-vis confusing use of it for other products.  In addition to the trade mark 
subject-matter, namely the origin function, the mark has the so-called ‘incidental 
functions’. In that sense, it suggests a quality or a reputation.  The Advocate General 
held, citing Professor Beier, that these qualitative and publicity functions are not 
legally protected under trade mark law.  Rather, they should be protected under 
contract law, competition law and tortious liability.46 Hence, the owner of the trade 
mark right can  prevent a competitor from using an identical or similar trade mark for 
identical or similar products to create a risk of confusion as to the origin of the 
product.  This protection is also important to protect the public against confusion.47 
 
In Hoffmann- La Roche, when an argument concerns an alleged connection between 
the prohibition of the repackaging of pharmaceutical products and the requirement of 
safeguarding consumers and protecting public health, the Advocate General also 
made it clear that such a connection does not exist under trade mark law and therefore 
it cannot be used to show that that prohibition stems from the specific function of the 
trade mark.48 The Advocate General then made a reference to the ECJ ruling in 
Centrafarm v. Winthrop49 where the ECJ held that the ‘specific considerations 
underlying the protection of industrial and commercial property are distinct from the 
considerations underlying the protection of the public and any responsibilities which 
that may imply’.50 
 
In Hoffmann- La Roche, the Advocate General recognised the role of a trade mark in 
arousing the expectations of consumers as to a specific and constant quality in the 
product.  However, he made it clear that the quality function cannot be considered as 
an essential element in the trade mark right.51 Reiterating Professor Beier’s argument, 
                                                
45 Advocate General Opinion in Case C- 119/75 Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v Terranova Industrie C. A. 
Kapferer & Co. [1975] 2 CMLR 482, AG 490- 493.  
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid, 490, 491. 
48 Advocate General Opinion Capotorti in Case 102/77 Hoffmann-la Roche & Co. AG and Hoffmann-la 
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the Advocate General pointed out that the quality guarantee of the mark is not covered 
by the protection afforded by the trade mark right.  Protection against fraud in matters 
of quality pertains to the law on ‘unfair competition and to the criminal law’.52  
 
2. Relationship between the Quality and Origin Function: A Modern 
Interpretation 
 
On a few occasions, the Court of Justice addressed the interplay between the origin 
and quality function.  Next, we highlight two leading examples. 
2.1 HAG II 
 
In HAG II, the ECJ interpreted the guarantee of origin as an assurance on consistent 
quality.53 In this case, the ECJ explained the interaction between the quality and 
origin function.  As such, it involved the ECJ balancing the interests of consumers and 
traders as to quality issues within the boundaries of the specific subject-matter 
doctrine.  The facts in this case were as follows: H was a German manufacturer of 
decaffeinated coffee established in 1906.  It registered the trade mark ‘Kaffee Hag’ in 
Belgium in 1908. In 1927, H set up a wholly owned and controlled subsidiary in 
Belgium and registered the trade mark ‘Cafe Hag’ in Belgium.  In 1944 the subsidiary 
was sequestrated and later became the trading company S, retaining the trade mark.  
In 1985, S began to supply decaffeinated coffee to Germany under the ‘Hag’ trade 
mark.  H sought to impose restrictions on S alleging that S was importing coffee 
which bore an identical or confusingly similar trade mark to H’s goods.  The German 
Federal Court of Justice sought a preliminary ruling as to whether H’s restrictions 
constituted a restraint of trade contrary to Articles 28 and 30 of the Treaty of Rome. 
In the course of establishing the trade mark subject-matter, and thus the essential 
function of the mark, the Advocate General succinctly summarised the interplay 
between the origin and quality function.54  
…the relevance of the trade mark’s function as a guarantee of origin lies none 
the less in the fact that the trade mark conveys to the consumer certain 
perceptions as to the quality of the marked goods. The consumer is not 
interested in the commercial origin of goods out of idle curiosity; his interest 
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53 Case C- 10/89 S.A CNL-SUCAL NV v HAG GF AG [1990] 3 CMLR 571. 
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is based on the assumption that goods of the same origin will be of the same 
quality. That is how trade mark protection achieves its fundamental 
justification of rewarding the manufacturer who consistently produces high-
quality goods. 
 
In its judgment, the ECJ drew heavily on the settled case law.55 It emphasised the role 
of marks in the system of undistorted competition.  The ECJ stressed the importance 
of allowing traders ‘to gain consumers by the quality of their products or services’ and 
this can only be done by granting the proprietor an exclusive right to use the mark to 
distinguish articles.56   
 
By explaining the essence of the essential function of the mark, in particular the 
circumstances in which the owner of the trade mark right might exercise the rights 
conferred on him by law, the ECJ highlighted the importance of the quality function 
within the boundaries of the essential function doctrine.  The ECJ held that the 
essence of the origin function is to enable the owner of the mark full control over the 
quality of the products for which he should be held accountable. 57  
 
According to this interpretation, identifying the physical origin of the goods is not the 
goal.  The essence of identifying and thus protecting the origin function is, inter alia, 
to assure consumers that goods of the same origin will be of the same quality.  To this 
end, the owner is granted an exclusive right to use its mark.  The protection of the 
essential function therefore (identifying the origin of a product) is no more than a 
vehicle  to protect the interest of the trade mark owner, on the one hand, and to assure 
consumers about the quality of the product on the other.  
 
The ECJ however did not go any further in clarifying the legal implication of that 
liability (liability concerning the quality of products) nor did it explain whether 
traders themselves should be bound by this quality liability or it is only a legal tool 
traders can use against others who try to impair the quality (conditions) of the original 
product.  This is a very important point.  As discussed before, trade mark protection 
does not reduce consumer reaching costs unless the owner of the trade mark right 
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maintains consistent quality.58  
2.2 IHT  
 
Very similar remarks concerning the interplay between the origin and quality 
guarantee were made in IHT.59 In this case, the Ideal Standard mark was originally 
owned by the American Standard group, via its French and German subsidiaries, and 
used for sanitary ware and heating equipment.  The French subsidiary was in financial 
trouble and sold the trade mark for heating equipment only to another French 
company, Compagnie Internationale du Chauffage, which had no legal or economic 
links with American Standard.  The IHT then sought to import goods bearing the 
mark from France into Germany.  The German subsidiary objected and brought 
proceedings for infringement.  The European Court of Justice pointed out that the 
German subsidiary can prevent the goods bearing the trade mark from being imported 
into Germany.  This is because the mark is a guarantee of quality.  The ECJ held that 
the mark must offer a guarantee that all goods bearing it have been produced under 
the control of a single undertaking which is accountable for their quality.60 
 
However, when explaining the legal nature of that quality control within the 
boundaries of the essential function of the mark, the ECJ pointed out that the decisive 
factor is whether or not the trade mark owner has the possibility of control over goods 
to which the mark is attached.  The ECJ observed: 
…that the decisive factor is the possibility of control over the quality of goods, 
not the actual exercise of that control.  Accordingly, a national law allowing 
the licensor to oppose importation of the licensee’s products on grounds of 
poor quality would be precluded as contrary to Articles [34] and [36]: if the 
licensor tolerates the manufacture of poor quality products, despite having 
contractual means of preventing it, he must bear the responsibility.  Similarly 
if the manufacture of products is decentralized within a group of companies 
and the subsidiaries in each of the Member States manufacture products whose 
quality is geared to the particularities of each national market, a national law 
which enabled one subsidiary of the group to oppose the marketing in the 
territory of that State of products manufactured by an affiliated.61 The lack of 
such assurance would mean that the proprietor of the trade marked products 
can not be held accountable for their quality.62 (Emphasis added) 
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Considering the importance of maintaining consistent quality if trade mark protection 
is to promote competition and to reduce consumer searching costs, the above citation 
should raise cause for concern.  Achieving the above goals may not be always 
possible, in particular, where the owner of the mark has a symbolic rather than a true 
quality control.   Taking the legal and economic rationales of protection, establishing 
the essential function of the mark does not achieve its objectives unless the owner 
maintains consistent quality.  This is quite an important point.  If the essence of 
allowing the owner of the trade mark to oppose further circulation of goods between 
Member States is simply to provide him with a symbolic, rather than an actual, 
control over the quality of his goods, the protection of the mark may constitute 
artificial partitioning of markets and thereby distort competition.63 Further, as we have 
already discussed in Hag II, the essence of the essential function is, inter alia, to 
allow the owner of the trade mark control over the quality of his goods for which he 
should be held accountable.64 With this in mind, the trade mark owner should be 
required to exercise actual quality control. 
 
Next, we look at the enforcement of the quality guarantee under Directive 89/104. 
The purpose is to examine whether the interpretation of that function has changed and 
if so in which direction. 
3. Quality Function Enforcement under Directive 2008/95: The EU Dimension 
 
The Trade Mark Directive 2008/95 is intended to approximate the laws of Member 
States.  That is why national trade mark laws have to be assessed in the light of its 
provisions.  As secondary legislation, the Directive also has to be interpreted in the 
light of the Treaty thus the Court of Justice’s case law becomes important.65 The 
Court dealt with the question of trade mark rights and free movement of goods on 
many occasions in which the Court enforced the quality function under the 
Community exhaustion differently from that under international exhaustion.  That is 
why we will deal with these two issues separately.  We consider first the question of 
quality under the principle of Community exhaustion. 
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3.1 From Bristol-Myers to Christian Dior 
 
The question of a trade mark subject-matter was first considered under Directive 
89/104 (replaced by Directive 2008/95) in Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS).66 The ECJ 
first considered the interpretation of Article 7 of the Directive in circumstances where 
the trade mark proprietor was seeking to prevent an importer from marketing products 
which had been on the market in another Member State by that proprietor or with his 
consent but where the importer had repackaged the product and reaffixed the trade 
mark without the proprietor’s authorisation.  
 
The ECJ first addressed the interplay between Article 7 (1) and (2) of the Directive 
and Articles 28 and 30 of the Treaty of Rome (now Articles 34- 36).  The ECJ held 
that Article 7(2) and Article 36 are mainly intended to reconcile the tension between 
the fundamental interest of protecting the trade mark rights and the objectives of the 
Directive and the Treaty.67 After emphasising the role of trade marks in promoting 
competition and therefore the importance of protecting the essential function of the 
mark,68 the ECJ held that trade mark rights are not intended to allow their owners to 
‘partition national markets and thus promote the retention of price differences which 
may exist between Member States’.69 The goal of this exclusive right is not only to 
enable the trade mark owner to prevent others from using his mark but also to enable 
consumers to make informed purchasing choices on the basis of the assumption that 
goods sold under the same name will normally be of uniform quality.  Thus: 
Trade mark law seeks to protect the interests, not only of the trade mark 
proprietor, but also of the consumer. In so far as the trade mark protects the 
interests of its proprietor by enabling him to prevent competitors from taking 
unfair advantage of his commercial reputation, the exclusive rights conferred 
on the proprietor are said, in the language of the Court’s case law, to constitute 
the specific subject-matter of the trade mark. In so far as the trade mark 
protects the interests of consumers by acting as a guarantee that all goods 
bearing the mark are of the same commercial origin, that is known, in the 
Court’s terminology, as the essential function of the trade mark.  Those two 
aspects of trade mark protection are of course two sides of the same coin.70 
(Emphasised added). 
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The European Court of Justice went on to say that the use of the trade mark right by 
the owner will contribute to the artificial partitioning of the markets between Member 
State where it is shown that ‘repackaging cannot adversely affect the original 
condition of the product’ or where the ‘owner of the mark receives prior notice before 
the repackaged product is put on sale’ and where it is stated on the new packaging by 
whom the product has been repackaged.71 The ECJ also held that opposing marketing 
of repackaged goods by a third part would contribute to the partitioning of markets 
between Member States in particular: 
Where the owner has placed an identical pharmaceutical product on the 
market in several Member States in various forms of packaging, and the 
product may not, in the condition in which it has been marketed by the trade 
mark owner in one Member State, be imported and put on the market in 
another Member State by a parallel importer.72  
 
Hence, the use of the trade mark right by the owner will contribute to the artificial 
partitioning of the markets between Member States; provided, inter alia, that in the 
course of such repackaging, the guarantee of origin is not impaired and the original 
condition of the product is not adversely affected.  In other words, the prevention of 
the resale of goods is considered artificial partitioning of the market if such a 
restriction cannot be justified by the need to safeguard the essential function of the 
mark, badge of origin.73 
 
In Loendersloot v Ballantine, the European Court of Justice reaffirmed its 
interpretation of the essential function of the mark.74 In this case, the ECJ considered 
the removal of itemisation numbers which had various uses, including tracking goods 
in different Member States.  The ECJ emphasised that trade mark rights are not 
intended to allow ‘their owners to partition national markets and thus assist the 
maintenance of price differences which may exist between Member States.75 Rather, 
these rights are intended to enable the mark to perform its essential function, a badge 
of origin.76 In Christian Dior v Evora,77 the ECJ came to the same conclusion. 
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3.2 Van Doren Draws the Line:  When Trade Mark Protection Contributes to 
Artificial Partitioning of Markets between Member States 
 
Van Doren is an interesting case. 78 Despite the fact that it is not directly related to the 
question of quality, it provides a good example as to the Court’s efforts to ensure that 
trade mark rights are not used to artificially partition the markets between Member 
States. In this case, the ECJ was required to give a preliminary ruling on the 
interpretation of Art.34 and Art.36 (ex Articles 28 and 30) of the TFEU and Art.7 (2) 
of Directive 2008/95 (former Directive 89/104.  The dispute was on whether goods 
were placed on the market for the first time within or outside the Community, which 
raised the question of the burden of proving where the trade marked goods were first 
put on the market.  Under German law, exhaustion of trade mark rights must be 
proved by the third party who relies on it.  
 
The ECJ held that the requirements deriving from the protection of the free movement 
of goods enshrined in Arts 34 and 36 (ex Articles 28- 30) necessitate that the rule of 
evidence needs to be qualified.79 This must be so, the ECJ added, where that rule (the 
rule of evidence as to whether trade mark rights have been exhausted) would allow 
the ‘proprietor of the trade mark to partition national markets and thus assist the 
maintenance of price differences which may exist between Member States’.80 The 
ECJ went on to provide examples where trade mark rights might artificially partition 
markets.  This includes cases where the trade mark proprietor markets his products in 
the Community using an exclusive distribution system.  In this case:  
 
…if the third party were required to adduce evidence of the place where the 
goods were first put on the market by the trade mark proprietor or with his 
consent, the trade mark proprietor could obstruct the marketing of the goods 
purchased and prevent the third party from obtaining supplies in future from a 
member of the exclusive distribution network of the proprietor in the EEA, in 
the event that the third party was able to establish that he had obtained his 
supplies from that member. Accordingly, where a third party against whom 
proceedings have been brought succeeds in establishing that there is a real risk 
of partitioning of national markets if he himself bears the burden of proving 
that the goods were placed on the market in the EEA by the proprietor of the 
trade mark or with his consent, it is for the proprietor of the trade mark to 
establish that the products were initially placed on the market outside the EEA 
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by him or with his consent. If such evidence is adduced, it is for the third party 
to prove the consent of the trade mark proprietor to subsequent marketing of 
the products in the EEA.81 
 
Thus, unless it is very difficult to do so, the burden of proof that trade mark rights 
have been exhausted falls on the defendant.   
3.3 Where are we Now? 
 
The quality guarantee is yet to be properly recognised within the boundaries of the 
trade mark’s essential function principle.  It has been argued that due to the way 
business activities are carried in today’s market, it might not be possible to enforce 
the quality guarantee.82 In Scandecor (before the House of Lords), Lord Nicholls 
stated that consumers in general are fully aware that the management of the business 
concerning a particular mark might change regularly and, therefore, it would be 
irrational to assume quality control over goods through the registration mechanism. 
He stated:  
This approach accords with business reality and customers’ everyday 
expectations. Customers realise there is always the prospect that, unbeknown 
to them, the management of a business may change. To confine the use of a 
trade mark to the original owner of a business would be to give the concept of 
a business origin or business source an unrealistically narrow and impractical 
meaning. Of course, the new management, the new owners, may not adhere to 
the same standards as the original owner.83 
 
Lord Nicholls later added that what really guarantees the quality of goods is the 
economic interest of the proprietors of keeping the value of their goods rather than 
any legal duties to do so.  He observed:  
In relying on a trade mark consumers rely, not on any legal guarantee of 
quality, but on the proprietor of a trade mark having an economic interest in 
maintaining the value of his mark. It is normally contrary to a proprietor’s 
self-interest to allow the quality of the goods sold under his banner to 
decline.84 
 
Lord Nicholls succinctly summarised the contemporary legal view towards the 
enforcement of the quality guarantee: the expectations of consumers as to the quality 
function are not enforced under trade mark law even if maintaining a consistent level 
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of quality might be a very important part of purchasing a branded good in the first 
place.  
 
Most recently, the European Court of Justice has considered the essential function of a 
mark in Copad v Christian Dior.85 The ECJ reiterated its position in previous cases.  
It repeated the same mantra that the essential function of the mark is to guarantee the 
identity of origin of marked goods or services and the mark must offer a guarantee 
that all the goods or services bearing it have been manufactured or supplied under the 
control of a single undertaking which is responsible for their quality.86 
 
In a nutshell, the essential function of the mark is to indicate the origin of goods to 
consumer or end user.  But it does not have quality guarantee in the legal sense. 
 
4. Quality Guarantee Enforcement: A Critical Review 
 
A number of cases, most notably Hoffman-La Roche and Centrafarm are cited as a 
narrow interpretation of the doctrine of the trade mark subject-matter, a badge of 
origin.  By contrast, HAG II and IHT are cited as a modern interpretation of the 
essential function of trade mark as something that goes beyond the guarantee of 
origin.  In neither case however, the ECJ did go as far as to require traders to maintain 
consistent quality.  
 
In the next part, we explain why it is important to pay regard to the quality function 
when establishing the trade mark essential function. 
4.1 The Importance of the Quality Function in the Analysis of the Trade Mark 
Subject-Matter 
 
The question concerning the need to enforce the quality guarantee relates to the 
justification of the establishment of the trade mark subject-matter in the first place and 
whether a tension arises between the justifications for the right and, therefore, the 
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objectives of the law and the methods of protecting that right.87 As we have already 
seen, the Court of Justice restricts trade mark protection to its core function in order to 
reduce the effects of the territorial nature of the trade mark right in restricting trade 
between Member States.  In this case consumers are protected against confusion as to 
the source of goods.  Under this scenario, it is thought that the interests of both traders 
and consumers are met.  Nonetheless, an analysis of the trade mark function that 
contents itself with a reference only to the legal rationale of protection, inevitably, 
remains incomplete.  It neglects the very purpose of branding in the first place: 
differentiating the product of one undertaking from those of other undertakings.  To 
solve this problem, the economic rationale of trade mark protection must also be 
included.  As explained in chapter one, the goal of trade mark protection is to 
encourage the traders of branded goods to maintain and improve the quality of their 
goods.88 That is why the owner of a mark is given the right to put goods into 
circulation for the first time and thus to oppose infringement.  In S.A. Cnl-Sucal NV v 
Hag,89 the Advocate General pointed out that:  
Like patents, trade marks find their justification in a harmonious dovetailing 
between public and private interests. Whereas patents reward the creativity of 
the inventor and thus stimulate scientific progress, trade marks reward the 
manufacturer who consistently produces high quality goods and they thus 
stimulate economic progress. Without trade mark protection there would be 
little incentive for manufacturers to develop new products or to maintain the 
quality of existing ones. Trade marks are able to achieve that effect because 
they act as a guarantee, to the consumer, that all goods bearing a particular 
mark have been produced by, or under the control of, the same manufacturer 
and are therefore likely to be of similar quality.  
 
Hence, the essence of protecting the trade mark subject-matter is to promote 
competition and thus economic efficiency.  As discussed in chapter one however, this 
goal can only be achieved where traders maintain consistent quality.90 
 
The enforcement of the quality guarantee is related to the issue of linking the subject-
matter of protection (producing quality goods) and the goals of protection.  It also 
relates to interests that should be taken into account when protecting trade mark 
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functions.  If trader interests are at the forefront of the debate, then traders should not 
be forced to maintain the quality of their goods.  This is because it is believed that 
traders who are unable to maintain the quality of their good are likely to lose 
business.91 If on the other hand it is the interests of consumers within the Union that is 
of prime concern, then traders must maintain the quality of their branded goods 
otherwise trade mark protection increases rather than decreases consumer searching 
costs.92 As noted in the first chapter however, both interests are relevant under the 
Trade Mark Directive 2008/95 and the TFEU.93 
 
The doctrine of the trade mark subject-matter should be interpreted in a way that 
accommodates these two distinctive interests.  This is because the interests of the 
trader and consumer under the trade mark subject-matter do not always coincide.  For 
one reason or another, a trader might not be willing or able to maintain the quality of 
his branded goods.  In such a case the interests of the trader and his targeted 
consumers collide.  Thus, the question of the subject-matter eligible for protection 
concerns one of the basic notions of protection against confusion: what is in that 
should be protected under the origin function of the mark and in what context?  
 
The preceding discussion should lead us to the following question: does the protection 
of the trade mark essential function contribute to the legal and economic rationales of 
protection even where the trade mark owner himself fails to maintain the quality of his 
goods?  Considering the economic role of trade marks,94 and taking the Court case-
law into account, the enforcement of the origin function rests in the fact that the trade 
mark conveys to the consumer certain perceptions as to the quality of the branded 
goods.95 Without this quality message, it would be difficult to justify why consumers 
would be interested in identifying the source of a product in the first place. 
4.2 The Protection of the Trade Mark Subject-matter: A Simple Solution for a 
Very Complicated Problem 
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In the light of the previously discussed cases, the Court of Justice appeared to be 
saying that the proprietor of a trade mark right can use the guarantee of origin which 
implies consistent quality to stop the importation and resale of goods if the essential 
function of the mark is impaired.96 This can happen where, for instance, the packaging 
of imported goods is of poor quality or untidy since such an act might affect the origin 
function of the mark or its reputation.  If this is really what the Court intended, then it 
would appear that the act of not maintaining the quality of the branded goods set up 
by the trader will affect the essential function of the mark and inevitably competition. 
However, if the same act is committed by the owner of the trade mark right, then that 
might not have the same legal effect.  This is because the trader is not legally required 
to maintain the quality of his branded goods.   
 
In Bristol-Myers (discussed before),97 the Advocate General pointed out that 
consumers will be disadvantaged by parallel imports which have been tampered with 
before being placed on the market, because they will assume that the goods have been 
produced under the control of the trade mark owner and so possess the quality 
normally associated with that trade mark and if they do not the origin function will be 
compromised.98 However, as already noted, the ECJ came to the conclusion that 
responsibility for quality, although different from indication of origin, is not the same 
as the mark guaranteeing that the goods will be of a certain quality.99 
 
Once again, such a narrow interpretation fails to acknowledge the rationale behind 
establishing the trade mark subject-matter and, therefore, restricting the protection of 
the mark to its core function, a badge of origin.  The essence of protecting the trade 
mark is to reward traders who produce high quality products and to encourage them to 
maintain that level of quality.  In this context, the essential function of the mark is 
designed to enable the owner of the trade mark right to have full control over the 
quality of his goods for which he should be held accountable.100 The use of trade mark 
rights to oppose further commercialization of goods should be tolerated only where 
such a restriction contributes to the economic progress of the market.  This progress 
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can only be secured where the mark conveys, among many other things, a true and 
genuine quality message.  
 
Clearly, the precise legal status of the quality guarantee is difficult to pin down in the 
Court’s case law.  Nonetheless, the doctrine of the trade mark subject-matter should 
serve a distinct public interest, most notably consumer interests, which should be 
understood as distinguishable from those of the proprietor.  To this end, more 
attention should be paid to the question of quality, which leads us to the next part of 
this discussion.    
4.3 The Deficiencies of the Trade Mark Subject-matter Doctrine 
 
Despite its surface appeal, on deeper scrutiny, the principle of restricting trade mark 
protection to its essential function suffers from internal inconsistency and practical 
difficulties.  This lack of consistency is related to the failure of the Court of Justice to 
engage with the question of how exactly the quality function relates to the origin one 
or, more importantly, how it is related to the essence of trade mark protection.  The 
analysis of the relationship between the subject-matter and the purpose of protection 
yields an interesting result.  Easing the tension between trade mark protection and free 
movement of goods can only be effective where the traders of branded goods 
maintain consistent level of quality.  Otherwise, as explained in chapter one, trade 
mark protection would enhance artificial product differentiation and increase 
searching costs.101 The failure to maintain consistent quality harms competition and 
the interests of consumers regardless of whether the act of not maintaining quality is 
committed by the trade mark owner or a third party (a parallel importer).  It is not the 
trade mark rights granted under Article 5 of Directive 2008/95 and Article 345 of the 
TFEU which are questionable here.  Rather, it is the fact that the protection of the 
trade mark right is based on a cluster of economic benefits that justify the existence of 
the right itself.  Hence, these benefits must be secured if the mark is to stay a viable 
economic tool.  One cannot blamed for questioning the right of a  trade mark owner to 
oppose parallel trade to protect the original conditions of the goods given the fact that 
the owner himself is not required by law to maintain the quality of his goods. 
Providing the trader of branded goods with such a right is inconsistent with the 
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essence of establishing the trade mark subject-matter under the law and the Treaty. 
This trend to overlook the significance of protecting quality issues under trade mark 
law underestimates the economic significance of this function and, possibly, prevents 
the achievement of the essential goals of the law.  It is therefore necessary to give 
substance to the indeterminate legal status of the quality function and, in doing so, to 
keep the goals of the Directive and the rationales of identifying the trade mark 
subject-matter very much in mind.  Ultimately, the position of the Court of Justice on 
the enforcement of the quality function of the mark reveals three major drawbacks. 
 
First, the Court did not explain how the damage to competition caused by the failure 
of branded goods to maintain a consistent level of quality can be justified under trade 
mark law whether or not the reduction in quality raises health or safety concerns.  In 
other words, this approach does not explain how the damage to competition process 
can be justified if the act of reducing quality is not caught under consumer or criminal 
law. 
 
Second, as we explained before,102 trade mark protection is said to promote 
competition and to reduce consumer search costs.  The failure to maintain a consistent 
quality increases consumer search costs.103 This should not be tolerated under trade 
mark law given the fact that one of the main reasons for protecting marks is to reduce 
consumer searching costs. 
 
Finally, the Court of Justice seems eager to minimize the monopoly power of the 
trade mark owner by restricting the protection of the mark to its core function. Yet by 
not adequately emphasising the link between the quality and origin function within 
the boundaries of the trade mark subject-matter, the Court weakens the effectiveness 
of its approach.   
4.4 Should the Quality Function be Protected? 
 
In the light of the above, this part asks the following question: should the quality 
guarantee be enforced?  It will have been apparent from reading previous parts that 
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the essential function of a trade mark may indicate many things including origin as 
well as quality.104 Thus, to state that the origin function should be the only protectable 
function under the trade mark subject-matter, the statement which was once described 
by Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer of the European Court of Justice as 
‘simplistic reductionism’,105 may be to put the case too strongly.  But it is certainly 
true that it is the essential function of trade mark to indicate the origin of goods or 
services unambiguously.  
 
A much more sustainable approach can be reached which provides that trade marks 
perform much wider functions than the badge of origin.  Accordingly, the quality 
guarantee is also worthy of protection.  A trade mark makes:  
… a statement about quality, reputation and even, in certain cases, a way of 
seeing life. In this context, a distinctive sign can indicate… the quality of the 
goods it represents…I see no reason whatever not to protect those other 
functions of the trade mark and to safeguard only the function of indicating the 
trade origin of the goods and services.106  
 
 
To conclude, the Court of Justice should pay more regard to the essence of 
establishing the trade mark subject-matter, namely enhancing competition.  To this 
end, the Court may revisit its position regarding the enforcement of the quality 
function under the trade mark essential function doctrine.  The quality function should 
play a role when shaping the scope and the form of trade mark protection.   
5. The Enforcement of the Quality Function: The International Dimension 
 
 
The enforcement of the quality function under the principle of international 
exhaustion raises even more serious issues which cast doubts on the use of trade mark 
rights to restrict free movement of goods and thereby distorts competition.  In the next 
part, we explore these issues in detail. 
5.1 Overview of the Problem 
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The TFEU neither requires nor prohibits a doctrine of international exhaustion of 
trade mark rights.107 Prior to the passage of Directive 89/104 (replaced by Directive 
2008/95), it was for individual Member States to apply international exhaustion.  
Some Members such as Germany, in the case of economically connected entities, and 
the UK, in the case where the quality of imported goods was the same of those sold on 
the market in the UK, had indeed imposed international exhaustion.  At that era, it 
was held that case law under Articles 34- 36 (ex Articles 28- 30) could not be 
transposed to imports from third countries.108 The Commission’s original proposal to 
approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks also indicates that 
the Commission would have imposed international exhaustion where the trade mark 
owner would not have been permitted to prevent further commercialization of goods 
which had been marketed anywhere in the world.109  
 
It is against this backdrop that this part questions the Court of Justice’s variable legal 
tolerance to parallel trade by systematically challenging the manner in which the 
Court has enforced the essential function of the mark and arguing that the reluctance 
to oppose the international exhaustion principle lacks proper justification and is not 
consistent with the Court of Justice justifications for establishing exhaustion in the 
first place.  Next part will examine the enforcement of the quality guarantee prior to 
and after the Directive. 




The first proposed Community legislation on exhaustion reveals that exhaustion was 
directly related to the trade mark function, a badge of origin.  This principle was 
intended to prevent the use of trade mark rights as obstacles to free movement of 
goods and services in the Community.110 Originally, the position was that the owner 
of the mark does not have a right to impose a third party’s use of the mark in relation 
of goods marketed within or outside the Community.  This suggests that there was no 
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intention to differentiate between intra- and extra market sales.111 The explanatory 
Memorandum of the proposal provides that: 
 
The obligation of establishing such a system [a system of undistorted 
competition in the Common Market]… could clearly not be observed if the 
Commission were to propose rules laying down the principle that the 
proprietor of a Community trade-mark had the right to use it in order to 
compartmentalise the world market, because there was… a real danger that 
undertakings whose principal place of business could well be in a non-
Member country would prevent their products from being imported into the 




However, the Commission was considerably pressured to retain trade marks as a 
means of preventing parallel importing.113 The Economic and Social Committee 
opposed the adoption of international exhaustion particularly ‘where the marked 
goods to be imported into the Community differ in quality from goods which are 
marketed in the Community under the same marks’ or ‘where the non-member 
country bans the import of comparable goods form the Community’.114 The European 
Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs also argued against the 
adoption of international exhaustion explaining that to “adopt an attitude based purely 
on the law relating to trade marks would lead to undesirable results from the point of 
view of commercial policy”.115 The prohibition of international exhaustion was, to a 
large extent, based on ‘the concern that third countries would not reciprocate but 
would allow the owners of IP rights in those countries to block parallel imports’.116 
Subsequently, the Commission changed its position and limited the scope of 
exhaustion to goods that had been put on the market in the Community.117  
 
5.3 The Enforcement of the Quality Function 
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Prior to the adoption of Directive 2008/95, some Member States applied international 
exhaustion.  Next we consider two leading examples. 
5.3.1 Cinzano- The German Approach 
 
Before the adoption of the Directive, Germany adapted international exhaustion in 
relation to all economically connected firms.  In Cinzano (Before the First Civil 
Senate), the holder of the trade mark right in the country of import, a group of linked 
subsidiaries considered by the Court as a single group for the purpose of exhaustion of 
rights, could not oppose goods which have been sold in one Member State from being 
resold and freely traded across the frontiers.  This is because, according to the Court, 
the function of the mark is to serve as an indication of origin and it should not be used 
for the purpose of isolating the national markets and thereby impeding international 
trade.118  
 
The facts in this case were as follows.  A West German subsidiary of the Italian 
Cinzano company registered several trade marks using the word ‘Cinzano’.  The 
marks were virtually identical to the Italian company's own trade marks, also 
registered in the Federal Republic.  The West German subsidiary imported Italian 
Cinzano in bulk, bottled it and marketed it in Germany.  The bottle is associated by 
the public with Italian Cinzano.  A Spanish subsidiary of the Italian company 
imported and marketed into Hamburg bottled Cinzano vermouths, produced in Spain 
and in France under licence from the Italian company.  The Spanish and French 
Cinzano bottles bore labels very similar to those sold in Germany by the German 
subsidiary.  The West German subsidiary argued that marketing of Spanish and 
French Cinzano violated its trade mark rights and interfered with the guarantee of 
quality and origin of the mark. Subsequently, Cinzano Germany was not entitled to 
use its trade mark rights to prevent importation of Cinzano vermouth made by a 
Spanish subsidiary or the French exclusive licensee.119 It was held that: 
The extension of the so-called principle of exhaustion in trade mark law to 
matters which occur abroad, and in which no use is made, through internal 
acts of utilisation of the trade mark monopoly reserved internally, thus rests on 
the consideration that it is irrelevant for the correctness of the indication of 
origin incorporated in the trade mark whether the owner of the internal trade 
mark has brought the goods on to the market in the same country or abroad, 
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provided only—and this is decisive—that it is he himself who has marked 




As to the quality guarantee, the Court held that a trade mark owner must not be 
permitted to use the quality function to prevent resale of goods.  It pointed out:  
 
It is true that a so-called guarantee function also additionally attaches to a 
trade mark in the sense that a consistent quality is always expected under the 
same trade mark. This guarantee function, however, as the Landgericht 
explains in more detail, is not protected by trade mark law, so that the owner 
of the trade mark cannot resist the import of goods which he has marked 
identically, by invoking his right to the trade mark, even if their quality differs 
from that of the goods which he himself markets internally.121  
 
Thus, as long as the essential function of the mark, a badge of origin, is not impaired, 
the owner of the trade mark right cannot oppose further commercialization of goods 
put on the market anywhere in the world by him or with his consent.  International 
exhaustion applies even where the quality of goods sold under the mark varies.  
5.3.2 The UK Approach 
 
In the United Kingdom the enforcement of the international exhaustion principle 
depended on whether the quality of goods sold inside the UK market differs from 
those sold outside it.  
5.3.2.1 Revlon: The Same Quality Goods 
 
The principle of international exhaustion was adopted in the United Kingdom only 
where the quality of imported goods was the same as those sold inside the UK.  In 
Revlon v Cripps & Lee, after facing financial difficulties and subsequently closing 
down, a shampoo manufacturer sold part of its stocks in the US.  As a result, it could 
not prevent the importation of the shampoo into the UK.122 This is because the Court 
of Appeal found that there was no misrepresentation as to the source of the United 
States products in question on account of the fact that the United Kingdom products 
had been sold in bottles bearing the words “REVLON/ New York and therefore 
disclosed their international source.  The Court took the view that: 
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There was no misrepresentation as to the quality or composition of the United 
States products in question on account of the fact that in his opinion the 
evidence did not establish any relevant distinction between the United 
Kingdom products and the United States products in question. He thought the 
latter were merely a variant of the former for a different type of hair.123 
 
According to the Court of Appeal, the principal function of a trade mark is to serve as 
a badge of the origin of goods.  Hence, ‘the products sold by the defendants [trade 
marks owners] are what the defendants say they are’.124 The Court appeared to be 
saying that the use of registered trade marks to prevent the importation of goods 
bearing a particular trade mark where the goods were originally marketed by some 
branch of the enterprise should not be permitted.  This is particularly true where the 
quality of goods sold inside the UK was the same as those sold outside it thus the 
essential function of the mark, a badge or origin, was not impaired.  
5.3.2.2 Colgate:  Different Quality Goods 
 
In the United Kingdom, the principle of international exhaustion was not applied in 
the UK where the quality of imported goods was different from those sold inside the 
UK market.  A good example is Colgate.  In this case, the main question was the 
ability of a multi-national group, which uses the same mark and the same worldwide 
presentation to cover different qualities of goods in different countries, succeed in an 
action against an importer who brought in low quality goods from abroad and 
marketed them alongside higher quality goods in the United Kingdom.125 The facts in 
this case were as follows.  
 
Colgate-Palmolive Company (Colgate U.S.) was the parent company of a group of 
international companies engaged in the business of manufacturing and supplying 
toothpaste in over 50 countries. Colgate-Palmolive Limited (Colgate U.K.) was a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Colgate U.S.  The mark COLGATE had been used for 
many years in the United Kingdom in relation to toothpaste and dental cream which 
contained sodium monofluorophosphate and, in later stage, sodium fluoride.  The 
product was manufactured and supplied by Colgate U.K.  In addition to its main 
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brand, ‘Colgate Great Regular Flavour’, in January 1983 Colgate U.K. had introduced 
a second brand known as ‘Colgate Blue Minty Gel’.  Both brands were supplied in a 
number of sizes contained in plastic tubes except for the smallest size for which the 
tubes were made of aluminium.  Then Colgate U.K. introduced a third brand, ‘Colgate 
Tartar Control Formula’ and in July 1986 a fourth brand was introduced, ‘Colgate 
Junior’.  Colgate U.K. had incurred very large expenditure in promoting the four 
brands and sales, particularly of the first two brands, had been very large.  Colgate 
U.K.’s advertising emphasised the benefits of their toothpaste: clean teeth, fresh 
breath and protection against tooth decay.  Colgate U.K. had been the sole registered 
user of the marks and it was known, in particular when used printed in white upon red 
packaging, as a Colgate U.K. product. 
 
The Colgate subsidiary in Brazil was Colgate-Palmolive Limitada.  The latter was 
licensed by Colgate U.S. to use the various COLGATE marks in Brazil.  Limitada 
was also permitted to export COLGATE to Bolivia, Paraguay and Chile.  In addition, 
Limitada sold to Brazilian export trading companies for export to countries where 
there was no Colgate subsidiary, in particular Nigeria.  A parallel importer had 
imported into and sold and supplied in the United Kingdom two kinds of toothpaste 
manufactured by Limitada which, due to economic conditions, contained local 
Brazilian chalk rather than imported dical, and a number of other cheaper raw 
materials had been substituted for preferred constituents.  
 
In the course of establishing the trade mark essential function, the Court of Appeal 
(the Court) upheld the fact that consumers view trade marked products as a sign of 
consistent quality.  Because the quality of the Brazilian toothpastes was inferior to 
that of the toothpastes of Colgate U.K consumers are: 
likely to be misled by the get-up of the two Brazilian toothpastes into thinking 
that these toothpastes not only emanated from the same source but were of the 
same quality as Colgate’s U.K. toothpastes.126 
 
The Court of Appeal went on to clarify the fact that the public are likely to believe 
that UK Colgate has imported these products from abroad, presumably bearing the 
same mark and therefore conveying the same quality.  It held that consumers are 
aware of the fact that: 
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…COLGATE toothpaste products emanating from the same source as the 
COLGATE toothpaste products they knew of and will expect them to be 
fluoride toothpastes and of the quality they associate with the COLGATE 
toothpaste products of which they know and are familiar, e.g. those 
manufactured and marketed by Colgate U.K.127 
 
The Court continued pointing out that consumers usually understand or anticipate 
from the trade marked goods under the origin function can maintain a consistent level 
of quality by saying:  
…a trader, by applying a U.K. registered trade mark to goods and thereby 
indicating their origin, gives an assurance to consumers in this country that the 
goods are of the quality which they have come to expect from products bearing 
that trade mark.128 (Emphasis added) 
 
In other words, the origin function of the mark should be used to protect consumer 
expectations as to the quality of branded goods. 
5.4 The Post Directive 2008/95 Era: Silhouette and the End of International 
Exhaustion 
 
After the adoption of Directive 2008/95 (former Directive 89/104, a great deal of ink 
has been spilt on the pros and cons of imposing international exhaustion.  After all, 
Article 7 of the Directive is confined to products marketed inside the EEA.  Hence, in 
the case where a product is imported from outside the Union and has not yet been 
placed on the market in the EEA with the consent of the trade mark owner, Article 7 
does not provide clear guidance.129 The impact of this legal uncertainty is clearly 
evident in relation to the enforcement of the quality function where the goods placed 
on the market outside the Union.   
 
The question of importing goods into the Community that were first marketed by a 
trade mark proprietor outside the Community has been considered by the ECJ in a 
number of cases including Silhouette.130 The facts of this case were as follows. 
Silhouette sold 21,000 fashion spectacle frames to a Bulgarian company at the time 
where Bulgaria was not a Member State.  The frames were imported to Austria by 
Hartlauer where they were offered for low price.  Silhouette sought an injunction on 
the ground that it had not consented to their frames being put on the market in the 
                                                
127 Ibid, 509. 
128 Ibid, 527. 
129 Bently and Sherman (n 73) 955. 
130 Silhouette v Hartlauer (n 6). 
 86 
European Economic Area (EEA) and had therefore not exhausted its rights under 
Council Directive 89/104 (the Directive).  The problem however was that, prior to 
implementation of the Directive, Austrian law provided that a proprietor’s rights were 
exhausted when the product was put onto the market anywhere in the world.  Further, 
Hartlauer contended that Art.7 of Directive 89/104 left the door open to Member 
States to make provision for exhaustion in respect of products placed on the market 
outside the EEA.  The ECJ was asked whether Article 7 (1) of the Directive meant 
that a trade mark owner has the right to prohibit a third party from using the mark for 
goods which have been put on the market outside the Community. 
 
The ECJ held that according to the text of Article 7 (1) itself, exhaustion of trade 
mark rights occurred only where products had been put onto the market by a 
proprietor in the Community.  Article 7 (1) did not provide for international 
exhaustion of rights, nor did it leave the Member States themselves free to provide for 
international exhaustion.131 The ECJ agreed that the Directive does not appear to 
require full-scale approximation, instead it provided for harmonisation of the 
substantive rules which most directly affected the internal market.132 However, in 
light of the first, third and the ninth recitals of the Directive, Articles 5 to 7 of the 
Directive were to be construed as completely harmonising the rules relating to the 
rights conferred by a trade mark.133 
 
In Zino Davidoff SA v A&G Imports Ltd,134 the ECJ reaffirmed its position on 
exhaustion. It made it very  clear that the Community legislature ‘did not leave it open 
to the Member States to provide in their domestic law for exhaustion of the rights 
conferred by a trade mark in respect of products placed on the market in non-member 
countries’.135 In Zino Davidoff , the ECJ was asked in three references by the English 
High Court to consider the circumstances under which the manufacturer can be taken 
to have implicitly consented to further commercialization within the Community of 
goods which were put on the market in a third country.  Laddie J was particularly 
critical of the ECJ ruling in the Silhouette by saying that the ECJ judgement has 
                                                
131 Ibid, 26- 27. 
132 Ibid, 23. 
133 Ibid, 23- 26. 
134 Zino Davidoff v Imports (n 19). 
135 Ibid, 32, 33. 
 87 
‘bestowed on a trade mark owner a parasitic right to interfere with the distribution of 
goods which bears little or no relationship to the proper function of the trade mark 
right’.136 
 
Laddie J’s frustration is quite understandable.  It is difficult to justify the ECJ attitude 
concerning exhaustion.  The ECJ restricted the protection of trade mark to its essential 
function to limit the impact of trade mark rights on free movement of goods. 
However, the ECJ severely breached the essence of that principle by allowing a trade 
mark owner to oppose the resale of goods put on the market by him or with his 
consent even where the essential function of the mark is not impaired.  
5.4.1 Should a System for International Exhaustion be Introduced? A Quality 
Perspective 
 
After the adoption of Directive 89/104 ( now  Directive 2008/95), the Commission 
was asked in the European Parliament whether the Directive had been intended to 
prohibit international exhaustion and if not whether the Commission would reconsider 
its position.  The Commission’s reply was that the Directive intended to prohibit 
international exhaustion.  The Commission later added that Community exhaustion ‘is 
likely to have certain advantages for the consumers’.  In particular, ‘it can guarantee 
the sustained quality of the products moving around the internal market’.137  
 
In 1998 and when asked how far sustained quality depended on a prohibition of 
international exhaustion, on the basis that products sold by trade mark owners in the 
Community are often produced outside the Community anyway, the Commission 
noted that the quality of goods vary between countries and thus allowing 
‘international exhaustion could mean that a consumer living in the Community might 
find that a parallel importer of the product differs from that to which he is 
accustomed.138 After Silhouette (discussed above) and considering the ECJ’s 
enforcement of the trade mark’s essential function, it became very clear that the 
refusal to impose international exhaustion has very little to do with protecting 
consumers’ expectations as to the quality of branded goods.  From Hoffmann- La 
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Roche to Silhouette,139 the ECJ held that the essence of the essential function of the 
mark is to enable the owner of the mark full control over the quality of the products 
for which he should be held accountable.  By opposing parallel importation even 
where the quality of imported goods is identical to those sold in the Community (and 
thus the origin function of the mark is unlikely to be impaired), the ECJ has breached 
its own principles stating that the use of trade mark rights to repeal the importation of 
goods will contribute to artificial partitioning of markets if the essential function of 
the mark is not damaged.140 
 
In 1999, the Commission had requested National Economic Research Associates, the 
NERA institute, to examine the economic consequences for the European Union of 
alternative regimes for the exhaustion of trade mark rights.141 According to the report, 
trade marks perform two mutually dependent functions: to help the consumer to 
identify the source and quality of goods and to reward the trade mark owner for his 
investment in product development and product quality and for their expenditure in 
creating brand image.142 Limiting the scope of exhaustion to the Community is 
important if trade marks are to stay effective in helping consumers to identify the 
quality and origin of goods.143 However, the report did not explain how the prevention 
of international exhaustion would benefit consumers particularly where the imported 
goods are of the same quality as those sold in the Community.  Subsequently, 
considering the finding of the report, the Commission concluded that there was to be 
no change to the rule of Community exhaustion.  The Report was criticized for being 
biased towards brand owners.144 
 
In 2003, the Commission working paper also concluded that there was no evidence of 
deficiencies in current legal provisions relating to possible abuse of trade marks 
within the EU.145 As before however, the Commission failed to explain the benefits of 
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imposing international exhaustion where these identified function are not damaged. 
The decision not to apply international exhaustion is difficult to defend.  Some 
pointed out that the decision to use trade marks as buttresses of a “fortress Europe” 
has been a political choice.146 Obviously, consumers may lose out particularly where 
the prices of the same quality goods outside the Community are cheaper than those 
inside it.147  
 
To conclude, the decision not to apply international exhaustion does not fit easily with 
the underlying policy of the law.  Trade marks are protected to indicate the source of 
goods and services and thereby to guarantee their qualities.  As we have already seen, 
the Court of Justice repeatedly stated that trade mark rights must not be used to 
artificially partition the markets or for the sake of maintaining price maintenance.  
Keeping that in mind, a question must be raised: Considering the essence of 
protecting the essential function of the mark and therefore the main goal for 
establishing exhaustion, how can the prevention of importing genuine goods into the 
Community be justified where the essential function of the mark, a badge of origin, is 
not affected?  Is it not the case that the use of trade mark rights to prevent parallel 
importation where such an act does not affect the essential function of the mark might 
have the equivalent effect of enforcing artificial price maintenance and artificial 
partitioning of the Community markets from international markets? 
 
5.4.2 Quality Enforcement Deficiency: Competition Law as a Possible but not 
Adequate Solution 
 
The Commission’s working paper concerning possible abuses of trade mark rights 
within the EU concluded that the exercise of trade marks is restricted by competition 
law and therefore there were no deficiencies in the current legislation.148 This part will 
critically investigate this statement.  The reader must remember however that the goal 
of this discussion is not the interaction between trade mark rights and competition 
law.  Rather, the focus will be on whether there is a gap between competition law and 
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trade mark law where the lack of quality enforcement might raise cause for concern.  
In other words, this part investigates whether the lack of quality enforcement might 
result in some anti-competitive effects that are prohibited under competition law, 
being permitted under trade mark law.  To this end, the following two examples will 
be considered.  
5.4.2.1 E.M.I. v CBS  
 
It has long been accepted that the act of dividing the external market from the 
Community market could be in breach of Article 101 of the TFEU.149 In E.M.I. 
Records v CBS United Kingdom,150 the ECJ dealt with the question of whether the 
exercise of a trade mark right in order to prevent the marketing of products coming 
from a non-member country under an identical mark, even if this constitutes a 
measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction, does not affect the 
free movement of goods between Member-States and thus does not come under the 
prohibition set out in 34.  In this case, the Mark COLUMBIA for records was 
separated and given to EMI in EC countries and to CBS in the Americas.  The 
question was whether trade mark law in the United Kingdom, Denmark and the then 
West Germany could be used by EMI to prevent imports of CBS COLUMBIA 
records by a CBS subsidiary and an independent importer without violating the free 
movement of goods policy for the reason that it is stated to operate only upon trade 
between Member States.  
 
The Court of Justice first agreed that neither the rules of the TFEU on the free 
movement of goods nor those on the putting into free circulation of products coming 
from third countries prohibit the proprietor of a mark from exercising his right in 
order to prevent the importation of similar products bearing the same mark and 
coming from a third country.151 The ECJ held that preventing the marketing of 
products coming from a third country under an identical mark does not ‘affect the free 
movement of goods between member States’ because it ‘does not in fact jeopardize 
the unity of the common market which Articles [34] et seq. are intended to ensure’.152 
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However, the ECJ went on to warn that if the trade mark barrier to entry to any part of 
the Common Market was the ‘subject, the means, or the consequence of a restrictive 
practice’, Article 101 could be violated.  The European Court of Justice pointed out: 
153   
 
A restrictive agreement between traders within the Common Market and 
competitors in third countries that would bring about an isolation of the 
Common Market as a whole which, in the territory of the Community, would 
reduce the supply of products originating in third countries and similar to 
those protected by a mark within the Community, might be of such a nature as 
to affect adversely the conditions of competition within the Common 
Market.154   
 
Surely, if a restricted agreement between traders inside and outside the Union may 
reduce the supply of goods in the Union and therefore distort competition, then 
certainly the use of the trade mark origin function to prevent the importation of goods 
originating in third countries which have the same or similar quality to those sold 
inside the Union does bring about an isolation of the Common Market and thereby 
affects adversely the condition of competition.  Accordingly, such an act, which 
cannot be prevented under Article 101, must not be permitted under trade mark law.  
Otherwise, the trade mark right may be used as an obstacle to free movement of goods 
and services in the Union. 
5.4 .2.2 Javico v Yves 
 
In Javico v Yves Saint-Laurent, the ECJ dealt with the importation of ‘YSL’ from East 
Europe.155 The product had been sold there under an express condition that the 
purchaser was to resell only in Russia and the Ukraine.  The ECJ was asked whether 
Article 101(1) of the Treaty precludes a supplier established in a Member State from 
prohibiting a distributor established in another Member State to which it entrusts the 
distribution of its products in a territory outside the Community from making any 
sales in a territory other than the contractual territory, including the territory of the 
Community, either by means of direct sales or by means of re-exportation from the 
contractual territory.  The ECJ held that if the purpose or effect of the ban on supplies 
                                                
153 Ibid, 27. 
154 Ibid, 28. 
155 Case C- 306/96 Javico International and Javico AG v Yves Saint Laurent Parfums SA [1998] 5 
CMLR 172.  
 92 
which they entail is to restrict to an appreciable extent competition within the 
Common Market and if the ban may affect trade between Member States, it may be 
caught by the prohibition contained in Article 101(1) of the Treaty.156 The ECJ 
pointed out that agreements apply within the Community which are intended to 
deprive a reseller of his commercial freedom to choose his customers by requiring 
him to sell only to customers established in the contractual territory is restrictive of 
competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) of the Treaty.157 The ECJ added that 
an agreement which requires a reseller not to resell contractual products outside the 
contractual territory has as its object the exclusion of parallel imports within the 
Community and consequently restriction of competition in the Common Market 
constitutes by its very nature a restriction of competition.158 Such a contractual 
prohibition would be in breach of Article 101 where the: 
Community market in the products in question is characterised by an 
oligopolistic structure or by an appreciable difference between the prices 
charged for the contractual product within the Community and those charged 
outside the Community and where, in view of the position occupied by the 
supplier of the products at issue and the extent of the supplier's production and 
sales in the Member States, the prohibition entails a risk that it might have an 
appreciable effect on the pattern of trade between Member States such as to 
undermine attainment of the objectives of the Common Market.159 
 
Another important issue to remember is that Article 101 prohibits agreements 
between undertakings and does not apply where the act of partitioning of the markets 
or prices maintenance is committed by a single entity.160 For this, Article 102 must be 
invoked.  To breach this Article, an undertaking must, inter alia, abuse its dominant 
position.  In Bundesverband der Arzneimittel v Bayer, the ECJ allowed non-dominant 
entities unilaterally to limit the supply of their products to wholesalers within a 
Member State in order to prevent them from exporting the goods to another Member 
State.161 
 
                                                
156 Ibid, 11, 12.  
157 Ibid, 13. 
158 Ibid, 14. 
159 Ibid, 28. 
160 R Whish, Competition Law (5th edn, Lexis Nexis, London 2003) 79. 
161 Joined Cases C-2/01 P and C-3/01 P Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Importeure eV and 
Commission of the European Communities (Sweden and Another, intervening) v Bayer AG [2004] 4 
CMLR 13, para 70. 
 93 
In Parke Davis v Probel the question of abuse was raised.162 The European Court of 
Justice considered the situations under which the exercise of patent rights could be an 
abuse of dominant position. The ECJ   held that the exercise of IP rights may be 
enjoined under Article 102 when used as an instrument of abuse and where trade 
between Member States may be affected.163 In Syfait v GlaxoSmithKline, the AG 
found that the refusal by a dominant pharmaceutical company to fulfil all orders from 
wholesalers does not automatically constitute an abuse of a dominant position.164 This 
is despite the fact that such a refusal clearly limits parallel trade of the products in 
question.  According to the AG, such a restriction ‘does not protect price disparities 
which are of the undertaking’s own marking, nor does it directly impede trade’.165 
Given the special economic characteristic of the pharmaceutical industry, a 
‘requirement to supply would not necessarily promote either free movement or 
competition, and might harm the incentive for pharmaceutical undertakings to 
innovate’.166 
 
To sum up, competition law can be invoked to curb the use of a trade mark rights to 
artificially partition the markets.  However, there are still some trade mark activities 
that might have as their object the exclusion of parallel imports within the Union and 
consequently restriction of competition which cannot be prevented under competition 
law.  Examples include the use of the trade mark’s essential function to repeal parallel 
importation under the grounds of providing the owner of the mark full control over 
the quality of his goods where the trader himself does not maintain the quality of his 
goods.  Another example is where the trade mark essential function is used to prevent 
the importation of similar or identical quality goods originated in a third country into 
the Union even where the essential function of the mark is not impaired.  
6. Overview 
 
The question of how one might reconcile tensions between trade mark protection and 
free movement of goods comes down to the question of the proper interpretation of 
                                                
162 Parke v Probel (n 22). 
163 Ibid, 4; for general information about this issue see Maniatis and Botis (n 1) 792. 
164 Advocate General Opinion in Case C- 53/03 Synetairismos Farmakopoion Aitolias & Akarnanias 




the trade mark subject-matter and, more specifically to the essential function of the 
mark.  The economic rationale of identifying the trade mark subject-matter is clear.  It 
seeks, on the one hand, to prevent the use of trade mark rights to artificially 
partitioning the markets between Member States thus maintain price differentials and, 
on the other, to reward the manufacturer who consistently produces high quality 
goods and thus stimulate economic progress.  That is why the force of the quality 
function should be implemented not only against parallel importers in general but also 
against the traders themselves.  
 
Finally, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that trade mark protection is 
intended to serve traders and consumers alike.  To achieve an appropriate balance, 
one needs to look beyond the doctrine of a trade mark subject-matter.  Given the lack 
of legal justifications for not applying international exhaustion, one cannot be blamed 
for thinking that the interests of consumers as to quality issues are used as a vehicle to 
enhance the rights of the trade mark owner. 
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Chapter Three:  Quality, The Protection of Non-Origin Functions: Putting 




The previous chapter has looked at the quality guarantee under the doctrine of the 
trade mark subject-matter.  It has investigated the principle of protecting the essential 
function of the mark.1 The main goal has been to examine the visibility of the origin-
oriented module of trade mark protection to achieve the objectives of the law, namely 
promoting competition and reducing consumer search costs without the need to 
enforce the quality guarantee by law. 
 
This chapter will examine the enforcement of the quality function in the case of marks 
with a reputation.  It has long been accepted that the protection of a reputable mark 
should not be restricted to its essential function, a badge of origin.  The function of 
this mark is usually seen as something that goes far beyond the mere indication of 
origin or quality.2 In his elegant and prescient article, Schechter argued that the 
uniqueness of the trade mark should constitute ‘the only rational basis for its 
protection’.3 As such, the protection of the mark should not be limited to its use in the 
market as a product identifier.  Rather, this protection should be extended to a non- 
trade mark subject matter, such as a trade mark selling power or its reputation.  
Expanding the protection of marks with a reputation is thought to enhance 
competition and reduce consumer searching costs.4  
                                                
1 See in general A Papandreou, ‘The Economic Effect of Trademarks’ (1956) 44 California L Rev 503; 
M Leaffer, ‘Sixty Years of the Lanham Act: The Decline and Demise of Monopoly Phobia’ in H 
Hansen, (ed.) US Intellectual Property Law and Policy (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2006) 86. Leaffer 
argues that the protection of the trade mark on the property model can be understood within the 
boundaries of three dimensional changes that have taken a place recently.  That is, a new marketing 
technique, new economic learning and finally an inexorable push for international harmonization in 
global commerce, at 90.   
2 Case C- 59/08 Copad SA v Christian Dior Couture SA [2009] ETMR 40, paras 24- 26; Case C- 
487/07 L'Oréal SA v Bellure NV [2009] ETMR 55, para 58; F Schechter, ‘The Rational Basis of 
Trademark Protection’ (1927) 40 Harvard L Rev 813; Leaffer (n 1). 
3 Schechter (n 2) 831. 
4 Ibid, 813; W Landes, and R Posner, ‘Trade Mark Law: An Economic Perspective’ (1987) 30 J L and 
Economics 265- 273; Leaffer (n 1) 90; Case C- 349/95 Loendersloot v George Ballantine [1998] 
ETMR 10, para 22; Case C- 10/89 SA Cnl-Sucal v Hag, [1990] 3 CMLR 571, para 13; Case C- 427/93 
Bristol-Myer Squibb v Paranova [1996] ETMR 1, para 43; Case C- 337/95 Christian Dior SA and 
Another v. Evora BV [1998] 1 CMLR 737, para 45; C- 48/105 Adam Opel AG v Autec AG [2007] 
ETMR 33; A Breitschaft, ‘Intel, Adidas &Co-Is the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice on 
Dilution Law in Compliance with the Underlying Rationales and Fit for the Future?’ (2009) 10 EIPR 
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The trouble with the notion of protecting non-trade mark subject-matters rests on the 
justification of this protection.  That is, the dilution doctrine downplays the 
significance of confusion as a ground for trade mark liability and focuses on the need 
for the protection of the interests of a trade mark owner.5 As such, protecting 
consumers against confusion or securing their expectations regarding quality issues 
are not the main concern.  Rather, the main goal is the protection of the selling power 
of the mark.  
 
It is the purpose of this chapter to examine the extent to which maintaining consistent 
quality does impact the scope of trade mark protection under the dilution doctrine. 
Accordingly, this chapter is divided into five parts.  It begins with an examination of 
the pros and cons of preventing dilution.  This part reveals that preventing dilution is 
mainly about protecting the investment made by the trade mark owner.  To this end, 
the law protects the relationship between a mark with a reputation and a particular 
product, particularly, the way consumers perceive that reputation in the context of that 
relationship: a sign of quality.6 Thus, despite the fact that dilution is mainly about 
protecting the selling power of the mark, regard has to be paid to the question of 
quality. 
 
Parts two and three of this chapter will then look at how the present law of trade 
marks shapes the boundaries of protection by not limiting the protection of a branded 
product to its physical components thus considering the presentation of certain luxury 
goods or their aura of luxury as protectable subject matters.  This chapter then will go 
on consider Schechter’s concept of expanding the protection of the reputable mark in 
the light of the traditional grounds of trade mark protection.  The initial results reveal 
that the tradeoff between the costs and benefits of expanding the protection of the 
mark with a reputation goes far towards explaining one dynamic that has driven the 
expansion of trade mark protection.  At the heart of this dynamic is the assumption 
that the expansion of protection for the selling power of the mark or its reputation can 
be justified under the grounds that this expansion enhances competition and consumer 
                                                                                                                                       
497; S Maniatis, and A Sanders, ‘A consumer trade mark: protection based on origin and quality’ 
(1993) 15 EIPR 406. 
5 See in general F Schechter, The Historical Foundations of the Law Relating to Trade-Marks 
(Columbia University Press, New York 1925) 164- 166. 
6 Loendersloot v George Ballantine (n 4); Cnl-Sucal v Hag, (n 4); Bristol-Myer v Paranova (n 4). 
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welfare.  As such, Schechter’s concept of protection is not always sustainable.  For 
example, should the distinctiveness of the mark be protected even where such 
distinction is not based on real economic value that justifies the protection in the first 
place?  How can the expansion of protection for the selling power of the mark or its 
reputation be justified if the product sold under the mark is no different from what is 
already available in the market?  Further, the selling power of the mark can be a 
formidable anti-competitive weapon if built on the mark itself rather than on the 
product to which it is attached.  In this case, protecting the selling power of the mark 
or its reputation would enhance artificial product differentiation and distort 
competition.  When consumers become less sensitive to lower prices of other 
substitute products and buy everything that goes under the trade mark, the latter 
becomes an anti-competitive tool.  This is because consumers would be less interested 
in product differentiation.  Rather, they would be interested in the mark’s singularity 
or distinctiveness.  There is nothing wrong with consumers being attracted to the mark 
rather than to the product to which it is affixed.  However, the protection of the mark 
in this case does not enhance competition neither does it increase consumer welfare.   
Hence, expanding the protection of the mark with a reputation can only be justified 
where the selling power of the mark or its reputation leads to economic efficiency by 
differentiating, among many other things, the quality of one product from other 
substitutable products.  The need to give substance to the quality function under the 
dilution doctrine therefore goes beyond whether or not to enforce the quality function 
by law.  It concerns the policy underpinning trade mark protection in the first place.  
When shaping the scope on trade mark protection therefore, one has to consider 
carefully matters of policy including the purpose of protecting trade marks in order to 
determine whether the law should simply react to how traders brand or present their 
branded goods or whether instead the law should seek to actively influence the 
commercial behaviour of traders and more importantly how.7 
 
The final part of this chapter begins with an in-depth analysis of the potential risk of 
expanding the monopoly power of the mark if Schechter’s concept of protection is not 
properly investigated.  This part shows an increasing trend to separate the selling 
power of the mark or its reputation from the product to which it is attached.  To this 
                                                
7 A recent discussion which notes a similar question is made by G Dinwoodie, ‘Trademark Law and 
Social Norms’ (2007) <http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/documents/EJWP0207.pdf.> accessed 27 June 2010. 
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end, economically irrational elements are introduced into consumer choices.  This, in 
turn, means that the mark’s appeal to consumers is independent of the quality or the 
price of the product.  As such, the owner of the mark enjoys an excessive level of 
trade mark monopoly.  Expanding the protection of the selling power of the mark in 
this case enhances artificial product differentiation and distorts competition. 
 
The objectives of this chapter are two fold, first to highlight the fact that the selling 
power of the mark plays a key role in retaining the loyalty of consumers.  At the same 
time, it expands the monopoly power of a trade mark owner.  This can only be 
justified if the selling power of the mark is linked to the specifications of the branded 
goods.   Otherwise, the protection of the distinctiveness of the mark could distort 
competition by enhancing artificial product differentiation.  Thus, Schechter’s 
argument that the preservation of the uniqueness of a trade mark should constitute the 
only rational basis for its protection can only be justified where such uniqueness does 
contribute to economic efficiency thus the production of quality goods.  Secondly, the 
fact that the main focus of dilution is to protect the investment of a trade mark owner 
should not render the notion of protecting the interests of consumers and the way they 
perceive the mark redundant.  Protecting the selling power of the mark as suggested 
by Schechter would simply encourage traders to enhance the advertising value of the 
mark rather than improving the quality of their branded goods, which should not be 
tolerated under trade mark law. 
 1.1 The Trouble with Dilution 
 
The trouble with the doctrine of dilution is that it rests on unstated assumptions about 
how trade marks work, and, because of its assumptions, it might be granting marks 
with a reputation too much monopoly in return for too little.  Almost all aspects of 
dilution are divisive.  Examples include expanding the scope of protection for marks 
with a reputation, the protection of the intangible values of these marks, the daunting 
task of justifying such an extended level of protection in the light of the traditional 
goals of the law.  Cast as a trade mark policy, reputation protection has influenced 
expansions of trade mark law.  The most troubling of which are linked to a broad 
conception of reputation that includes artificial elements unrelated to the trade marked 
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product.8 As we progress through this chapter, the impact of such policy in distorting 
competition becomes evident. 
 
In order for a mark to qualify for extra protection, it must have a reputation.  The legal 
impact of having a reputation cannot be overstated.  The ECJ has ruled that when 
determining trade mark liability, account has to be taken of the distinctive character of 
the mark, in particular its reputation.  The greater the reputation of the mark, the wider 
the domain of protection.9 Recently, the ECJ pointed out that the more immediately 
and strongly the mark is brought to mind by the sign, the greater the likelihood that 
the current or future use of the sign is, or will constitute taking unfair advantage of the 
distinctive character or the repute of the mark.10 
 
Thus, establishing a trade mark reputation may have very significant legal 
implications.   On the one hand, the owner of a reputable mark will enjoy an extra 
level of protection under Article 5(2) of Directive 2008/95.  On the other, the burden 
of proof under Article 5(2) will loosen since, as the ECJ pointed out, the stronger the 
earlier mark’s reputation the easier it will be to accept that detriment affected without 
due cause has been caused to it.11 
 
Considering the profound impact of establishing a reputation in increasing the level of 
protection for trade marks, the following questions should be raised: when we say the 
protection of a trade mark non-subject-matter such as a reputation, what do we mean 
by that?  What does the notion of a trade mark reputation mean when it comes to trade 
mark functions?   
 
In the followings the rationales for including dilution protection in the law and the 
challenges to these rationales will be analysed as these will form the basis of several 
arguments during the further course of discussion.  
                                                
8 Copad v Christian Dior (n 2); see in general R Bone, ‘Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of 
Goodwill in Trademark Law’ (2006) 86 Boston U L Rev 592- 593, 616- 621. 
9 Case C- 39/97 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. [1999] 1 CMLR 77, paras 22- 
24. 
10 L'Oréal v Bellure (n 2) para 44; Case C- 252/07 Intel Corp Inc v CPM United Kingdom Ltd [2009] 
ETMR 13, para 67. 
11 Ibid. 
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1.2 Expanding Protection for Marks with a Reputation 
 
Not that long ago, a trade mark was considered not to be a subject of property except 
in connection with an existing business.12 As a result, the goodwill of the mark could 
only be derived from the specific goods or services to which it is attached.  As such, a 
significant function of a trade mark is to link goods or services to a source of supply.  
In this context, Article 5 (1) of Directive 2008/95 (and Article 9 (1) (a) and (b) of 
Regulation 207/2009) regulates the protection of identical or similar marks in relation 
to identical or similar goods.  This Article is seen as sufficient as a general rule. 
 
In today’s market however, some marks are thought to have a value that goes far 
beyond the product they represent.  These marks are particularly vulnerable to the 
existence of similar marks even in highly dissimilar product areas.  These marks are 
thought to perform as a powerful image of quality, exclusivity, youth, fun and luxury.  
In this case, the role of a trade mark is not necessarily associated with a specific 
product.  Rather, the mark is capable of presenting a strong marketing message in 
itself.13 Accordingly, the mark becomes the focal point of communication with 
consumers.  The aim of protecting such function is to secure a safe return to the 
investment made by the owner of the mark rather than to prevent public confusion.14 
That is why in many cases the mark itself not the product to which it is affixed 
becomes the essence of protection.  This explains why the subject-matter of dilution is 
not based on the idea of preventing confusion.  Rather, it is based on the notion of 
protecting the selling power of the mark.15  
 
The concept of dilution was first articulated by Schechter in 1927.16 Shechter 
advocated protection against injury to a trade mark owner going beyond the injury 
caused by use of an identical or similar mark in relation to identical or similar goods 
                                                
12 Hanover Star Milling Co. v Metcalf (1916) 240 US 403, 414. 
13 Advocate General Opinion E Sharpston in Case C- 252/07 Intel Corp Inc v CPM United Kingdom 
Ltd [2009] ETMR 13, AG 5- 10; see also the Advocate General Opinion R Jarabo in Case C- 206/01 
Arsenal Football Club Plc v Read [2002] ECR I-10273, AG 46, 47; Advocate General Opinion Jacob 
in Case C- 408/01 Adidas-Salomon AG and Another v Fitnessworld Trading Ltd [2004] 1 CMLR 14, 
AG 36- 39. 
14 See in general Advocate General Opinion Intel v CPM  (n 13) AG 17; M Senftlenben, ‘The 
Trademark Tower of Babel- Dilution Concepts in international , US and EC Trademark Law’ (2009) 
40 IIC 45. 
15 S Diamond, ‘Trademark Dilution: of Fame, Blurring, and Sealing Wax, with a Touch of Judicial 
Wisdom’ (2008) 24 Santa Clara Computer and High Tech L J 524. 
16 Schechter (n 2). 
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or services causing confusion as to origin.  He described the type of injury with which 
he was concerned as the ‘gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold 
upon the public mind’ of certain marks.17 Schechter believed that dilution-based 
infringement is superior to the confusion-based one and that is how he came to the 
conclusion that ‘the preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark should constitute 
the only rational basis for its protection’.18 The problem however is that the 
justifications of trade mark protection under the confusion theory might be different 
from those under the dilution doctrine.  The subject of protection under these two 
different approaches is not the same.  As noted before, under the trade mark subject-
matter doctrine, the protection of the mark is restricted to its core function, a badge of 
origin.  The goal is to enable a trade mark owner to have full control over the quality 
of the product for which he should be held accountable.19 Under the dilution doctrine, 
the protection of the mark is not restricted to its core function.  It is believed that a 
mark with a reputation is able to raise a desire for a product regardless of any 
assumption about its quality.  In this context, the role of the mark shifts from indicator 
of origin and thereby quality to become more of a marketing tool.20 As such, the 
scope of monopoly granted to a trade mark owner is much wider than that granted 
under confusion.  Next we examine the practical and legal justifications for expanding 
protection for marks with a reputation. 
1.2.1 Practical Justifications 
 
Expanding the scope of protection for marks with a reputation is usually justified on a 
number of grounds.  One of the arguments put forward is the economic deficiency of 
a registration system.  That is, protecting the reputation of the mark is understood to 
enhance the investment value of the mark and the product to which it is attached.  
Such wide scope of protection, however, cannot be maintained through the traditional 
boundaries of the registration system.  This is because it is partially impossible to 
register the mark with a reputation for all tradable goods or services.  Economically, it 
                                                
17 Ibid; see also S Casparie-Kerdel, ‘Dilution disguised: has the concept of trade mark dilution made its 
way into the laws of Europe?’(2001) 23 EIPR 186. 
18 Schechter (n 2) 831; R Bone, ‘Schechter’s Ideas in Historical Context and Dilution’s Rocky Road’ 
(2008) 24 Santa Clara Computer and High Tech L J 477. 
19 Chapter two, 15- 19. 
20 T Drescher, ‘The Transformation and Evolution of Trade Marks- from Signals to Symbols to Myth’ 
(1992) 82 TMR 301, 309- 321. 
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is not a workable scenario since the additional costs of looking after the mark will be 
unbearable. As one observer points out:  
The most famous marks are not used everywhere and cannot be registered and 
maintained in all the places and for all the categories in which infringement 
may arise. It is strange, but true, that most owners of famous marks are living 
beyond their means in the defence of their trade marks, in the sense that they 
must spend where they do not earn.21 
 
That is why it is important to expand the scope of legal protection for the mark with a 
reputation not only for similar and dissimilar goods or services but also for products it 
does or it does not seek to exploit commercially in the foreseen future.22 The problem 
with this argument, however, is that it ignores the costs of preventing other 
competitors from using the mark.  Put differently, it neglects the impact of expanding 
the protection of marks on competition by mainly focusing on the interest of the trade 
mark owner. 
 
Another argument put forward is that preventing dilution reduces consumer searching 
costs.  Dilution decreases the distinctiveness of an established trade mark.  This 
means that it takes more time and, therefore, it costs more money for the consumer to 
recognize the original mark and the products to which it is attached.  For example, 
using the same mark for multiple sorts of goods or services might ‘dilute the 
distinctive quality of the mark’.  This makes it difficult for consumers to recall the 
experience they associate with the mark.23 This, in turn, is thought to increase 
consumer searching costs. 
 
Nevertheless, persuasive empirical evidence suggests that the increase in searching 
cost in such a case is trivial and in no way justifies the economic costs of restricting 
competition that may result from the expansion of the level of legal protection 
afforded for marks with a reputation.24 Further, as we have just mentioned above, 
trade mark protection under the dilution doctrine is not necessarily related to the 
origin function.   The reputable mark is protected for its own value not for its role as a 
                                                
21 R Leheman, ‘Reputation Without Use and Household Names’ (1986) 3 Trademark World 18- 27. 
22 J Phillips, Trade Mark Law: a Practical Anatomy (OUP, Oxford 2003) 364. 
23 Schechter (n 2) 813; D Klerman, ‘Trademark Dilution, Search Costs, and Naked Licensing’ (2006) 
74 Fordham L Rev 1762. 
24 R Bone, ‘A Skeptical View of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act’ (2007) 11 IPL Bull 188- 194; 
see also R Tushnet, ‘Gone in 60 Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science’ (2008) 86 
Texas L Rev 507.  
 103 
product identifier.  That is why the notion of expanding the protection of mark with a 
reputation is still a hotly debated topic.  Recognising the difficulties of justifying the 
expansion of trade mark protection under traditional policy grounds, some have 
turned their attention to a different corner.  They simply argue that preventing dilution 
can be justified as a way of preventing competitors from taking unfair advantage of 
the seller’s goodwill.25 
 
The lack of a persuasive argument makes the concept of dilution one of the most 
troublesome aspects of contemporary trade mark law.  It simply diverts its way from 
the traditional objectives of trade mark law.26 It is very difficult to economically 
justify the cost of protecting the reputation of the mark unless there is a clear and tight 
link between the mark with a reputation and the specifications of the product to which 
it is attached.27  
1.2.2 Legal Justifications 
 
It has long been accepted that a mark with a reputation has value which transcends the 
product to which it is affixed and this value should be protected.  One can imagine 
how if ‘Dior’ was protected only in respect of perfumes, the distinctiveness of the 
mark could be eroded if it were used by others in respect of a host of unrelated 
products.28 The reputation of Dior could be also harmed if the mark was used for 
substandard cosmetic products.29 Thus, marks with a reputation have much wider 
appeal than normal marks and as such their role goes beyond the traditional 
boundaries of functionality.  As one observer stated:  
…the trademark is not merely the symbol of goodwill but often the most 
effective agent for the  creation of goodwill, imprinting upon the public mind 
an anonymous and impersonal guaranty of satisfaction, creating a desire for 
further satisfaction. The mark actually sells the goods. And, self –evidently, 
                                                
25 D Franklyn, ‘Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider 
Principle in American Trademark Law’ (2004) 56 Hastings L J 138- 143.  
26 M Lemley, & E Volokh, ‘Freedom of speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases’ (1998) 
48 Duke L Rev 216- 217.  
27 Chapter one, 26- 29. 
28 See in general I Fhima, ‘Dilution by blurring- a conceptual roadmap’ (2010) 1 IPQ 44- 87; see also I 
Fhima, ‘Dilution in the US, Europe, and beyond: international obligations and basic definitions’ (2006) 
1 JIPLP 406. 
29 This concept is quite controversial. It is a sort of implied likelihood of confusion which is totally 
different from the concept of dilution itself as a way of damaging the mark without the need to 
establish confusion; see R Nelson, ‘Unraveling the Trademark Rope: Tarnishment and its Proper Place 
in the Laws of Unfair Competition’ (2002) 42 J L and Technology 133- 136. 
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the more distinctive the mark, the more effective is its selling power…30 The 
more distinctive or unique the mark, the deeper is its impression upon the 
public consciousness, and the greater its need for protection against vitiation 
or dissociation from the particular product in connection with which it has 
been used.31  
 
Hence, some marks with a reputation have extra value which can be added to the 
products on offer.  Marks that ‘once functioned solely as signals denoting the source, 
origin, and quality of goods, have become products in their own right, valued as 
indicators of the status, preferences, and aspirations of those who use them’.32 This 
added value is termed by some observers as a ‘brand value’.33 The term ‘brand’ value 
has been defined as ‘a wider concept intended to attract consumer loyalty by virtue of 
values, including lifestyle messages, associated with that brand’.34 The mark that 
acquires brand values enjoys a very strong competitive position.  That is: 
The difference between products and brands is fundamental. A product is 
something made in a factory; a brand is something bought by a consumer. A 
product can be copied by a competitor; a brand is unique. A product can be 
quickly outdated; a successful brand is timeless.35 
 
Marks with a reputation (brands) therefore are understood to have a quality of 
‘transferability’, in a sense ‘they have the ability to transfer consumer loyalty between 
products, services and categories over time and to separate it from tangible 
production’.36 This, in turn, means that those brands, marks with a reputation, are 
often deemed to have something more than trade marks as they are usually defined.37 
According to one observer, ‘a useful way to conceptualise a brand is as an 
aggregation of assets which includes, but is not limited to a trade mark’.38 In that 
sense, a brand can be: 
                                                
30 Schechter (n 2) 819. 
31 Ibid, 825. 
32 J Kozinski, ‘Trademarks Unplugged’ (1993) 68 New York U L Rev 965. 
33 J Davis, ‘Between a sign and a brand: mapping the boundaries of a registered trade mark in European 
Union trade mark law’ in L Bently, J Davis and J Ginsburg, (eds) Trade Marks and Brands, an 
Interdisciplinary Critique (CUP, Cambridge 2008) 80. 
34 R Sumroy, and C Badger, ‘Infringing “Use in the Course of Trade”’ in J Phillips, and I Simon, (eds) 
Trade Marks Use (OUP, Oxford 2005) 164; H Norman, ‘Time to blow the Whistle on Trade Mark Use’ 
(2004) 1 IPQ 1.  
35 S King cited in D Haigh, Brand Valuation: Understanding, Exploiting and Communicating Brand 
Values (Financial Times, London 1998) 8. 
36 D Haigh, Brand Valuation: Understanding, Exploiting and Communicating Brand Values (Financial 
Times, London 1998) 1. 
37 Davis (n 33) 81. 
38 G Smith, Trade Mark Valuation (Wiley & Songs, New York 1997) 42. 
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A combination of legal rights, together with the culture, people, and programs 
of an organization within which the specific logo and associated visual 
elements plus the larger bundle of visual and marketing intangibles’ and the 
‘associated goodwill are deployed.39 
 
The notion of protecting the intangible values of a mark raises serious issues, in 
particular, the legal impact of granting a broad scope of monopoly on competition.   
Preventing dilution of a trade mark reputation is much more difficult to reconcile with 
the economic rationales for protection discussed before.  This issue is examined 
below.  
1.3 The Costs of Expanding Protection for Marks with a Reputation 
 
Article 5 (2) of Directive 2008/95 grants the owner of a reputable mark some kind of 
extra protection.  This additional protection provides a trade mark owner more 
monopoly on the exploitation of its mark.40 In some cases, the impact of such a 
monopoly in restraining competition becomes very evident.  Examples include the 
case where the goods marketed by the proprietor and his competition are not similar,41 
or where the proprietor’s mark contains descriptive words.42 Providing extra 
protection for a mark with a reputation may also impose extra cost on small 
businesses which, in comparison with big companies, might either not be able to 
promote their marks to gain reputation or they might struggle to submit sufficient 
evidence for an existing reputation such as expensive consumer surveys.43 But 
perhaps the most troubling question is how to justify the protection of the mark’s 
selling power or its reputation in gross or where linked to artificial components of the 
product. 
 
On the one hand, as we discussed before, trade mark protection is usually justified 
under the ground of protecting competition thus the production of quality goods.44 On 
the other, the protection of the distinctive character of the mark or its reputation is not 
                                                
39 D Haigh, and J Knowles, ‘Don’t waste time with brand valuation’ Marketing NPV (2004) 
<www.brandfinance.com.> accessed 20 June 2010. 
40 Senftleben (n 14) 47- 48.  
41 E Hunt, and L Kemp, ‘Three Challenges for the ECJ’ (2008) 179 Managing Intellectual Property 
115. 
42 R Kunstadt, ‘Trade marks: not just for the rich and famous’ (2008) 3	  JIPLP 454- 455. 
43 Ibid, 453- 454. 
44 Chapter one, 14, 20- 22. 
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necessarily related to the association consumers make between the quality of goods 
sold under the proprietor’s mark but to the mark’s singularity.  The lack of quality 
factor would mean that the expansion of protection for the selling power of the mark 
is used as a tool to hammer any potential competitor and yet without providing real 
economic benefits in return.45 In such a case, the protection of a trade mark reputation 
would actually enhance artificial product differentiation.  The act of preventing 
dilution is not carried out in accordance with the traditional boundaries of protection 
since it imposes liability upon other competitors without any requirement of 
confusion.46 This makes it very difficult to economically justify the protection of a 
trade mark reputation.  Thus, the significance of understanding how reputable marks 
should act if the law is to achieve its object cannot be overstated.  Only then one 
might be able to specify the extent to which reputable marks should be protected and 
in which context.  If left unchecked, the protection of marks under dilution might have 
anti-competitive effects.  
2. Dilution: the Framework of the Law 
 
After giving an overview of the rationales of dilution protection, in this part we 
investigate the Court of Justice Jurisprudence concerning dilution law.   According to 
recital 10 of the preamble of Directive 2008/95, a Member States may grant more 
extensive protection to trade marks which have a reputation.  In similar terms, Article 
5 (2) (and Article 9(1) (c) of Regulation 207/2009) allows Member States to give the 
owner of a reputable trade mark some kind of extra protection.  For the benefit of 
trade marks with a reputation, Article 5 (2) establishes a form of protection whose 
implementation does not require the existence of a likelihood of confusion and applies 
to situations in which the specific condition of the protection consists of a use of the 
sign in question without due cause which takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental 
to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark.47 In order for that to work, 
a mark, inter alia, must have: 
• a reputation in the Member State; and 
• the use of the opponent’s sign is detrimental to the distinctive character; 
                                                
45 Ibid, 26- 29. 
46 L'Oréal v Bellure (n 2) H8; Case C- 292/00 Davidoff v. Gofkid, [2003] 1 CMLR 35, H6- 10; Bone (n 
8) 547- 558. 
47 Case C- 102/07 Adidas AG v Marca Mode CV [2008] ETMR 44, para 40. 
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•  or the reputation of the trade mark  
• without due cause. 
 
In explaining the implications of these acts, we will explore the nature of the 
protection enjoyed by a trade mark by virtue of its reputation.  The goal is to 
investigate whether trade mark law is moving towards granting marks with a 
reputation a great monopoly and, if so, the impact of this extensive level of protection 
on competition.  
 
2.1 Motors Corporation v. Yplon:  Establishing Reputation 
 
For a mark to fall under the scope of Article 5 (2) of Directive 2008/95, it must have a 
reputation in the Union.  In General Motors v Yplon, the European Court of Justice 
had a chance to clarify this term.48 In this case the General Motors Corporation, the 
owner of the registered Benelux trade mark ‘Chevy’, brought legal proceedings 
against the use of its mark by the Yplon, who had also obtained a registered Benelux 
trade mark for ‘Chevy’, but for a different group of goods.  General Motors argued 
that dilution of its mark was caused by Yplon’s use of the Chevy mark.  Yplon 
defended its position by questioning the reputation of General Motors trade mark 
within the Benelux countries.  As a result, the ECJ was asked to provide guidance on 
the interpretation of reputation within Article 5 (2). 
 
The ECJ held that a mark ‘would have a reputation where it was know by a significant 
part of the public concerned by the products or services covered by the trade mark.49 
This should be assessed by considering all the relevant facts of each case, in particular 
the market share held by the trade mark, the intensity, geographical extent and 
duration of its use and the size of the investment made by the proprietor in promoting 
it.50 In the terms of Article 5 (2) of the Directive, the trade mark is not required to 
have a reputation throughout the territory of a Member State and it is sufficient for it 
to exist in a substantial part of it.51 Then the ECJ observed that  when examining the 
                                                
48 Case C- 375/97 General Motors Corp v Yplon SA [1999] ETMR 950. 
49 Ibid, 26- 27. 
50 Id. 
51 Ibid, 28. 
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other conditions laid down in Article 5 (2), it should be observed that the ‘stronger the 
earlier mark’s distinctive character and reputation the easier it will be to accept that 
detriment has been caused to it’.52 Put differently, establishing a strong trade mark 
reputation not only will enable a trade mark owner to have more protection for its 
mark under Article 5 (2) but also it will make it easier for him to establish the 
conditions laid down by this Article.  
2.2 Adidas-Salomon v Fitnessworld and Beyond: Type of Association 
 
What kind of similarity between the proprietor’s mark and the opponent’s sign is 
necessary to justify a dilution action?  In Adidas-Salomon v Fitnessworld, the ECJ 
gave some advice on this issue.  In this case, Adidas claimed that the defendant had 
infringed its registered three-strip trade mark by providing sports clothing with two 
parallel stripes.   The defendant argued that there was no trade mark infringement as 
the two parallel stripes were used just for decorative purposes and not as a sign of 
origin. The ECJ explicitly held that confusion is not a requirement within art.5 (2) of 
Directive 89/104 (now Directive 2008/95). 
… the protection conferred by Art.5(2) of the Directive is not conditional on a 
finding of a degree of similarity between the mark with a reputation and the 
sign such that there exists a likelihood of confusion between them on the part 
of the relevant section of the public. It is sufficient for the degree of similarity 
between the mark with a reputation and the sign to have the effect that the 
relevant section of the public establishes a link between the sign and the 
mark.53  
 
The ECJ went on to say that the use of a sign as an embellishment does not 
automatically exclude dilution protection unless the relevant public perceives the sign 
as a pure decorative element and is not reminded of the proprietor’s trade mark at all.  
In this case, there will be no room for dilution protection.54   
 
                                                
52 Ibid, 30. 
53 Case C- 408/01 Adidas-Salomon v Fitnessworld [2004] 1 CMLR 14, para 31. The ECJ upheld its 
position in Adidas v Marca Mode (n 47) 40- 41. The circumstances in both cases were similar. Even 
under Article 5 (1) of the Directive, it is easier to establish similarity between sings thus a link as the 
ECJ held in Adidas v Marca Mode that: 
The more the mark is well known, the greater the number of operators who will want to use 
similar signs. The presence on the market of a large quantity of goods covered by similar signs 
might adversely affect the trade mark insofar as it could reduce the distinctive character of the 
mark and jeopardise its essential function, which is to ensure that consumers know where the 
goods concerned come from; Case C-102/07 Adidas AG v Marca Mode CV [2008] ETMR 44, 
para 36. 
54 Adidas-Salomon v Fitnessworld (n 53) para 41; Adidas v Marca Mode (n 47) 34. 
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In Adidas however, the ECJ did not give specific guidance on the quality of the link 
required to establish that the marks are similar.  In Intel Corp v United Kingdom, the 
ECJ had a chance to do so.55 In this case the Intel Corporation, owned registered trade 
marks in the United Kingdom containing the word INTEL for computer and 
computer-linked goods and services.  It claimed for invalidity of the opponent’s mark 
INTELMARK, registered for marketing and telemarketing services.  Intel argued that 
the unique nature and the high reputation of the INTEL sign automatically established 
a link between its mark and the opponent’s sign.  The ECJ first pointed out that 
evidence for actual confusion or for a likelihood of confusion proves the existence of 
a link.  However, such a high standard of connection between the reputable mark and 
the opponent’s sign is not necessary under 5 (2).56 Then the ECJ observed that it ‘is 
tantamount to the existence of such a link’ if the opponent’s sign ‘would call the 
earlier mark to mind’ of the reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and 
circumspect consumer.57  
2.3 Unfair Advantage 
 
Article 5 (2) (and Article 9 (1) (c) can be invoked if it can be shown that the use of a 
sign would take unfair advantage of the earlier mark.  The goal is to enable a trade 
mark owner to prevent the use of a similar mark when to do so would involve a free 
ride on the reputation of the earlier mark.58 The term unfair advantage was addressed 
in L’Oréal v Bellure.59 This case concerned the sale of look-alike products sold under 
a trade mark similar to certain L'Oréal brands.  The case also concerned the use of 
comparison list by the retailers of these look-alikes.  The UK Court of Appeal 
submitted a request for preliminary ruling to the ECJ regarding the notion of ‘unfair 
advantage’. The ECJ was asked, inter alia, whether Article 5 (2) meant that a third 
party which used a sign similar to a trade mark with a reputation was taking unfair 
advantage of the earlier mark where such use gave that party an advantage in the 
marketing of its goods or services regardless of whether or not such use would create 
a likelihood of confusing the relevant public or risk detriment to the mark or to its 
proprietor. 
                                                
55 Intel v CPM (n 10). 
56 Ibid, 57- 58. The ECJ came to the same conclusion in L'Oréal v Bellure (n 2) 37. 
57 Inte v CPM (n 10) 60. 
58 AG Opinion (n 13) AG 39. 
59 L'Oréal v Bellure (n 2). 
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The ECJ held that Article 5 (2) of Directive 89/104 ( now Directive 2008/95) must be 
interpreted as meaning that the taking of unfair advantage of the distinctive character 
or the repute of a mark relates to the advantage arising from the use by a third party of 
a sign similar to a mark with a reputation to ride on ‘the coat-tails of the mark with a 
reputation’ in order to benefit from the power of attraction, the reputation and the 
prestige of that mark without bearing the costs of  creating and maintain the mark’s 
image.60 In this regards, the unfair advantage is not related to the harm caused to the 
trade mark or the trade mark owner.  The ECJ also held that an advantage taken by a 
third party of the distinctive character or the repute of the mark may be unfair, ‘even 
if the use of the identical or similar sign is not detrimental either to the distinctive 
character or to the repute of the mark or, more generally, to its proprietor’.61 
 
The ECJ went on to add that when determining whether the use of a sign takes unfair 
advantage of its distinctive character or repute, all factors relevant to the 
circumstances of the case must be taken into account (a global assessment).  These 
include the strength of the mark’s reputation and the degree of distinctive character of 
the mark, the degree of similarity between the marks at issue and the nature and 
degree of proximity of the goods or services concerned.62 As regard the strength of 
the reputation and the degree of distinctive character of the mark, the ECJ held that 
the more immediately and strongly the mark is brought to mind by the sign, the 
greater the likelihood that the current or future use of the sign is taking, or will take, 
unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of the mark.63  
2.4 Detrimental to the Distinctive Character of the Earlier Mark: Dilution or 
Blurring 
 
In Adidas-Salomon v. Fitnessworld, the ECJ clarified the meaning of blurring.  The 
ECJ termed the concept of detriment to the distinctive character of a trade mark as 
dilution.64 According to the ECJ, blurring of the distinctiveness of the mark means 
                                                
60 Ibid, 41. 
61 Ibid, 43. 
62 Id, 44. 
63 Id. 
64 Adidas-Salomon  v. Fitnessworld (n 53) 37- 40; T Martino, Trademark Dilution, (OUP, Oxford 
1996) 43- 46. 
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that it is no longer capable of ‘arousing immediate association with the goods for 
which it is registered and used’.65 
 
In Intel Corp v United Kingdom (discussed before), the ECJ  held that in order to  
establish the existence of a detrimental effect,  a proprietor must give specific 
evidence for one of the dilution alternatives mentioned in Article 5 (2) of Directive 
2008/95.66 The ECJ added that the more immediate and stronger the earlier mark is 
brought to mind by the later sign, the greater is the likelihood of a detrimental effect 
to the distinctive character of the earlier mark.67 To establish this point, a global 
approach that takes into account all the factors, in particular the reputation and the 
degree of distinctiveness of the earlier mark must be undertaken.68 The ECJ further 
required the owner of the earlier mark to provide evidence for actual and present 
injury to its mark or a serious likelihood that such an injury will occur in the future.69 
It is not sufficient to simply establish that the use of the later mark takes or would take 
unfair advantage of, or would be detrimental to, the distinctive character of the earlier 
mark.  The ECJ pointed out that: 
proof that the use of the later mark is or would be detrimental to the distinctive 
character of the earlier mark requires evidence of a change in the economic 
behaviour of the average consumer of the goods or services for which the 
earlier mark was registered consequent on the use of the later mark, or a 
serious likelihood that such a change will occur in the future.70 
 
Interestingly, the ECJ did not mention the alternative basis for infringement, unfair 
advantage (free riding).  It remains to be seen how the ECJ will interpret the concept 
of changing a consumer’s economic behaviour.  
2.5 Damage to Reputation: Tarnishment 
 
In Adidas-Salomon v. Fitnessworld, the ECJ defined the concept of detriment to the 
repute of a trade mark as ‘degradation or tarnishment of the mark’ in such a way that 
the trade mark’s power of attraction is affected.71 The damage to a trade mark occurs 
                                                
65 Adidas-Salomon v. Fitnessworld (n 53) 37- 40. 
66 Intel v CPM (n 10) 70- 71. 
67 Ibid, 67. 
68 Ibid, 68. 
69 Ibid, 77. 
70 Id. 
71 Adidas-Salomon v Fitnessworld (n 53) 38. Section 15 U.S.C.A, 1125 (C) (2) (B) of the American 
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 defines tarnishment as ‘association arising from the 
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if its subsequent use reflects badly on it reputation.  This could occur where the goods 
for which the infringing sign is used appeal to the public’s senses in such a way that 
damages the trade mark’s power of attraction.72 A good example could be the 
modification of COCA COLA mark to COCAINE.  This could tarnish the image of 
COCA COLA by suggesting that it contains cocaine.73 To prove the damage, a trade 
mark owner must establish that the negative association with the earlier mark will be 
real.  This does not only involve establishing the existence of a particular image in the 
earlier mark but to clarify the way in which the later mark will bring about the 
damage.74 Otherwise, there will be no tarnishment.  In Daimler v Alavi, for instance, 
the High Court of Justice found that the use of MERC was not detrimental to the 
repute of the claimant for high quality engineering because nothing would actually 
rub off on the MERC or Mercedes sign.  The Court held: 
… no objection to the defendant’s use of the sign MERC can he made out on 
this ground. I consider that in order to succeed under Article 5(2)… it must be 
shown that there is established in the mind of the relevant public a connection 
between the mark with which they are familiar and the disparaging use. Thus 
it is not sufficient to see the word MERC, note that this is the word which one 
uses to refer to Mercedes cars, see the disagreeable web-site and register it as 
disagreeable, if nothing actually rubs off on the sign MERC itself or on 
MERCEDES, or on DaimlerChrysler. I was not satisfied that this was the case 
here, and so this allegation of infringement fails.75 
 
One of the good examples in which the question of tarnishment was addressed is 
Hollywood v Souza Cruz.76 In this case, the OHIM Third Board of Appeal pointed out 
that a trade mark is tarnished when: 
…it is linked with goods of poor quality which evoke undesirable or 
questionable mental associations which conflict with the associations or image 
generated by legitimate use of the trade mark by its proprietor [or when] it is 
linked with goods which are incompatible with the quality and prestige 
associated with the trade mark, even though it is not a matter of inappropriate 
use of the trade mark in itself.77  
 
                                                                                                                                       
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous 
mark’. 
72 AG Opinion (n 13) AG 38. 
73 L Bently, and B Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (3rd edn, OUP, Oxford 2009) 888. 
74 Daimlerchrysler v Javid Alavi [2001] ETMR 98, para 94. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Case R 283/1999-3 Hollywood v Souza Cruz [2002] ETMR 64, para 86 (OHIM, Third Board of 
Appeal). 
77 Ibid, 86- 87.  
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Then the Board made a clear link between the notion of tarnishment and the level of 
quality consumers associate with a trade marked product. 
The detrimental effect could be that use of the trade mark for another type of 
product would make the trade mark less attractive for the products for which it 
is registered. This would be the case when this other type of products, 
although not per se having a negative influence on the public’s perception, 
nevertheless influences it in such a way that the trade mark is detrimentally 
affected in terms of its capacity to stimulate the desire to purchase the goods 
for which it was registered. This leads to an erosion of distinctive character 
caused by the proliferation of “parasitic” trade marks which, although not 
debasing the original trade mark, are so numerous that they deprive the trade 
mark of its distinctive character and hence of its impact.78 
 
Another example of linking quality to reputation within the meaning of tarnishment 
under Article 5 (2) of the Directive can also be found in the Adam Opel v Autec.79 In 
this case the European Court of Justice found that Autec’s use of the Opel mark might 
infringe under the dilution provision of the TM Directive, as such use might tarnish 
the Opel mark especially if the toys were of poor quality.80  
 
Most recently, the ECJ made similar remarks in L'Oréal v Bellure.  In this case the 
ECJ explained when tarnishment may occur holding that: 
tarnishment is caused when the goods or services for which the identical or 
similar sign is used by the third party may be perceived by the public in such a 
way that the trade mark’s power of attraction is reduced. The likelihood of 
such detriment may arise in particular from the fact that the goods or services 
offered by the third party possess a characteristic or a quality which is liable to 
have a negative impact on the image of the mark.81 
 
To sum up, it should be understood that, in view of the spirit of trade mark law, the 
notion of preventing tarnishment means protecting the level of quality or social status 
the consumers associate with a product sold under a mark with a reputation.  This 
association between the selling power of the mark and the product to which it is 
attached is what justifies granting marks with a reputation an extra level of protection 
in the first place. 
2.6 Without Due Cause 
 
                                                
78 Ibid, 108.  
79 Adam v Autec (n 4). 
80 Ibid, 34- 37. 
81 L'Oréal v Bellure (n 2) 40. 
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Once a trade mark owner has established that the use of its trade mark, which has a 
reputation, will take unfair advantage or, be detrimental to, the earlier mark, he then 
must show that the use would be without due case.  The interpretation of the term 
without due cause is not a crystal clear.  There are few cases in which this term has 
been addressed.   The best known example is perhaps to be found in the decision of 
the Benelux Court of Justice (the Court) in Lucas Bols v. Colgate-Palmolive.82 In this 
case the mark CLAERYN for gin was held to be infringed by use of the sign 
KLAREIN for a detergent.   The Benelux Court had to consider situations where the 
use of the earlier mark might be without justifiable reason.  The Court said the 
following:  
It is … possible … that the goods to which [the use of] a similar mark relates, 
appealed to the sensations of the public in such a way that the attraction and 
the “capacity of the mark to stimulate the desire to buy” the kind of goods for 
which it is registered, are impaired.83 
 
The Court then clarified two cases where the use of another’s mark was itself 
justifiable.   The first is where the use of the earlier mark was indispensable.  The 
second is where the user had a legitimate right to use the sign is question.84 Some 
useful guidance concerning the question of due cause can also be found in Premier 
Brands.85 In this case, the High Court of Justice made it clear that Article 5 (2) is not 
intended to confer absolute rights on trade mark proprietors in all circumstances.  The 
High Court identified two major facts which have to be fully appreciated when 
addressing the question of due cause.   Firstly, regard has to be paid to the essence of 
Article 5 (2) which is the protection of the value and the goodwill of trade marks with 
a reputation from being unfairly taken advantage of or unfairly harmed.86 Secondly, 
the term without due case must be understood in line with the terms unfair advantages 
and detrimental to.  The Court held: 
… the words “being without due cause” are somewhat opaque in their effect, I 
consider that they have to be read as not merely governing the words “the use 
of the sign”, but also as governing the words “takes unfair advantage of, or is 
detrimental to”. Section 10(3) [corresponds to Article 5(2)] must be read in a 
commercially sensible way. Bearing in mind its overall purpose, it appears to 
me that it requires the defendant to show not merely that the use of the 
allegedly infringing sign in connection with the defendant’s goods is “with 
                                                
82 Lucas Bols v Colgate-Palmolive (1976) 7 IIC 420.  
83 Ibid, 425. 
84 Id. 
85 Premier Brands UK Ltd v Typhoon Europe Ltd & Another [2000] ETMR.1071. 
86 Ibid, 1097. 
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due cause”; it also requires him to show that although the use of the sign might 
otherwise be said to “take unfair advantage of or is detrimental to” the mark, 
the advantage or detriment are not “without due cause”.87 
 
Having investigated the legal framework of dilution, next we will analysis the 
direction of the law in relation to the protection of reputable marks. 
 
3. Marks with a Reputation before the Court: Where are we Going? 
 
Indications that marks with a reputation enjoy an extended level of protection are not 
scarce.  The Court of Justice has demarcated the protection of these marks in many 
areas; protection against registration88 or use89 by a third party in case of identical, 
similar or dissimilar goods or services.90 Further, protection was granted against non-
trade mark use by a third party.  In Arsenal v Reed, the European Court of Justice 
seemed to offer protection for marks with a reputation against a use by a third party 
which was not in itself a trade mark use.91 Recently, the ECJ in Adidas AG v Marca 
Mode CV, pointed out that a trade mark infringement claim can be successful even 
where the registered mark is used for decorative purposes.92 The ECJ stated:  
                                                
87 Id. 
88 For instance, the ECJ has approved Audi’s application to register the word sign ‘Vorsprung durch 
Technik, as a Community trade mark. It found that the mere fact that a mark applied for is a laudatory 
slogan does not automatically mean that it is devoid of the distinctive character necessary to indicate 
the origin of goods and services; Case C- 398/08 Audi AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal 
Market [2010] ETMR 18. 
89 Adidas-Salmon v. Fitnessworld Trading (n 46); Adam Opel v Autec (n 4); Adidas v Marca Mode (n 
47); and Case C- 533/06 O2 Holdings Ltd v Hutchison 3G UK Ltd [2008] ETMR 55, para 36. Most 
recently however, the ECJ ruled in joined Cases C- 236,237 and 238/08 Google France, Google Ic. v 
Louis Vuitton Malletier that the use of a sign identical with a trade mark as a keyword is not use within 
the meaning of Article 5 (1) and (2) of Directive 89/104 or of Article 9(1) of Regulation 40/94.  Should 
a trade mark use be a requirement of any action for dilution of a trade mark? This is part of an 
interesting debate concerning the scope of trade mark protection.  Dogan and Lemley have written of 
the need for trade mark use to be a requirement of any action for dilution of a trade mark. Such a 
requirement is necessary to restrict the rights of a trade mark owner to prevent any unauthorized use of 
its mark or a similar mark.  In a usual trade mark infringement situation, the test of confusion limits the 
conferring rights in gross to trade mark owners. Since the test of confusion is not required under 
dilution claims, there is a risk of increasing rights in gross granted under dilution. S Dogan, and M 
Lemley, ‘The Trademark Use Requirement in Dilution Cases’ (2008) 24 Santa Clara Computer & High 
Technology L J 541-545.  By contrast, Dinwoodie and Janis have argued against the need for a trade 
mark use requirement in standard infringement actions based on proof of confusion or its likelihood.  
One of the several criticisms put forward is that the test of trade mark use is virtually identical to a 
confusion test; G Dinwoodie, and M Janis, ‘Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law’ 
(2007) 92 Iowa L Rev 1646- 1650. 
90 L'Oréal v Bellure (n 2) H8- 10; Adidas-Salomon v. Fitnessworld (n 53) 37- 40.  
91 Case C- 206/01 Arsenal Football Club Plc v Matthew Reed [2003] 1 CMLR 12. 
92  Adidas v Marca Mode(n 47) 34. 
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…the public’s perception that a sign is a decoration cannot constitute a 
restriction on the protection conferred by Article 5(1) (b) of the Directive, 
when despite its decorative nature, that sign is so similar to the registered mark 
that the relevant public is likely to perceive that the goods come from the same 
undertaking or, as the case may be, economically linked undertakings.93 
 
Most recently, the Court observed that the use by an advertiser of his competitor’s 
registered mark for the purpose of identifying his competitor’s goods, not his own, 
can still fall under the scope of  Article 5 (1) and (2).94 
 
But perhaps the most troubling trend of all was revealed in the European Court of 
Justice ruling in Copad v Christian Dior.95 In this case, the ECJ considered the allure 
and prestigious image of luxury products, which confer on then an aura of luxury 
aura, as part of their quality hence protectable subject-matters.  Cast as a trade mark 
policy, the notion of expanding the protection of marks with a reputation might not be 
always consistent with the broader policy of the law particularly in the case of 
protecting artificial elements that could enhance artificial product differentiation.  
Next, we will track the roots and implications of such an approach. 
3.1 Dior: Presentation as Part of the Quality of Goods 
 
This case concerned the ability of a trade mark proprietor to rely on its trade mark 
rights under Directive 89/104 Article 5 and Article 7 (now Directive 2008/95) to 
prevent the advertising of goods placed on the market by him or with his consent 
particularly where that advertising damaged the luxury image of its brand.96 In this 
case, the ECJ first considered the presentation of goods as part of their quality.  The 
facts in this case were as follows.  Perfumes Christian Dior France produced luxury 
perfumes and other cosmetic products, distributed through a selective system.  Dior 
Netherlands was the sole representative for the distribution of Dior products 
domestically.  The selective distribution system provided that the products may be 
sold only by selected retailers and on condition that those retailers supply only to 
ultimate consumers or other selected retailers.  Dior France had registered a number 
of Benelux trade marks comprising illustrations of the packaging in which the bottles 
                                                
93 Ibid. 
94 O2 v Hutchison (n 89). 
95 Copad v Christian Dior (n 2). 
96 Parfums Christian Dior v Evora (n 4). 
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containing its products were sold.  The defendants obtained quantities of the 
claimant’s products by parallel importation and proceeded to advertise the goods by 
distributing promotional leaflets depicting the bottles and packaging of some of those 
products.  Dior France objected to these forms of advertising since it its view they 
were liable to damage the luxurious and prestigious image of the Christian Dior trade 
mark.  The Dutch Supreme Court referred a number of questions to the European 
Court of Justice which, inter alia, included whether, as a result of the manner in 
which the reseller uses the trade mark in order to attract public attention, he damages 
the luxurious and prestigious image of the goods, and hence the advertising function 
of the trade mark? 
 
The ECJ stressed the importance of striking the correct balance between, on the one 
hand, the legitimate interest of the trade mark owner in being protected against 
resellers using his trade mark for advertising in a manner which could damage the 
reputation of the trade mark and, on the other, the reseller’s legitimate interest in 
being able to resell the goods in question by using advertising methods which are 
customary in his sector of trade on the other.97 The ECJ agreed to allow the owner of 
the mark with a reputation to prevent ‘advertising by which a reseller sought to 
advertise his own undertaking by creating the impression that it was of a particular 
quality, thus taking advantage of the reputation and goodwill attached to the trade 
mark.98 The ECJ further added that advertising luxury goods must not affect the value 
of the trade mark by detracting from the allure and prestigious image of the goods in 
question and from their aura of luxury.  The ECJ held: 
 
… although the luxurious nature of such cosmetics derived from, inter alia, 
their high intrinsic quality, their higher price, and the manufacturers’ 
advertising campaigns, the fact that the products were sold within the 
framework of a selective distribution system, which sought to ensure that they 
were presented in retail outlets in an enhancing manner, was also capable of 
contributing to that image. It accordingly considered luxury cosmetics worthy 
of the protection afforded by a selective distribution network. It can, therefore, 
be properly assumed for present purposes that the reputation of a trade mark 
for luxury cosmetics can, in principle, be damaged by marketing which 
detracts from its luxurious image.99 
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The ECJ then went on to say that the proprietor of a trade mark may rely on Article 7 
(2) of Directive 89/104 to oppose the use of the trade mark if such use seriously 
damages the reputation of the trade mark.100  
3.2 Dior 2009 
 
In Copad SA v Christian Dior, the ECJ elaborated in more detail the interplay 
between quality and the presentation of luxury goods.101 This case concerned the 
resale by a licensee of luxury corsetry goods bearing the Christian Dior trade mark to 
downmarket traders.  The licence agreement stated that in order to maintain the 
reputation and prestige of Dior trade mark, the licensee would not sell to particular 
companies such as discount stores without Dior’s consent.  Indeed, the luxury corsetry 
goods were to be distributed through a selective distribution network.  In breach of 
that restriction, the licensee sold the goods to a discount store operator.  The owner of 
the Christian Dior mark objected to the resale and filed a case before a French court.  
The Court referred a request for preliminary ruling to the ECJ to determine whether a 
provision in a license agreement prohibiting the licensee, on the ground of the trade 
mark’s prestige, to sell the goods bearing the trade mark covered by the contract to 
discount stores, fell within the scope of art.8 (2) of Directive 89/104.  
 
Regarding the quality of goods sold under the Christian Dior mark, the European 
Court of Justice found that the quality of luxury goods results not just from their 
physical characteristics but also from their allure and prestigious image which confer 
on the product an aura of luxury.  This aura of luxury emanating from luxury goods is 
essential in that it enables consumers to distinguish them from similar goods.  Hence, 
any impairment to that aura of luxury is likely to affect the actual quality of those 
goods.102 The ECJ also held that the characteristics and conditions of a selective 
distribution network can, in themselves, preserve the quality of luxury goods and 
ensure their proper use.  Thus, the sale by the licensee of the luxury goods to parties 
that do not belong to the selective distribution network would conceivably affect the 
quality of these goods.  The ECJ pointed out: 
 
                                                
100 Ibid, 48. 
101 Copad v Christian Dior (n 2). 
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Setting up a selective distribution system such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings which, according to the terms of the licence agreement between 
Dior and SIL, seeks to ensure that the goods are displayed in sales outlets in a 
manner that enhances their value, “especially as regards the positioning, 
advertising, packaging as well as business policy”, contributes, as Copad 
acknowledges, to the reputation of the goods at issue and therefore to 
sustaining the aura of luxury surrounding them. It follows that it is 
conceivable that the sale of luxury goods by the licensee to third parties that 
are not part of the selective distribution network might affect the quality itself 
of those goods, so that, in such circumstances, a contractual provision 
prohibiting such sale must be considered to be falling within the scope of 
art.8(2) of the Directive.103  
 
One of the most important reflections of this case is that the image and prestige of 
luxury goods are important aspects of their quality.  Therefore undermining the allure 
and prestigious image of luxury brands can constitute trade mark infringement.  
3.3 Scrutinizing the ECJ Decision in Dior 
 
It will have been apparent from reading previous chapters that there is an unending 
tension between expanding protection for the selling power of a reputable mark, in 
particular its reputation, and promoting competition.104 It is widely accepted that, for a 
good segment of consumers, the quality of a luxury product depends not only on its 
physical characteristics but also on some artificial product differentiation techniques 
such as its aura of luxury or prestigious image.  As such, from a trader point of view, 
it does make business sense to recognise that fact and thus to work hard to improve 
the advertising or the persuasive value of the mark.  The problem however is that by 
considering the presentation of goods and their allure and prestigious images as 
protectable subject-matters, the Court of Justice might be unwittingly encouraging 
artificial product differentiation. Presentation, allure and prestigious image of goods 
(brand values) add very little to the product.  The ECJ ruling in Dior could be 
understood as a green light for traders to build a reputation on the brand rather than on 
the product to which it is affixed.  As we explained before however, maintaining and 
improving the quality of goods is the main assurance that trade mark protection does 
enhance competition and reduces consumer searching costs.105 Hence, even if the 
prestigious image or presentation of a branded good might constitute its distinctive 
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character or reputation, the protection of such economically artificial components 
does not necessarily enhance consumer rational commercial behaviour.106 For many, 
the conclusions of the ECJ in Copad v Christian Dior were going to give rise to 
controversy.   This should not come as a surprise given the fact that the previous 
judgment might indeed increase the risk of simply improving the advertising value of 
branded goods at the expense of their quality which is contrary to the legal and 
economic rationales of trade mark protection.  This trend towards granting marks with 
a reputation extensive protection is not combined with a clear view as to how exactly 
and, in what context; does the protection of brand values contribute to the legal and 
economic objectives of the law.   Given the impact of a trade mark reputation on 
retaining the loyalty of consumers thus expanding the monopoly power of a trade 
mark owner, this lack of guidance should raise cause for concern.  The ECJ is 
therefore required to balance the protection of the quality of a product against other 
artificial components such as its prestigious image or presentation.  The ECJ appears 
to agree with Schechter’s notion of trade mark protection and thus with his argument 
that protecting the distinctiveness of the mark should be the only rational basis for 
protection.  To this we shall now turn our attention. 
4. Re-thinking Schechter’s Concept of Dilution: A Quality Perspective 
 
The growing judicial acceptance of expanding the protection of the publicity value 
(intangible values) of reputable marks seems to come at the expense of other much 
more important factors such as quality.107 The assumption is that dilution is mainly 
about protecting the selling power of the mark thus consumer’s concerns regarding 
quality issues might not be a priority.  This notion seems to be used to systematically 
influence the law in favour of traders. 
 
There appears to be only patchy legal consensus on what a brand value or a reputation 
is. Many examples indicate that these terms are being used to refer to the way 
consumers perceive the reputation of a mark: a connection between the mark and a 
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certain level of quality.108 The question to be raised here, therefore, is: does the 
expansion of protection afforded to the intangible values (brand values) of reputable 
marks at the expense of quality factors fall in line with the objectives of the Directive 
and therefore the essence of trade mark protection?  Should the law be concerned 
mainly with providing legal cover for the selling power of the mark without 
considering what the law is intended to achieve in the first place and therefore how 
the selling power of the mark is built or used?   
 
As already discussed, trade mark protection is justified under the grounds of fostering 
competition and reducing consumer searching costs.109 The relationship between 
marks with a reputation and the increase in protection is understood to be mutually 
reinforcing competition and the interests of consumers.  The more well-known the 
mark, the more distinctive it is, and the more protection it gets.  Thus, the tradeoff 
between marks with a reputation, protection and reducing searching costs goes far 
towards explaining one dynamic that has driven the expansion of marks protection in 
the course of the twentieth century.  At the heart of this dynamic is the assumption 
that the expansion of protection for the selling power of the mark or its reputation can 
be justified under the grounds that this expansion benefits the process of competition 
and hence consumers directly or indirectly.  This by necessity requires that the selling 
power of the mark with a reputation should always be based on the features of the 
products to which it is attached.  
 
Considering the legal and economic rationales of trade mark protection, Schechter’s 
notion of dilution is clearly debatable.  The protection of the distinctiveness of the 
mark cannot be justified where such distinction is not based on real economic value 
that justifies the restriction of competition that might be caused by such a protection. 
In many cases the presentation of goods or their prestigious images do not provide 
any meaningful difference to what is already available in the market.  The illusory 
nature of the concept of protecting the distinctiveness of the mark threatens to 
destabilize the legal basis of trade mark protection.110 To tackle this issue, regard has 
to be paid to the fundamental goal of protecting a trade mark in the first place: to 
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enable consumers to differentiate the product of one undertaking from those of other 
undertakings.  This is the essence of preventing trade mark infringement.111 
Therefore, there should always be a clear link between the protection of the distinctive 
character of the mark and the products to which it is affixed.  Otherwise, traders are 
likely to invest on the image or the advertising value of the mark which is cheaper and 
easier than investing and improving the quality of branded goods. 
 
The question of quality under the dilution doctrine therefore goes beyond whether or 
not to enforce the quality function of the mark.  Rather, it concerns the policy 
underpinning trade mark protection.  As such, trade mark law should proactively seek 
to influence traders’ commercial behaviour by not protecting and, thus, encouraging 
artificial product differentiation.112 Building the distinctive character of the mark or its 
reputation on the mark itself rather that on the products to which it is attached might 
have a harmful impact on competition.  It has been stated that: 
The object of the law is to preserve for a trader the reputation he has made for 
himself, not to help him in the disposing of that reputation as of itself a 
marketable commodity, independent of his goodwill, to some other traders. If 
that were allowedly, the public would be misled.113 
 
The idea of protecting the distinctiveness of the mark or its reputation per se face 
serious legal challenges particularly in the context of trade mark functions.  In the 
following parts, we first explore whether the notion of expanding the protection of a 
reputable mark is related to the mark’s role as a connection between a product and a 
certain level of quality.  Second, by investigating the impact of a trade mark’s 
reputation on consumer purchasing decisions, we highlight the risks in implementing 
Schechter’s concept of protection on competition.  
4.1 Schechter’s Concept of Dilution: Legal Benchmarks 
 
The notion of expanding the scope of protection for marks with a reputation is deeply 
rooted in the history of trade mark law.  This type of protection however was and is 
directly linked to the mark’s main role as a product identifier.  If the mark is not to act 
as an anti-competitive tool, its selling power cannot be established in isolation from 
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the products to which it is attached.  This is not to suggest that marks with a 
reputation can only indicate the specifications of the branded goods.  Rather, the 
suggestion here is that such expanded scope of protection should be implemented 
within the relationship of the mark with the products to which it is affixed and not in a 
vacuum.  The Paris Convention, Article 6bis refers to such a notion as does Article 16 
of TRIPS and Article 5 (2) of Directive 2008/95.  Article 6bis of the Paris Convention 
clearly states that: 
goods or services which are not similar to those in respect of which a 
trademark is registered, provided that use of that trademark in relation to those 
goods or services would indicate a connection between those goods or 
services and the owner of the registered trademark and provided that the 
interests of the owner of the registered trademark are likely to be damaged by 
such use (emphasis added).   
 
Therefore, the expanded scope of protection for marks with a reputation in the case of 
dissimilar goods or services is directly related to their core role as a connector 
between particular goods or services and a specific brand.  And once that connection 
has gone missing, such an expansive scope of protection cannot be legally justified.  
 
The provision mentioned above is reflected and further enhanced in the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Law (TRIPS).  Article 16 (3) reads:  
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to 
goods or services which are not similar to those in respect of which a 
trademark is registered, provided that use of that trademark in relation to those 
goods or services would indicate a connection between those goods or services 
and the owner of the registered trademark and provided that the interests of the 
owner of the registered trademark are likely to be damaged by such use. 
 
Similar provision is made under the First Trade Mark Directive where Article 5 (2) 
states: 
… the proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his 
consent from using in the course of trade any sign which is identical with, or 
similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are not 
similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, where the latter has a 
reputation in the Member State and where use of that sign without due cause 
takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the 
repute of the trade mark ( emphasis added).114 
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Thus, a trade mark’s selling power or reputation must not be built in a vacuum: it 
must always be attached to goods or services on which it is used and its protection 
should not go beyond or be separated from the goods on offer. 
 
4.2 Relationship between the Selling Power of the Mark and the Purposes of 
Protection 
 
One preoccupation of the courts in interpreting Article 5 (2) of Directive 2008/95 has 
been to establish the line for trade mark protection and whether it should go beyond 
the traditional boundaries of protection to include non-trade mark subject-matter and, 
if yes, why and to what extent.  The ECJ has repeatedly upheld the fact that a trade 
mark reputation subtly reassures customers as to the quality of the branded goods or 
services.115 Thus, in order to justify the protection of the selling power of the mark, it 
is important not to lose sight of the fact that a trade mark  needs to carry ‘associated 
goodwill’ in the minds of customers based on the experience or reputation of high-
quality products and good service’.116 The essence of expanding the protection of 
marks with a reputation rests on the idea that consumers associate these marks with a 
high standard of quality.  That is why even in case of dissimilar products or services, 
marks with a reputation still enjoy protection even in the absence of public confusion 
since such use would undermine that association and therefore the selling power of 
the mark.  These previous facts are clearly reflected in the ECJ’s case law.117 
 
In its attempt to interpret the law and without restricting the trade mark functions, the 
ECJ made it clear that not all branding techniques stimulate competition.  The ECJ 
pointed out repeatedly that ‘undertakings must be able to attract and retain customers 
by the quality of their products or services, which is made possible only by distinctive 
signs allowing them to be identified’.118 The ECJ seems to be saying that if the 
objectives of the Directive are to be achieved, the concept of quality must be one of 
the keystones against which the goals of promoting competition can be measured.  
Protecting the selling power of the mark therefore is no more than a staging post on 
the road to differentiating the features and the quality of the products of one 
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undertaking from those of other undertakings.  Without this quality link, the selling 
power of the mark would enhance artificial product differentiation and, as a result, 
hinder competition and increase rather than decrease consumer searching costs.119                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
Once again, when considering the expansion of protection afforded to a mark with a 
reputation, one must consider the questions of how and where the selling power of the 
mark should be based.  Building the selling power of the mark or its reputation on the 
mark rather than on the product upsets the balance between the gain and the costs of 
expanding trade mark protection.  The act of protecting the distinctive character of the 
mark or its reputation per se enables the owner of the mark with a reputation to extend 
the monopoly power of the mark against other competitors.  That is, an overall 
balance of potential costs and benefits of enabling the owner of the mark with a 
reputation to prevent the unauthorized collateral or derivative uses of the mark, should 
be considered in relation to the potential costs and benefits a third party would incur 
by being unable to make use of the mark.120 These concerns are clearly acknowledged 
by the ECJ.121  
 
Thus, there is not a case for expanding the rights of the mark owner against any 
perceived wrongdoing and therefore, to entitle him to prohibit the other’s activities 
unless the economic benefits of this expansion exceeds the cost.  The benefits of 
protecting the prestigious image of luxury goods might be insignificant in comparison 
with the restriction such protection might impose on competition.  Instead, protecting 
a trade mark reputation should be understood as a way of deriving economic 
efficiency and enhancing consumer welfare by providing quality products rather than 
a way of protecting the owner of the mark with a reputation from the heat of 
competition.  That is why Schechter’s call for the protection of the distinctiveness of 
the mark to be ‘the only rational basis’ for trade mark protection, is questionable.122 
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There is a real risk of over-protecting a trade mark’s selling power as a form of 
intangible output, equivalent to the subject-matter of a trade mark.  Without paying 
regard to the question of quality, such an approach would inevitably jeopardise the 
objectives of the law and the Treaty since it fails to take account of the costs incurred 
through the expansion of protection.  This can be clearly seen in the case of expanding 
the protection of the selling power of the mark in ‘gross’ since it is very difficult to 
envisage how such expansion of protection contributes to the objectives of the law.123 
 
It could be submitted that unless the resulting benefits of expanding the scope of 
protection for marks with a reputation outweigh the costs, there should be no case for 
expanding the protection beyond the necessary to ensure their effectiveness.  The 
failure of trade mark law to show a consistent reflection in this delicate balance 
requires the rationale for trade mark protection to be reassessed and the boundaries to 
be re-rationalized.  This can be done by re-affirming the indispensable role of the 
quality function in offsetting the anti-competitive aspects of trade mark protection.   
 
In the next part, we will critically debate the notion of downgrading the interest of 
consumers under the dilution doctrine in favour of those of traders. 
4.3 Where does Dilution Occur? New Grounds for Enforcing Quality  
 
 The need for paying regard to the quality function within the boundaries of dilution 
has to do not only with how the law and the Court of Justice interpret dilution but also 
with the question of where and how exactly dilution occurs.  As already discussed, the 
focus under dilution is about the protection of the selling power of the mark and its 
brand value rather than on the consumer interest of not being confused.  However, a 
close look as to how and where dilution occurs reveals that consumers occupy the 
centre stage and they have a role to play and, therefore, their interests should be taken 
into account. 
 
 Let us raise the following question: where does dilution occur?  It takes place in a 
consumer’s mind.  Hence, the minds of consumers and how they perceive the mark is 
the benchmark against which the concept of dilution, as set up by Schechter, should 
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be measured.124 Thus, dilution has been seen as a ‘psychological phenomenon’ that 
takes place in the minds of consumers.125 The state of mind that needs to be checked, 
therefore, belongs to consumers and the way they perceive the relationship between 
the mark and the product to which it is attached: a sign of quality.126 Hence, it might 
be true that preventing public confusion might not be an issue when establishing 
dilution.   Nevertheless, any interpretation that does not take quality and, therefore, 
the way consumers perceive the selling power of the mark or its reputation into 
consideration might not be consistent with the law.  It is difficult to envisage how 
promoting competition and the rhetoric of public interest would be achieved if the 
way consumers perceive the selling power of the mark is not taken into account when 
considering the level and scope of protection. 
4.3.1 What  gets Blurred or Tarnished? 
 
The second question to be raised here is what exactly gets blurred or tarnished?  Is it 
the reputation of the mark, its character or the perception of consumers as to the link 
between the mark and the products and services?  The answer is clear: what gets 
blurred or tarnished is the perception consumers associate with the mark.127  And this 
is how the essence of expanding protection for marks with a reputation should be 
understood.   Accordingly, it could be submitted that all aspects of dilution, fame, 
distinctiveness, blurring, associations, tarnishment and harm to reputation are directly 
related to the mark and the products or services to which it is attached and the 
expansion of trade mark protection should always be viewed within that context.   
4.3.2 Dilution and the Average Consumer: How Many Definitions are there? 
 
When we say that dilution occurs in a consumer’s mind, what type of consumers do 
we mean and why?  Interestingly, there is no consensus as to the mental standard or 
standards of this consumer.  This can be due to the fact that there is no well-developed 
                                                
124 Schechter himself defined dilution as ‘the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and 
hold upon the public’s mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-competing goods’. Schechter (n 
2) 825. 
125 J Jacoby, ‘Considering the who, what, when, where and how of measuring dilution’ (2008) 24 Santa 
Clara Computer and High Tech L J 603. 
126 Christian Dior v. Evora (n 4); Adam Opel v Autec (n 4); Cnl-Sucal v Hag (n 4) and Case C- 9/93 
IHT Internationale Heiztechnik v Ideal-Standard [1994] 3 CMLR 857. 
127 Christian Dior v. Evora (n 4); Adam Opel v Autec (n 4); see in general Schechter (n 2) 825; Jacoby 
(n 125). 
 128 
theory of consumer sophistication.128 It is difficult to predict or to think through the 
consumer and to see the market place as he sees it, the issue John Keats named 
‘negative capability’.129 That is why it seems that consumer interest rhetoric has 
double meanings.   Indeed, the status of the consumer, his/her interest and most 
importantly how these interests can be protected under contemporary trade mark law 
is not comprehensible.   One fact that is quite clear, however, is that the rationale of 
consumers’ interest is used as a vehicle to serve traders rather than to establish the 
objectives of the law.  The way traders perceive consumers therefore depends, to a 
great extent, on how they perceive their own interests.  Thus, the same consumer 
might be a ‘rational sovereign and a gullible fool’ as one commentator states: 
The sovereign consumer…serves one master, namely, the trademark apologist, 
in theoretical disputes over the basis of trademark protection and another, the 
restrictionist, in disputes over the scope of that protection. The rational 
consumer may justify the protection of trademarks for their informational 
content, but, in his perspicacity, he also justifies a narrow scope of protection 
as against other similar marks. The consumer as fool is a similarly double-
edged construct. His susceptibility to the persuasive content of trademark 
undermines the basis of trademarks protection, but this lack of discernment 
also recommends a wide scope of protection when protection is given. The 
result is that trademark apologists- and plaintiffs- tend to adduce the sovereign 
when they speak of the basis of protection and the fool when they speak of the 
scope.  Trademark restrictionists- and defendants- do the reverse. They adduce 
the fool when they speak of the basis and the sovereign when they speak of the 
scope…These tensions…continue to muddle outcomes in the courts because 
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trademark law lacks a well-developed theory of the consumer and, 
specifically, of consumer sophistication (emphasis added).130  
 
The aim of this discussion is to highlight the fact that the concept of protecting the 
selling power of the mark or its reputation as envisaged by Schechter should not be 
implemented without considering the interests of consumers as to quality issues.  
Hence, the argument that dilution is about the protection of the selling power of the 
mark is, therefore, not intended to protect the interests of consumers does not have 
much a chance of success when considered in the light of the objectives of the law 
and the economic grounds for achieving these objectives.  
5.  Dilution and Market Reality 
 
In this part we ask the following question: what is the role of a trade mark reputation 
in expanding the monopoly power of a trade mark owner at the expense of his 
competitors?   To this end, this part seeks to examine whether the current exploitation 
of the selling power of the mark, and, therefore, the concept of dilution, risks 
diverting the law from its course.  As such, this part firstly seeks to investigate the 
increasing tendency of trade mark owners to separate the reputation of the mark from 
the products to which it is affixed.  Secondly, it examines the extent to which a mark 
with a reputation has the ability to sell a product regardless of its specifications.131 
Finally, this part investigates what did Schechter mean when he argued that protecting 
the distinctiveness of the mark is ‘the only rational basis’ for trade mark protection.132 
If the mark with a reputation is capable of selling a product even with the availability 
of similar, yet cheaper substitutes, how does Schechter’s concept of protection fit with 
the law keeping in mind that marks are thought to enhance economic efficiency which 
means producing the best quality product for the lowest cost?  These issues are 
addressed respectively. 
5.1 Building a Reputation on a Brand not on the Product to which it is Attached 
 
Traders seek to retain the loyalty of consumers using the most cost effective tool.   
Building a very strong reputation allows traders to maintain consumer loyalty 
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regardless of the product in question.  Such worries have their grounds in today’s 
marketing techniques.  The increase of mass national and international marketing 
combined with the extensive reliance on advertising has enhanced the tendency 
towards a total separation between the mark with a reputation and the product on 
offer.  Separating the reputation of the mark from the products it represents gains the 
owner of the mark greater flexibility to use the reputation of his mark on a wide rage 
of products without giving consumers a reliable quality guarantee.  
 
Traders are profit seekers.  This fact must always be remembered.  As such, they only 
use the quality function of a trade mark as a vehicle to retain the loyalty of consumers 
where there is no other more profitable and cheaper way to do so.133 Put differently, 
there is a trade-off between the costs of ‘saving from producing a lower-quality 
product with reduced marketing expenditure, set against the damage to reputation’.  
Traders therefore, build the reputation of their marks on the quality of their products 
only where maintaining quality is the cheapest available way of doing so.  That is: 
It is more accurate to describe the firm’s self-interest as involving building a 
good reputation at least cost. Often the best way of achieving this combination 
is through sophisticated marketing, rather that making a high-quality product. 
Consumers come to believe the trade mark signals high quality, and may 
continue to do so even after purchase if the quality defects are hidden or 
debatable (emphasis added).134  
 
Building the selling power on the mark means that the mark has ceased its role as a 
product identifier since according to this scenario it will convey very little information 
as to the products quality, reliability and mode of manufacturing.  An excellent 
example as to the restriction of the trade mark role as an indicator of a product 
specification or quality  can be seen in case of associating a beer or a fizzy drink with 
a healthy, long lasting happy life.  Another example can be seen in a different area 
such as parallel importation where two exactly identical products (two pair of jeans), 
one of which is allowed to bear the trade mark and the other is not because of the lack 
of the trade mark owner’s consent.135 Such branding technique can only work where it 
is possible to separate the mark from the product it represents.  Put differently, such a 
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technique is likely where it is possible to build the reputation of the mark or its selling 
power on the mark itself rather than on the product to which it is attached. 
 
Moreover, one of the key claims for justifying trade mark protection is that  branded 
goods are ‘superior’ or ‘reassuring’ consumers’ willingness to pay a premium for 
branded goods.136 Building the reputation of the mark in separation to the products to 
which it is affixed, jeopardizes the economic grounds for protection.  This separation 
is true and real because it is widely known that the capacity of a mark with a 
reputation to acquire such status, particularly when it establishes itself in the market, 
depends ‘much less on the quality and conditions of the marked products than on its 
presentation and price’.  This, in turn, transfers branded products ‘into symbols of 
status’ even though such status does not necessarily match any improvement in 
quality or other features.137 This change in the performance of trade mark is best 
described by Naomi Klein.  She states:  
What was changing was the idea of what –in both advertising and branding –
was being sold. The old paradigm had it that all marketing was selling a 
product. In the new model, however, the product always takes a back seat to 
the real product, brand, and the selling of the brand acquired an extra 
component that can only be described as spiritual.138 
 
This branding policy, separating the mark from the product to which it is attached, 
allows certain marks with a reputation to enjoy an absolute marketing and, therefore, 
competitive advantage over other competitors by building and enhancing the 
reputation of the mark rather than improving the quality of the product on offer.  As 
Branson puts it:  
We have never been constrained by the “what business are we in?” 
question’139…The idea is to build ‘brands not around products but around 
reputation. The great Asian names imply quality, price and innovation rather 
that a specific item. I call these ‘attribute’ brands: they do not relate directly to 
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one product- such as a Mars bar or a Coca-Cola- but instead to a set of 
values’.140 
 
Given the fact that limiting the impact of the trade mark monopoly can only be 
ensured by linking the protection of the mark to its fundamental function namely, 
indicating the differences between products, separating the reputation of the mark 
from the products to which it is attached inevitably jeopardizes the essence of trade 
mark protection by expanding the monopoly power of the trade mark owner where the 
mark enhances artificial product differentiation and the artificial partitioning of the 
market.  
 
The persuasive power of the mark with a reputation combined with the separation 
between the mark and the products to which it is affixed marginalizes the essence of 
trade mark protection by unduly increasing the monopoly power of the mark.  This, in 
turn, requires the scope of protecting marks with a reputation to be reconsidered.  The 
fundamental purpose of trade mark protection is to promote competition and to reduce 
consumer searching costs which should always be the benchmarks against which the 
eligibility of the selling power of the mark for protection should be measured.  
Needless to say, as we have seen before, there is no way the mark with a reputation 
can enhance economic efficiency without conveying a clear and consistent quality 
message.141  
 
The economic justification for trade mark protection is based on the idea that traders 
act in a competitive environment and they use trade marks to differentiate their 
products from those of their competitors.142 Marks allow traders to have a certain 
degree of monopolistic power which allows them to earn high profit.  With that in 
mind and taking the idea of separating marks with reputation from the products to 
which they are attached, it is very difficult to envisage how trade marks can increase 
consumer welfare, let alone the impact such a strategy might have on competition.  As 
already discussed, consumers perceive reputation, the selling power of the mark, as a 
strong quality indication.  The elusive nature of this link, i.e. the link between the 
selling power of the mark and the quality function, creates inertia amongst consumers 
                                                
140 Klein (n 154) 24. 
141 Chapter one, 28- 33. 
142 Landes and Posner (n 4) 265- 309. 
 133 
were usually stick with what they know.  This, in turn, gives the owner of the mark 
great market power by creating a barrier to entry for newcomers.143 Nonetheless, 
neither competition nor the public are beneficiaries of such a policy.   
 
Again, as to the issue of expanding the boundaries of protection for the mark with 
reputation, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that this expansion can only be 
economically justified if it is proven that protecting intangible assets, such as a 
reputation, benefits society.  A closer look at the concept of brand values reveals that 
they increase consumers’ artificial wants.  These artificial needs can be satisfied 
efficiently and by lower costs through ‘marketing expenditure rather than improving 
the products themselves’.144 This is not the end of the story since such a technique, 
satisfying social needs such as social status through branding, leaves more losers, 
those who can not afford to buy the products, than winners, who purchase the 
product.145 Put differently, it is not healthy for social welfare and economic efficiency 
to simply stimulate new wants and then satisfy them since it is well-known that 
human ‘happiness lies in narrowing the gap between what we have and what we 
want’.146 If this argument is to be accepted however, then it must be proved that the 
mark with a reputation is capable of selling a product depending on the reputation of 
the mark rather than the quality of the product to which it is attached.  This question is 
addressed next. 
5.2 Can a Reputation Alone Sell a Product? A Practical Test 
 
The argument against the protection of the selling power of the mark or its reputation 
as suggested by Schechter has its grounds in today’s market reality.147 Empirical 
studies show that marks with a reputation have a strong persuasive impact.  This in 
turn means that the selling power of the mark can lure consumers into buying a 
product which is essentially the same as lower-priced alternatives.  In this case, 
protecting the selling power of the mark or its reputation enhances artificial product 
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differentiation which is diametrically opposite to the objectives of the law.148 This 
argument conflicts with the notion that trade marks are informative rather than 
manipulative tools.149 In other words, reputable marks are not capable of selling 
products regardless of their qualities.  This is despite the fact that the father of the 
dilution theory himself (Frank Schechter) pointed out that a positive trade mark 
reputation might not necessarily be  the result of a good reputation for the quality and 
reliability of marked products but equally upon its ‘own uniqueness and 
singularity’.150 A reputable mark does suggest, influence and persuade.151 In doing so, 
it deludes, and ‘induces consumer delusion as to needs and /or wants’.152  
 
Thus, it is quite plausible to assume that the uniqueness or individuality of a trade 
mark does influence consumers’ purchasing decisions and hence could enhance 
artificial product differentiation.  As one observer states:  
Our results show that meaningless differentiation is valued by consumers in a 
surprising number of situations. For example, meaningless differentiation is 
valued even if the differentiated brand is priced above all others and, more 
surprisingly, in some cases increasing price actually can increase preference 
for the differentiated brand. Furthermore, the competitive advantage created 
by adding an irrelevant attribute can be sustained even if consumers 
acknowledge the differentiating attribute is irrelevant.153 
 
Scott Bedbury, the vice president of marketing in Starbucks, clearly acknowledges 
that ‘consumers do not truly believe there is a huge difference between products’ and 
this is one of the reasons why brands must ‘establish emotional ties’.154 It is not only 
the coffee that customers are after; they are after the ‘romance of the coffee 
experience, the feeling of warmth and community people get in Starbucks stores’.155 
Tibor Kalman observes that shift in the contemporary marketplace in this way: ‘the 
original notion of the brand was quality, but now brand is a stylistic badge of 
courage’.156 
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5.3 Schechter’s Notion of Trade Mark Protection: Risk Analysis 
 
Schechter’s notion of trade mark protection significantly increases the monopoly 
power of a trade mark owner at the expense of competition and consumers alike.  For 
traders, Schechter’s call for the protection of the distinctiveness of a trade mark does 
make prefect sense.  It enables them to market their branded goods using the cheapest 
and most effective marketing tools.  However, that notion of protection makes very 
little of the fact that unless the selling power, uniqueness or singularity of a mark are 
based on the quality or reliability of the product to which it is attached, the protection 
of its distinctiveness might distort competition and enhance artificial product 
differentiation thus artificial partitioning of markets.  This is because apart from 
improving and maintaining the quality and reliability of a branded good, all other 
factors such as the singularity of a mark or its reputation, have very little economic 
substance.157   
 
Therefore, as a major tool in today’s marketing strategies, there is a real risk of using 
the trade mark as a vehicle to mislead consumers rather than conveying information 
about the product on offer.158 This risk becomes much more likely where firms try to 
work on their trade marks as assets in their own right and totally separated from the 
products to which they are affixed.  It is widely agreed that:   
The trademark is endowed with a sales appeal independent of the quality of 
price of the product to which it is attached; economically irrational elements 
are introduced into consumer choices; and the trademark owner is insulated 
from the normal pressures of price and quality competition.159 
 
The argument as to the soundness of granting protection to the selling power of the 
mark regardless of the way it has been built or used (in gross) is increasing.  As one 
observer points out:  
[S]ome advertising and associated trademarks serve as a form of blackmail. 
Such advertising seeks to persuade us by first creating or exacerbating out 
insecurities and self –doubts. It tells us that we are not pretty enough, not 
popular enough, not hip enough, not right enough. Only after it has shaken our 
self-image and disturbed our self –contentment does this type of advertising 
step forward to offer a remedy. Many consumers are susceptible to these ads 
and well take the remedy offered. This adverting can therefore persuade 
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consumers to purchase a good they would not otherwise have bought or pay 
more for a good than they would otherwise have paid. This increased 
willingness to buy does not, however, reflect an aggregate increase in utility, 
and even if we limit our consideration to those consumers who are persuaded 
to purchase. In many cases, the consumer may pay the higher price simply to 
restore her pre-advertisement satisfaction level.160   
 
This argument highlights the fact that protecting the selling power of the mark or its 
reputation in gross should not be legally established without careful consideration of 
the legal and economic essence of this protection.  Once again, emphasizing the 
importance of protecting the selling power of marks without emphasizing the direct 
link between the mark and the product creates artificial wants and artificial 
satisfaction as one commentator states: 
It may well increase the total happiness in our society if every time a guy 
drinks a Budweiser or smokes a Camel, he believes he‘s a stud. We may all be 
better off if, each time a woman colors her hair with a L‘Oreal product, she 
murmurs to herself “ and I‘m worth it”. If that‘s so, however, Warner 
Brothers, Anheuser-Busch, R.J. Reynolds, and L’Oreal can hardly take all the 
credit. They built up all that mystique with their customers’ money and active 
collaboration.161 
 
Considering the present argument, two questions should be raised: how it is possible 
to separate the selling power of a mark or its reputation from the products to which it 
is attached?  How are traders of branded goods capable of introducing economically 
irrational elements into consumer choice?  To answer these questions, one first has to 
fully understand what psychologists and behavioral economists call the ‘availability 
heuristic’162 and its impact on consumers’ purchasing decisions and, secondly the role 
of neuromarketing on transferring consumers from quality bias to a brand bias.  To 
this we shall turn our attention. 
5.3.1 Market Power and the Concept of ‘Availability Heuristic’ 
 
In this part, we examine the role of a trade mark reputation or singularity in expanding 
the monopoly power of a trade mark owner.  To this end, we investigate how 
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consumers perceive the role of a trade mark reputation.  This must lead us to what is 
termed ‘availability heuristic’.  This concept is based on the assumption that people 
simplify complex situations by relying on rules-of-thumb when they make their 
decisions.163 That is, people tend to ‘attach disproportionate weight to things that are 
“cognitively available” to them, such as things with which they are familiar or which 
they can readily call to mind’.164 Thus, when a consumer wants to purchase a product, 
he usually attaches disproportionate weight to a mark with reputation as an indicator 
and reference point.   This in turn means that the mark with a reputation is capable of 
acquiring or obtaining a excessive selling power, which is of great value to the owner 
of the mark.  Acquiring such a powerful selling power nevertheless might have anti-
competitive effects.  This is because the sheer value it adds to the branded goods in 
comparison with how little it actually says165 or actually adds to the product.  A 
reputation gives a unique, yet false, impression of singularity and distinction by 
introducing economically irrational elements into consumer choice such as emotional 
ties.  This allows the trade mark owner to excessively distort competition by retaining 
the loyalty of consumers without having to improve the quality of his goods.  This 
cannot be legally or economically justified.  This anti-competitive effect is not limited 
to the use of the mark or its reputation in relation to products related to the mark but 
also when the mark is attached to a different product.   This can only be possible if the 
selling power of the mark or its reputation is based on the mark rather than on the 
products to which it is attached.  That is one of the reasons why establishing a 
reputation seems appealing to traders.166 Reputation says nothing and everything at 
the same time in a positive way, which enhances the value of the mark in question 
without having to go the hard way, improving the quality of the products on offer.  
Thus, objective facts that might affect a decision to engage with the offering are 
suppressed in favour of non-brand facts such as ideas that relate a brand to a certain 
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lifestyle or problem or motivation.  So in that sense a computer is not only a 
computer, liquor doesn’t just make you drunk.  On the contrary, carrying a laptop 
makes you a man (if you are physically one otherwise you are not targeted by this 
brand) and, in the same way, liquor allows any nerd to be attractive to women.167  
 
In the same way, Pepsi’s image as a fizzy drink is associated with youthfulness rather 
than with the fact that drinking lots of sugared water rots your teeth and increases the 
chance of obesity.  In other words, you could do better by drinking tap water.  A 
trader of fizzy drink would be very happy to convince a consumer with the idea that a 
fizzy drink is good as long as the consumer is happy to be convinced.168 To avoid any 
fraudulent allegations, the trader may leave the image or reputation of its mark to 
speak for the product and thus encourage consumers to draw their own conclusions.  
In theory, it is the consumer who chooses to accept or reject the suggestion that he 
might be better off by swigging from a bottle of sugared water than from mineral 
water.  In practice however, the reality cannot be further from the truth. Objectively, 
the relationship between Coca-Cola or Pepsi and concepts such as youthfulness has 
never existed.  Still, the impact of the selling power of these formidable brands 
encourages consumers to think otherwise.   As one observer points out as to the 
relationship between Pepsi and a healthy lifestyle:  
The relationship does not exist physically. What I buy is a can or bottle of 
liquid containing certain ingredients-nothing more. I receive nothing from 
Pepsi that has any natural relationship to any characteristics of me. 
Nonetheless, I can see relationship if I want to. I am free, as is everyone, to 
decide in my own perception that Pepsi reflects my motivations or my 
psychological or social needs.  If I say it does, then the relationship is true 
about me, not about Pepsi. And from that relationship I receive a value that I 
appreciate and enjoy- and might not receive from any other soft drink. These 
benefits are real in a very important way, not as physical realities, but as the 
realities of my own mind.169 
 
Such emotional or psychological attractions of certain trade marks to consumers can 
take several forms.  This attraction can be perceived as to the ability of the mark to 
perpetuate an identity that acquires history or tradition; as Hays puts it: ‘fifty-seven 
years later, she still recalled the taste of that Coke on that summer day…From then 
on, wherever she was, in a corner store or in a restaurant or on a place, she always 
                                                
167 Vaver (n 165) 177- 179. 
168 Ibid, 90. 
169 Id. 
 139 
asked for Coca-Cola’.170 The salient trade mark might also be used as a way of 
showing a certain social status such as wealth.171  
 
The impact of brand values on the market power of the owner is profound.  It simply 
allows the owner to relax his control over the quality and the conditions of the 
products on offer and at the same time it allows him to retain his exclusive right to 
authorize the use of his mark for marketing purpose.  The economic role of marks 
with a reputation will be transformed from being a sign of origin and therefore giving 
consumers some information as to the specification and quality of products on offer, 
to being a link to a brand’s value therefore conferring emotional or psychological 
attributes on the branded goods or services.172 
 
While it is clear that maintaining the quality of goods or services increases 
consumers’ social welfare, it is far from clear how building the reputation of  branded 
goods on the brand itself rather than on the product to which it is attached would 
improve social welfare.  One fact, however, is very obvious: while there is a great 
tendency to expand trade mark protection beyond its traditional boundaries, from an 
economic point of view; it does not seem that there is a case for doing so.173 
 
One may argue that the appeal of marks with a reputation to consumers is normally 
founded upon the nature and quality of the products on offer and therefore it is 
difficult to sell a product of bad or low quality without being forced out of the market 
very soon.   This argument is true, in particular, at the early stages of establishing the 
reputation of the mark as an indication of quality products.  This reputation, however, 
can be easily developed through advertising and imagery and can therefore acquire an 
independent value and appeal to consumers regardless of the products which they 
have been used with.174 As one observer states: 
I doubt that many of you would welcome a commodity marketplace in which 
one competed solely on price, promotion and trade deals, all of which can 
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easily be duplicated by competition, leading to over- decreasing profits, decay 
and eventual bankruptcy.175 
 
In other words, instead of competing on the basis of real value, traders can compete 
on marketing and branding which does not add a lot to the quality of the product but 
is still relatively cheap and more importantly very effective in terms of easing 
competition.  This defacto power should not be legitimized by legal protection.  In 
principle, there is nothing wrong with the notion of expanding the scope of protection 
for reputable marks.   However, the systematic degradation of the importance of 
enforcing quality under the dilution doctrine combined with the increased tendency to 
build the reputation of the mark on the brand rather than of the products to which it is 
attached undermines the legal and economic foundations of the law.  Thus, unless it is 
economically proven that protecting the selling power of the mark or its reputation in 
gross stimulates competition and reduces consumer’s searching costs, there should be 
no case for expanding the protection of marks with a reputation. 
5.3.2 A Quality Bias or Brand Bias: the Impact of Neuromarketing? 
 
In this part we investigate the impact of branding in transforming consumers from 
being a quality bias to become a brand bias.  By now, it must have been clear that 
reputable marks influence consumers’ purchasing decisions.  The more the consumer 
purchases the product sold under the mark, the less vigilant he becomes about it.  
Reinforced by neuromarketing techniques, in many cases consumers develop a brand 
bias rather than a quality bias.176 This means the consumer does not usually 
investigate the specifications of the product, particularly its quality, every time he 
buys the product.  This mental or habitual relationship is enhanced by time and after 
while the buyer would not normally question the credibility of the mark unless the 
level of quality is reduced to the limit.   Indeed, it is stated that:  
Humans have a psychological momentum to continue doing the same thing in 
the same way as it was done in the past. Buying habits are no exception. There 
is comforting security in returning to a product…with which one is familiar. 
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Such a purchasing habit depends upon the tenacity of the past’s hold upon the 
future.177 
 
Consumers perceive a reputable mark as a reliable and accurate indicator of quality 
regardless of whether it does truly convey this function or not.  The loyalty of the 
consumer in this case relates to the mark itself not to the product to which it is 
attached.   A survey conducted by the Henley Centre reveals that ‘public trust brand 
names such as Kellogg’s, Heinz and Marks and Spencer more than parliament, the 
police and the legal system’.178 Such results indicate that marks are not impartial 
sources of information and they play a positive role in shaping consumers’ purchasing 
habits.  It is a revealing testimony on the impact of brand loyalty in affecting 
consumer purchasing decisions.   Brand loyalty prevents consumers from choosing 
cheaper yet similar quality substitutes and also decreases the ability of buyers to spot 
variation in quality.  In this case, the mark becomes an anti-competitive tool as it 
allows the owner of the mark to have a disproportionate level of monopoly which 
cannot be legally justified.  This is because the monopoly power of the mark in that 
case does not contribute to the process of competition; neither does it enhance 
consumers’ welfare.  
 
A ‘neuroeconomists’ behavioural research provides that consuming or purchasing a 
product sold under a favoured brand creates an emotional reaction in a buyer’s brain 
(a pleasant feeling of satisfaction).179 Such positive reaction affects the ability of the 
consumer to switch to a different product and in some cases it negatively influences 
his ability to spot variation in quality.  Neuroscientists use nuclear magnetic 
resonance imaging to investigate a person’s decision-making process and his 
estimation of drawbacks and advantages during this process, especially in the field of 
commerce when buying a product or trading.  With this technique the participant’s 
brain activity is recorded and active brain areas are identified during simulated trading 
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situations.  This area of research is called ‘Neuroeconomy’.180 A subdivision of this 
area is Neuromarketing,181 which specifically covers the investigation of factors that 
influence the decision to buy a product or not.  The impact of a brand image on a 
customer’s decision is investigated and how a brand can be created by appropriate 
advertisement.182 
 
Current theories assume that a human is entirely rational in his decision-making 
process and generally acts egoistically, thus only seeking his own advantage.  It is 
stated that a person only behaves altruistically, when he sees a gain in helping 
someone.  However, recent research suggests that this is not always the case and 
people do act altruistically without a personal benefit.  It was shown that emotions 
play a major in this process.  Trust is generally rewarded by people’s behaviour, 
whereas mistrust and cheating is punished.  By scanning a person’s brain certain areas 
have been identified to be important for the build-up of trust, which is close to the 
human rewarding system.183  
 
Traders (companies) would like to find out how trust in their products can be created 
efficiently.  Research work undertaken by a group at the University of Munich 
suggests that when dealing with a favourite brand a person’s brain shows activity is 
similar patterns to the ones connected to trust and positive emotions.184 The previous 
research reveals interesting results.  In an experiment to assess the impact of a mark 
with a reputation, such as Coca-Cola, testers were told that one of the classes contains 
Coca-Cola; most of them preferred this one despite the fact that the glass in concern 
contained Pepsi Cola.  In blind experiment however the mainstream prefers Pepsi 
Cola.185 In another blind testing experiment, consumers have encountered difficulties 
identifying their preferred beer brand.186 
                                                
180 Hollricher (n 180).  
181Ibid; Neuromarketing is simply techniques seek to highlight how consumers make their purchasing 
choices.  Researchers map the test parson’s brain to assess how it reacts to a particular advertisement or 
a product. The concluded results can be implemented via branding and adverting techniques. 
182 Id.  
183 Id. 
184 Id.  
185 V Packard, The Hidden Persuaders, (Ig Publishing, New York 2007) 45; see also Rosler (n 180) 
781. 




Trade mark law should protect and preserve a trade mark reputation as a sign of 
quality.   Apart from this context, the law should not treat reputation as a marketable 
commodity and thus a protectable subject-matter independent of the product to which 
it is attached.   The debate about the wisdom of protecting the selling power of the 
mark in gross should perhaps be conducted with candid reference to broader 
economic and legal policies rather than under the cover of enhanced protection of 
goodwill as suggested by Schechter.  The selling power of a mark or its reputation 
must not be allowed to be used by a trade mark owner to hammer any potential 
competition or to enhance consumer’s irrational behaviour. 
 
The preceding three chapters have sought to highlight the potential impact of failing 
to enforce the quality function under trade mark law with the main emphasis on the 
risk of expanding the monopoly power of the trade mark, enhancing artificial product 
differentiation and the artificial partitioning of the markets between Member States.  
The next part will critically examine why the quality guarantee is not enforced under 
trade mark law.  This part of the thesis has two chapters.  The first explains and 
critically reassesses the notion that the quality guarantee is an economic function that 
trade mark law does not have to bother itself with.  The goal is to identify when and 
how the current legal framework on trade marks generates problems in the domain of 
quality.  This chapter is particularly important.  It explains why market forces alone 
cannot be trusted to enforce the traders of branded goods to maintain a consistent 
quality, thus generating the need to regulate this function under the boundaries of 
trade mark law. 
 
The second chapter investigates when and how the current legal framework could not 
rectify any unfairness uncovered- thinking, for example, of the extensive protection 
offered by consumer protection regulations, Sale of Goods Act and trading standards 
regimes.  This chapter investigates the concept of quality under consumer protection 
law.  It highlights the fact that the rationales for regulating quality under consumer 
law are not the same under trade mark law; thus the former should not be used as an 
excuse for failing to regulate the quality function of the mark under trade mark law.  
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Chapter Four: Rethinking Deregulation: The Enforcement of the Quality 
Function under the Chicago Economic School Revisited 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In this chapter, we ask a question: if the quality guarantee is important for the 
achievement of the legal and economic objectives of trade mark protection, why then 
is it not enforceable under trade mark law?  A ‘law and economics’ approach or what 
might be loosely termed ‘Chicago economics’ is used to explain the development of 
trade mark law and, at the same time, to examine how the law can efficiently achieve 
its objectives.  As we have already seen in chapter one, two of the chief proponents of 
this approach, Landes and Posner, argue that trade mark protection has an underlying 
economic logic that seeks to achieve economic efficiency.1 The Chicago School uses 
economics to ‘explain the structure of trademark law rather than to change the law’.   
They add ‘our overall conclusion is that trademark law, like tort law in general… can 
best be explained on the hypothesis that the law is trying to promote economic 
efficiency’.2 The use of law and economics therefore is based on the notion that the 
right to trade mark protection is to achieve economic efficiency and to maximise 
social welfare. 
 
The Chicago law and economics approach has profoundly influenced the development 
of trade mark law in general and the enforcement of the quality function in particular.   
According to Chicago economists, traders are unable to lower the quality of their 
branded goods without risking the loss of business; a matter closely related to the 
presumption that as traders have obvious economic interests to maintain the quality of 
their branded goods there is no need to enforce the quality guarantee by law.3 As 
such, consumers will reward firms with a reputation and thus maintain consistent 
                                                
1 Chapter one, 14- 22; for general information see I Png, and D Reltman, ‘Why are some products 
branded and others not?’ (1995) 38 J L and Economics 207- 224; B Klein, and K Leffler, ‘The Role of 
Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance’ (1981) 89 J Political Economy 615- 641; P 
Nelson, ‘Information and Consumer Behaviour’ (1970) 78 J Political Economy 311; P Dixon, and C 
Greenhalgh, ‘The Economics of Intellectual Property: A Review to Identify Themes for Future 
Research’ (2002) Oxford Intellectual Property Research Centre 1- 64. 
2 W Landes, and R Posner, ‘Trade Mark Law: An Economic Perspective’ (1987) 30 J L and Economics 
265.  
3 Ibid, 269- 271; R Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (7th edn, Aspen Publishers, New York 2007) 
370. 
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quality levels with repeat purchases and punish those with a bad reputation by not 
buying their products.  This incentive is termed by Landes and Posner as the ‘self-
enforcing feature’ of a trade mark.4 
 
Despite its surface appeal, on deeper scrutiny, the Chicago approach suffers from 
internal inconsistency and practical difficulties.  The controversy rests on the idea of 
using a cluster of assumptions which are not particularly popular between economists.   
The Chicago law and economics movement assumes that consumers are self-
interested (rational) in a narrow sense and they always seek to maximize their own 
personal material benefits.5 Chicago economists in general and, Posner in particular, 
rely on traditional law and economics which suggests that consumers make their 
purchasing decisions based on their anticipation of the expected outcomes of their 
decisions.6 Under this view, consumers are seen as rational players able to estimate 
the likely outcomes of uncertain decisions and to select the outcome which maximises 
their welfare at the time the decision is made.  This is because markets work well in 
supplying consumers with product information and consumers, who are assumed 
rational, would make the correct purchasing decisions.7 In turn, this assumed 
rationality means that consumers should be held accountable for their purchasing 
decisions.  That is why Chicago School does not pass judgement on a consumer’s 
preferences or purchasing decisions even if they appear to be irrational, immoral or in 
some cases economically suicidal.8 The key benefit of such an approach (consumer 
sovereignty or freedom to choose) is not ‘welfare maximization of any sort, but rather 
the simple tolerance of the desires of others’9… the ultimate goal, in other words, is 
                                                
4 Landers and Posner (n 2) 270. 
5 M Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2002) 13- 16; the 
Chicago concept of wealth maximisation gave rise to a flurry of criticisms. Examples include, T 
Kronman, ‘The Value of Moral Philosophy’ (1998) 111 Harvard L Rev 1751; J Coleman, ‘Efficiency, 
Utility, and Wealth Maximisation’ (1980) 8 Hofstra L Rev 509; R Dworkin, ‘Is Wealth a Value?’ 
(1980) 9 J L S 191; J Aldred, ‘The economic rationale of trade marks: an economist’s critique’ in L  
Bently, J Davis, and J Ginsburg, (eds) Trade Marks and Brands, an Interdisciplinary Critique (CUP, 
Cambridge 2008) 267- 270; T Kronman, ‘Wealth Maximisation as a Normative Principle’ (1980) 9 J L 
S 227; E Weinrib, ‘Utilitarianism, Economic, and Legal Theory’ (1980) 30 U Toronto L J 307.  
6 Posner (n 3); Landers and Posner (n 2) 269- 271. 
7 Landers and Posner (n 2) 269- 271. 
8 B Beebe, ‘Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law’ (2005) 103 Michigan L Rev 2058; G Romp, 
Game Theory: Introduction and Applications (OUP, Oxford 1997) 1- 4. 
9 J Persky, ‘Consumer Sovereignty’ (1993) 7 J Econ PERSP 183- 189. 
 146 
liberty, not efficiency; the latter is merely a felicitous incident of the pursuit of the 
former’.10  
 
The notion that market forces are sufficient to protect the interest of consumers as to 
quality issue, or the so-called ‘self-enforcing feature’ of a trade mark, is based on a 
game-theory analysis.  Game theory is applicable in countless scenarios where almost 
any situation can be animized as a game.11 This theory is used to predict the outcome 
of lawmaking using information about the preferences of players (individuals).12  
 
The problem, however, is that it is difficult of obtain reliable observations of trader or 
consumer behaviour under game theory analysis.  As this chapter will demonstrate in 
detail, the elements that influence a trader’s decision to maintain the quality of his/her 
branded goods are enormously complex, unpredictable and uncertain, often because 
the rationale of maintaining consistent quality is related to two distinctive factors: the 
dynamic nature of markets and how a trader sees the reputation of a mark as  purely 
an investment tool, in comparison with the way a consumer perceives it- a sign that, 
among many other things, indicates the origin or quality of a product.  For a 
consumer, therefore, a trade mark can be much more than an economic tool.  As such, 
his relationship with the mark is not limited to its economic functions.  Thus, the 
notion of the rational consumer, assumed by Chicago economists, becomes unrealistic 
and, in some cases, even inaccurate.  Ultimately, it will be argued that trade marks 
may indeed indicate a certain level of quality but they do not necessarily maintain 
consistency of quality.13 
 
In this chapter, our discussion will begin by examining first the mechanisms of which 
the well-being of a society can be measured and then the most popular approaches to 
achieve that goal (enhancing the well-being of the society).  As such, parts 2 and 3 
will focus on what goal (s) the law should promote and more importantly how.  The 
                                                
10 Beebe (n 8). 
11 J Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1994) 1- 2; T 
Siegfried, A Beautiful Math: John Nash, Game Theory, and the Modern Quest for a Code of Nature 
(Joseph Henry Press, Washington 2006) 51. 
12 D Law, ‘Introduction: Positive Political Theory and the Law’ (2006) 15 Journal of Contemporary 
Legal Issues 1- 4; D Smith, J Banks, Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference (Michigan 
University Press, Michigan 1999) 1- 25. 
13 See in general Aldred (n 5) 270.  
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chapter goes on to investigate the use of game theoretic analysis in law where the act 
of policymaking is treated as a strategic game.  As such, the conducts of individuals 
can be predicted.  By examining the notion that individuals are rational and they 
always seek to maximise their wealth, part 5 of this chapter will investigate whether 
market forces are sufficient to enforce traders to maintain the quality of their branded 
goods.  
 
As a lawyer, I shall not attempt to analyze the richness of meaning captured by 
generations of economic interpretation.  This is not the place to describe the 
distinctive features of law and economic movement in general, or the Chicago School 
in particular, in detail. Instead, I persist in asking: why this, the quality guarantee, is 
not legally enforceable under trade mark law?  To this end, only issues that are 
directly related to this question will be addressed.  The link between law and 
economic movement and game theory, on the one hand, and the enforcement of the 
quality function, on the other, might not be easy to spot.  Thus, to simplify the debate, 
the following diagram provides a graphic overview as to how these three issues are 
related.  The diagram particularly highlights, in particular, the role of game theory 
analysis in identifying the preferences of individuals (consumers) who do not have 
actual information about the behavior of other players (traders).  This constitutes 
market failure.  The ultimate goal of utilising game theory analysis is to establish 
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2. How to Measure the Well-being of a Society? 
 
The conventional view is that the economic well-being of a society depends on 
achieving a workable competitive market economy.  But what are the criteria against 
which the concept of economic well-being can be measured?  Put differently, what 
should a legal system try to maximize? 
2.1 Allocative Efficiency 
 
The first criterion of social welfare is largely attributed to the Italian economist 
Vilfredo Pareto.14 Pareto developed the notion of allocation efficiency, best known as 
‘Pareto optimality’.  Under this approach, the well-being of a society is measured in 
terms of how effectively the allocation of resources satisfies the economic wants and 
desires of individuals in society and thus generates the highest possible level of social 
well-being throughout the community as a whole.15 Under this concept of 
competitiveness, economic resources are allocated between different goods and 
services in such a way that it is not possible to make anyone better off without making 
someone else worse off.16 At this stage, one attains a Pareto efficient allocation of 
resources, otherwise, market failure is deemed to have occurred. 
2.2 Wealth Maximization 
 
By contrast, Posner and some other Chicago economists adhere to Kaldor-Hicks 
paradigm of wealth maximization.17 Under this concept of economic well-being, any 
change within an economy that favours some individuals at the expense of others will 
constitute an improvement, if the gains to the winners exceed the losses to the 
losers.18 Posner advocates for the use of wealth maximisation as a guide to judicial 
action.  The previous concept combines: 
                                                
14 Coleman (n 5) 512. 
15 Dworkin (n 5) 139. 
16 R Whish, Competition Law (5th edn, LexisNexis, London 2003) 1- 4; G Dutfield, and U Suthersanen, 
Global Intellectual Property Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2008) 49. 
17 Coleman, (n 5) 513.  For Posner, wealth maximisation is a mechanism to evaluate the consequence 
of changing legal rules. The author would like to thank Professor Andrew Scott for his comments on 
this issue. 
18 N Mercuro, and S Medema, Economics and the Law: From Posner to Post-Modernism (2nd edn, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton 2006) 48.  In the course of defending the notion of wealth 
maximisation, Posner defines the term wealth as value.  This value is measured by ‘what people are 
willing to pay for something or, if they already own it, what they demand in money to give it up’.  For 
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…elements of utilitarianism and individualism and in so doing comes closer to 
being a consensus political philosophy in our contentiously pluralistic society 
than any other overarching political principle. This point is concealed by the 
fact that the term “wealth maximisation” is not a term in common usage. It 
would be easy to show, however, that many invocation of fairness and justice, 
“balancing” and due process and other familiar principles or methods of 
judicial decision –making are proxies for wealth maximisation.19  
 
This economic notion of well-being has generated a great deal of criticism.  Coleman, 
for instance, dismisses Posner’s concept of efficiency stating that wealth 
maximisation is neither more defensible than utilitarianism nor it is an alternative 
efficiency criterion.  In fact it is not an efficiency criterion at all.20 Similar remarks 
were made by Dworkin who passionately criticised Posner’s notion of efficiency.   
Dworkin questions whether wealth maximisation is a worthy goal so that judicial 
decisions should try to maximise pointing out: 
Who would think that a society that has more wealth, as defined, is either 
better or better off than a society that has less, except someone who made the 
mistake of personifying society, and therefore thought that a society is better 
off with more wealth in just the way any individual is?21 
 
Dworkin adds, in some cases a gain in social wealth may be outweighed by losses in 
utility or fairness.  Thus, a gain in social wealth ‘considered just in itself, and apart 
from its costs or other good or bad consequences, is no gain at all’.  Further, Posner 
argues that in a society dedicated to wealth maximisation, people can improve their 
position only by benefiting others.22 This argument however does not ‘specify the 
metric it assumes for testing whether a society bent on wealth produces more 
beneficial-for-others activity than a society that encourages a more direct altruism’.23  
It is not clear that more ‘wealth will be produced by people for other people, as 
distinct from themselves, under wealth maximisation than under a system of taxation 
and redistribution , even though the latter produced less wealth altogether’.24 Dworkin 
                                                                                                                                       
economists however, wealth does not necessarily mean money.  He concluded that the morality of 
wealth maximisation resembles what a student of Adam Smith called ‘capitalist conception of justice’; 
R Posner, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’ (1979) 8 JLS 119- 130, 135; see also R 
Posner, ‘Wealth Maximisation Revisited’ (1985) 2 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Public Policy 85. 
19 Posner (n 18) 104.   
20 Coleman (n 5) 521. 
21 Dworkin (n 5) 194. 
22  Posner seems to adhere to Friedman’s concept of rationality and wealth maximization; Friedman (n 
5). 
23 Dworkin (n 5) 211. 
24 Ibid.  
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also describes Posner’s claim that individuals seeking wealth only for themselves will 
produces a distributive justice better than a society not single-mindedly pursuing that 
goal without adequate specifications, as ‘merely tautology’.25  
 
The law and economics movement, especially the Chicago law and economics, has 
been criticized on the ground that rational choice theory in economics makes 
unrealistic simplifying assumptions.  The Chicago School models are based on perfect 
rather than workable competition.  According to the Harvard sociologist Daniel Bell, 
this love of an idealised system is the defining quality of radical free market 
economics.  Capitalism is envisaged as ‘a jewelled set of movements or a celestial 
clockwork… a work of art, so compelling that one thinks of the celebrate pictures of 
Apelles who painted a cluster on grapes so realistic that the birds would come and 
pick at them’.26 Given the overriding need to pursue justice and fairness in 
distribution through the legal system, many scholars believe that that deregulation 
approach, and thus efficiency, as defined by the Chicago School, could ‘never be the 
ultimate end of a legal system’.27 
3. Schools and Perspectives in Law and Economics 
 
After examining the criteria against which the well-being of a society can be 
measured, in this part we investigate how the well-being of a society can be enhanced.   
Economic analysis of law is usually divided into two subfields, positive and 
normative.28 To this we shall now turn. 
3.1 The Positive Approach 
 
This approach uses economic analysis to predict the effects of various legal rules.   
According to Posner, this approach helps explain and predict how various laws will 
affect the behaviour of individuals.29 It might determine that a certain sanction is more 
likely to deter a certain crime.  This analysis however does not mean that the law 
                                                
25 Ibid, 212. 
26 D Bell, ‘Models and Reality in Economic Discourse’ in D Bell, and I Kristol, (eds) The Crisis in 
Economic Theory (Basic Books, New York 1981) 57- 58. 
27 F Parisi, ‘Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law and Economics’ (2004) 18 Eur J L 
and Economics 259- 272. 
28 Mercuro and Medema (n 18) 45. 
29 Coleman (n 5) 549. 
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should be adopted to correct market failure.30 This is because Chicago economists 
rely on the standard economic assumption that individuals are rational wealth 
maximisers.31 Friedman argued that individuals are effectively free to enter or not to 
enter into any particular exchange ‘so that every transaction is strictly voluntary’.  As 
such, no exchange will take place unless all parties do benefit from it.32 Cooperation 
is ‘thereby achieved without coercion’.  In this context, the ‘consumer is protected 
from coercion by the seller because of the presence of other sellers with whom he can 
deal’.33 In the same way, the seller is protected from coercion by the consumer 
because of other consumers to whom he can sell.  In this case, individuals co-operate 
with others because, by doing so, they satisfy their own wants effectively.34 As such, 
individuals (and entities) study the role of law as a means for changing the relative 
prices attached to alternative individual actions.   Under this view, a change in the law 
will affect human behaviour by altering the relative price structure.35 
 
The positive political theory treats policymaking as a game of strategy and focuses on 
the choices that rational actors make in pursuit of their goals.  According to this 
approach, law is a form of policy.  As such, law making can be modelled as a game of 
strategy in which ordinary individuals (assumed as rational actors) seek to maximise 
their material interests.36 The essence of this approach is to explain and predict the 
content of the law and the course of its development.  To this end, game theory is 
used to derive predictions about the outcome of the lawmaking form information 
about the preferences of the players (individuals).37  As discussed in chapter one, this 
positive theorizing approach has been dominant in the field of property rights, in 
particular concerning the enforcement of the quality function under trade mark law.38  
By relying on this particular approach to economics, the Chicago law and economics 
movement has concluded that the proprietor of a trade mark has an economic interest  
not to allow the quality of the goods sold under his banner to decline, which obviates 
                                                
30 Ibid, 549. 
31 Friedman (n 5). 
32 Ibid. Some of Milton’s ideas raised serious ethical concerns where he, for instance, argued that 
commercial entities should not have social responsibility whatsoever. As such, donating money for 
charity is an ‘inappropriate use of corporate funds in a free-enterprise society’. Ibid, 133- 135. 
33 Ibid, 13- 16. 
34 Id. 
35 Parisi (n 27). 
36 Law (n 12); Smith and Banks (n 12). 
37 Ibid. 
38 See chapter one, 13; see also Mercuro and Medema (n 18) 245. 
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the need for legal enforcement.  This point will be further developed in this chapter 
(section 5). 
3.2 The Normative Approach 
 
The normative law and economics often goes one step further and makes policy 
recommendations based on the economic consequences of various policies.   
According to this approach, it is believed that there is a larger need for legal 
intervention in order to correct for pervasive forms of market failure.  Legal 
intervention therefore is believed to be the appropriate way of correcting such 
failures.39 Under this approach, efficiency is seen as a goal both of ‘current social 
policy and judicial behaviour and argues that governments should intervene in human 
affairs or rearrange socio-political and legal institutions to promote efficiency’.40  
4. Game Theory of Economics 
 
One important development on the law and economic movements has been the 
application of game theory to legal problems.  Under this theory, policymaking is 
treated as a game of strategy.  As such, the focus is on the choices that rational actors 
make in pursuit of their goals.41 
4.1 What is Game Theory? 
 
In order to understand social situations, we need a theory that explains how 
individual’s decisions are interrelated.  Game theory is one such theory.  The theory 
applies where there is imperfect information that is where a player has to rely on 
his/her ‘rational’ expectations of the behaviour of the other simply because he/she 
does not have actual information about the behaviour of the other player.  As such, 
game theory analysis is concerned with how rational individuals make decisions when 
they are mutually interdependent.42 Put differently, the game theory analyses 
situations in which strategic uncertainty is present.  The latter occurs when the 
outcome of an action does not only depend on one player’s act but on one more 
                                                
39 Parisi (n 27). 
40 Coleman (n 5) 549. 
41 Law (n 12); Smith and Banks (n 12). 
42 M Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory (OUP, Oxford 2004) 1- 4. 
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actor.43 Players can be individuals or collective entities that make consistent choices.  
In order for the game to work, a player must play rationally.44 As such, the theory can 
be used as an analytical tool to predict and also to explain and prescribe.45 Under this 
theory, two distinguished branches can be identified: the Co-operative46 and Non-
cooperative game.  The former applies in the case of enforceable contracts.  The latter 
applies in the case of unenforceable contracts between players.  Examples include the 
relationship between the traders of branded goods and their customers where the 
expectations of consumers regarding the quality of goods are not legally enforceable 
under trader mark law.  Another example could be competition between economic 
agents in the market.  In this regard, the Non-cooperative game theory is a framework 
that treats strategic settings as games where the outcome of one individual’s optimal 
behaviour depends on what he or she believes the other will do.  In this chapter, our 
analysis will be restricted exclusively to that game, the Non-cooperative game.  
 
According to game theory, individualism is very important.  In the Non-cooperative 
game, as just mentioned, players (individuals) are unable to enter into binding and 
enforceable agreements with one another.  This assumption however does not mean 
that individuals do not work together.  They do work together not because they have 
to but because it is in their own interest to do so.47 Another assumption under the 
game theory is that individuals are rational hence it is assumed that they will act in 
their own self-interest.  This means that individuals are able to determine the outcome 
of their actions.48 
 
The problem however is that considering the complexity of many decisions and the 
amount of information required to analysis many situations rationally, the rationality 
assumption seems unrealistic.  Given the long-run equilibrium of the economy, it is 
possible to identify rational firms through the outcome of competition where irrational 
players eventually will be forced to leave the market.49 When it comes to consumers 
                                                
43 K Binmore, Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction (OUP, Oxford 2007) 2. 
44 Ibid. 
45 C Camerer, Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction (Princeton University 
Press, New Jersey 2003) 5. 
46 This theory focuses on how individuals committed to each other formulate rational decisions. Romp 
(n 8) 2.  
47 Ibid, 1- 5.  
48 Id; J Watson, Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory (Norton & Company, London 2002) 79. 
49 Romp (n 8) 3. 
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however, the same is not true.  There is no evolutionary process where rational 
consumer can eliminate non-rational consumers.  The lack of such a process means 
that the economy will not necessarily converge on the rational outcome.50 Finally, the 
concept of rationality adhered to by Chicago School does not explain how exactly 
individuals make a complex decision.  Rather, it simply assumes that they will act 
rationally.51 
 
In order to identify the motivation of players in a game, economists have invented the 
term utility.  This allows each player to assign a numerical value to each possible 
outcome of a game.  The theory however does not assume that some preferences or 
outcomes are more rationales than others.  It simply regards reason as an instrument 
for avoiding inconsistent behaviour.  As such, all consistent behaviours count as 
rational.52 According to the theory, acting consistently is assumed as seeking to 
maximise the value of something (utility).  So in order to predict an individual’s 
behaviour, we have to measure his utility or preference.  But first we need to measure 
how much value the tested individual is prepared to assign to any preference.53 To this 
end, we need to establish a criterion or scale to use.  For this purpose, we pick two 
outcomes that are respectively better and worse than any other outcome the tested 
individual is likely to encounter.54 
4.2 John Nash Equilibrium and Game Theory  
 
John Nash initiated the modern theory of rational bargaining where he established the 
so called Nash equilibrium (solution).  This is now considered as the basic building 
block of the theory of games.55 As noted, it is assumed that rational players seek to 
maximise their payoff.  However, this is not easy given the fact that players do not 
know what strategies their opponents were going to choose.  A Nash equilibrium is a 
pair of strategies whose use results in a cell in which both payoffs are identified.  A 
Nash ‘solution’ only occurs when all players are making the best reply to the strategy 
                                                
50 Ibid; for a critique of game theory see A Kelly, Decision Making Using Game Theory: An 
Introduction for Mangers (CUP, Cambridge 2003) 173. 
51 Romp (n 8) 3. 
52 Binmore (n 43) 7. 
53 Ibid, 8. 
54 Id. 
55 Ibid, 12. 
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choices of the others.56 According to Nash, rational players use reason to solve a 
game.  Individuals learn from experience.  For each game, Nash proposes a solution, 
which should be a reasonable prediction of rational behaviour by players.57  
4.3 Strategic versus Extensive Game 
 
There are two ways of representing a non-cooperative game: the strategic and the 
extensive form.  We restrict our analysis to the strategic form.  This game lists each 
player’s strategies, and the outcomes that result from each possible combination of 
choices.58  Under a non-cooperative game, the consumer (assumed to be a rational 
individual) is engaged in a game with the producer.  The problem however is that the 
trader (producer) will have full knowledge of the quality of the product regardless of 
the trade mark.  By contrast, the consumer has only limited knowledge.  As we will 
next see in the prisoner’s dilemma, how best to respond to asymmetric information of 
this type can, in certain contexts, be solved by using the Nash equilibrium (solution).   
Nash’s solution identifies the situation where all players have chosen their moves and 
they have no incentive to change because any change would make them worse off.59  
4.3.1 The Prisoner’s Dilemma as an Example 
 
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, every player chooses the course of action that is most 
advantageous to them.  What is the best action will depend on the other player’s 
choices.  That is why, when a player chooses an action, he must bear in mind the 
options available to other players.  In other words, he must take a view about the other 
player’s likely actions.60 But how exactly can a player take such a view?  The 
assumption is that each player’s belief is derived from his past experience playing the 
game and that this experience is sufficiently extensive that he knows how his 
opponents will behave.  A player need not be told about other players’ actions 
                                                
56 Ibid, 14. 
57 Osborne (n 42) 1- 6, 13- 21. 
58 B Stengel, ‘Equilibrium Computation for Two-Player Games in Strategic and Extensive Form’ in N 
Nisan, T Roughgarden, E Tardos, (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 53. 
59 Osborne (n 42) 1- 6, 13- 21; H Bierman, and L Fernandez, Game Theory with Economic 
Applications (Wesley Publishing Company, Wokingham 1993) 81. The author would like to thank 
professor Andrew Scott for his comments on this issue. 
60 Osborne (n 42) 13- 31. 
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because he knows those actions from his previous involvement in the game.61 A very 
significant point to note here is that the experience of players in previous games does 
not make them familiar with the behaviour of other players hence the player does not 
condition his action on the opponent he faces.  That is why the assumption is that each 
player views each play of the game in isolation.62 A Nash equilibrium is an action 
profile 1 where no player can do better by choosing an action different from 1 
providing that both players play the game. 
   
4.3.2 The Prisoner’s Game: Preference Identification Strategies 
 
This game consists of three elements: a set of players, usually two players but they 
can be more (our game contains two arrested prisoners), possible actions for each 
player and the process of deciding what these actions are, a key point in game theory.  
The game provides two actions for each prisoner: keep quiet or confess.  Finally, the 
Prisoner’s Game contains a set of preferences for every set of choices or outcomes by 
the players.63  Now, the first prisoner is called prisoner 1 and the second is known as 
prisoner 2.  Both have been arrested for a number of crimes and they can both be 
sentenced for a minor offence but there is not enough evidence to convict them for the 
major crime unless one of them informs against the other.  If they both stay quiet 
(therein after: Q), they will only be convicted for the minor offence for a short time.  
However, if one of them, only one, confesses (therein after: C) and gives evidence 
about the other, the confessing party will be freed and then be used as a witness 
against the other, who will be sentenced for a very long time.  If both suspects speak, 
however, they will both get a reduced sentence.  Now, both prisoner 1 and prisoner 2 
have the choice to keep quiet or to confess.  So both of them have the same options 
and both of them have preferences.   The most important part of the game is to 
establish all the actions that every player might have and, at the same time, the 
outcome of these actions (preferences). 
 
The diagram below indicates these options and their interrelationship. 
                                                
61 Ibid. In some cases however players do not have experience with the game or they might not view 
other players in isolation; Ibid, 27- 28. 
62 Ibid, 21. 
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The preferences of prisoner 1 from worse to best are as follows.  The worst outcome 
for him is if he keeps quiet and prisoner 2 confesses.  In this case his preference will 
be (0) because he will be locked up and prisoner 2 will be set free.   The second less 
preferred outcome would be if they both confess since they both will get reduced 
sentences.  In this case, the preference of prisoner 1 will be (1).  But if they both keep 
quiet (and taking into account the lack of evidence) they both will have a short 
sentence.   Prisoner 1’s preference in this case is (2).  However, the best preference 
for him will be if he confesses and prisoner 2 keeps quiet.  In this case, he will be set 
free and prisoner 2 will be locked behind bars for a long time.   Here, the preferences 
of prisoner 1 scores (3). 
 
Prisoner 2 has the same options and preferences but in reverse.  His less preferred 
outcome would be where prisoner 1 gets 3.  The second less preferred outcome would 
be when they both get 1.  The next less preferred when they get 2.  And his best 
outcome would be where he gets 3 and is therefore set free and  prisoner 1 gets 0 and 
is locked up for long time.  
4.3.2.1The Solution to the Game: Nash Equilibrium 
 
In the above game, Nash’s equilibrium (solution) is used to evaluate the players’ 
actions and preferences.  The key idea here is to consider the strategies of both players 
such as keeping quiet or confessing to identify the exact action profile where both 
players have no interest whatsoever in changing their minds (actions), otherwise, they 










players select preference 1.  This is because if prisoner 1 changes his mind, the 
outcome will be worse for him.  He will be locked up for long time and prisoner 2 
will be set free.  So he has no incentive to change his outcome (action).  The same 
thing is true for prisoner 2.  Hence both players have no incentive to change their 
mind where they both get preference 1.  According to Nash, this is the solution of the 
game.  As such, we can only have Nash equilibrium where both players have 
preference 1.  The reason why we do not have Nash’s solution where the players have 
preferences 3, 2, or 0, is that in these cases both players have a strong incentive to 
change their minds.  For instance, let us choose the case where prisoner 1 has 
preference (3) and prisoner 2 preference is (0).  In this case prisoner 1 has no 
incentive to change his mind because in this position he will be set free.  However, 
prisoner 2 has a very strong incentive to confess about prisoner 1 since keeping quiet 
is the worst outcome for him.  If the prisoner 2 speaks, he and prisoner 1 will get a 
reduced sentence.  But if he keeps quiet, he will be locked up for a long time.  That is 
why we do not have the Nash equilibrium here (no game) and the same is true in the 
case where the players’ preferences score 2 or 3.  
 
Keeping Nash’s solution in mind and considering the fact that a trader and a consumer 
operate in a similar context of uncertainty as to how the other will react if certain 
actions are taken, the game theory analysis could apply to the trader-consumer 
relationship.  In theory, a trade mark owner (assumed to be rational and always seeks 
to achieve long term profit) has a strong incentive to maintain a good reputation, and 
thus good quality products.  If he does not, a consumer (assumed to be rational) is 
likely to switch to a substitutable product.   Accordingly, one Nash equilibrium 
(solution) may indeed be the state where the trader has an incentive to maintain the 
quality of goods sold under his mark to retain the loyalty of a consumer, and the 
consumer has an incentive to continue buying the product because of its quality.  This 
argument however does not exclude all other possibilities.  For instance, what would 
the implication of game theory analysis on a trader-consumer relationship be if the 
rationality assumptions of the Chicago School can be challenged? Put differently, 
what if the trader is able to retain the loyalty of the consumer without having to 




Based on the foregoing, one immediate question emerges: how does the Chicago 
economist come to the conclusion that market forces are sufficient to enforce traders 
to maintain the quality of their branded goods, and thus there is no need to enforce 
this function by law? 
4.4 Game Theory and the Enforcement of the Quality Guarantee: Chicago 
Approach 
 
Chicago economists acknowledge the fact that trade mark protection does not reduce 
consumer search costs unless the trader of branded goods maintains a consistent level 
of quality ‘over time and across consumers’.64 Nevertheless, as discussed in chapter 
one, Landes and Posner argue that a trader is unlikely to develop a strong brand unless 
he is able to maintain the quality of the product to which the mark is attached.65 This 
assumption is built on one of the fundamental building blocks of the Chicago law and 
economics movement:  individuals (and entities) are rational profit maximisers.66 As 
such, Chicago economists appear to assume that consumers are watchful and would 
realize when a trader reduces the quality of his branded goods and, as a result, would 
abandon the mark by switching to a competitor’s product.  This commercial loss is 
thought to be adequate and effective to prevent traders from lowering the standard of 
their goods in the first place.  Chicago’s  positive or what we might loosely call 
‘deregulation’ approach is based on the notion that market forces provide a reliable 
enforcement mechanism that ensures the protection of the interests of consumers as to 
quality issues under trade mark law.67 Posner points out:  
The investment that a producer makes in his trademark is like a hostage: It 
increases the cost to the producer of surreptitiously reducing the quality of the 
product or otherwise trying to deceive consumers, because when they catch 
on, the producer may lose his entire investment…He may even if they don’t 
catch on, because failure to maintain quality control is a legal bar to enforcing 
a trademark against an infringing competitor.68 
                                                
64 Landers and Posner (n 2) 269. 
65 Chapter one, 14. 
66 For more information about Chicago economics see Mercuro and Medema (n 18) 102. 
67 See page, 151. 
68 Posner (n 3); see also C Shapiro, ‘Premium for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputation’ 
(1983) 98 QJE 659; Similar remarks were made by other Chicago economists where they argue that an 
efficient structure of private property rights will emerge as a result of market forces. G Furubotn, R 
Richter, ‘The New Institutional Economics: An Assessment’ in G Furubotn, R Richter, (eds) The New 
Institutional Economics (Texas University Press, College Station 1991a) 16; D Libecap, Contracting 
for Property Rights (CUP, Cambridge 1989a) 16. Still, some acknowledge that self-interested 
individuals may fail to live up to their past promises; even in the case of contractual relationship hence 
some enforcement mechanism is necessary.  The problem however is that, although enforcement 
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The Chicago law and economics movement has had a profound impact on the 
enforcement of the quality guarantee under trade mark law.  For the vast majority of 
trade mark scholars, that function is perceived as an economic one that should not be 
enforced under trade mark law. 
 
Despite its surface appeal, on deeper scrutiny, the Chicago deregulation approach 
concerning the enforcement of the trade mark quality function suffers from a few 
major flaws.  The controversy rests on applying game theory analysis and Nash’s 
solution to a trader-consumers relationship.  To this end, the Chicago School employs 
a cluster of unrealistic and hotly contested postulates such as perfect competition, 
consumer rational behaviour and wealth maximisation. As the proceeding parts of this 
chapter will show however, contrary to the Chicago School approach, consumers are 
not rational.  Furthermore, the notion that traders have economic interests not to 
reduce the quality of their braded goods is not always accurate.  To this we shall now 
turn. 
5. Chicago School Critique 
 
In the paradigm governing the enforcement of the quality guarantee, the Chicago 
approach is untenable.  Firstly, maintaining quality control is not a legal bar to 
enforcing a trade mark against an infringing competitor under trade mark law.69 Even 
under consumer protection law, the traders of branded goods are required to maintain 
a satisfactory quality which is not the same as maintaining a consistent quality.70 
 
                                                                                                                                       
reduces uncertainty in the market, it is costly.  This includes the cost of establishing an enforcement 
mechanism and the cost of detecting violations and imposing penalties on the violators.  This means 
that enforcement in the case of some property rights will be less perfect. D North, Institutions, 
Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (CUP, Cambridge 1990b) 33, 58; D North, 
‘Institutions and Economic Performance’ in U Maki, B Gustafsson, and C Knudsen, (eds) Rationality, 
Institutions and Economic Methodology ( Routledge, London 1993b) 247. 
69 Chapter two, 17; Case C- 9/93 IHT Internationale Heiztechnik v Ideal-Standard  [1994] 3 CMLR 
857, para 38. 
70 Sections 14 (2) and (2 A) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 as amended (SGA) regulate quality matters.  
Section 14 (2) reads: ‘Where the seller sells goods in the course of a business, there is an implied term 
that the goods supplied under the contract are of satisfactory quality’. 
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Secondly, Chicago economists build their assumptions on the model of perfect 
competition rather than on workable competition.71 The problem however is that this 
model (perfect competition) is based on assumptions unlikely to be observed in 
practice.  As such, the notion that individuals (or entities) are rational and that they 
always attempt to maximise profits is not always accurate.  Some might be interested 
in expanding the size of their businesses more than maximising their profit.  Others 
may be more interested in indulging themselves in the quiet life at the expense of their 
wealth.72 Further, considering the idea that Nash equilibrium occurs only where 
individuals (players) have no interests to change their minds (actions), it appears that 
the Chicago School of economics has built its quality maintenance assumption on a 
static model of economic behaviour which may fail to account for the dynamic nature 
of markets.  As such, even where the traders of branded goods might be interested in 
maximising their profit, this in itself, does not necessarily mean that they are going to 
maintain the quality of their goods.  While the act of maintaining consistent quality 
may be important for a certain period of time to retain the loyalty of consumers, the 
cost of doing so becomes economically unsustainable (and irrational according to 
Nash solution of the game) whenever the dynamic nature of markets has changed 
such as in the case of the increase in the price of raw materials or where the traders 
were able to retain the loyalty of consumers by using cheaper methods such as 
advertising.  In this case, the traders have a strong incentive to change their minds 
(action), and hence not to maintain consistent quality. 
 
Thirdly and closely related to the second point, the Chicago approach largely ignores 
the role of forces such as social norms on individual behaviour.73 The inclusion of 
social norms into the trade mark-consumer relationship makes for robust explanations 
of consumer behaviour and more accurate prediction of the effects of legal 
protection.74 It should be evident, given the advertising and persuading impact of 
                                                
71 Posner observes that the Kinked demand curve (workable competition) ‘cut-throat competition, 
leverage, administrated prices, and the other characteristic concepts of the industrial organisation of 
this period had this in common: they were not derived from and were often inconsistent with economic 
theory, and in particular with the premises of rational profit maximisation’;  R Posner, ‘The Chicago 
School of Antitrust Analysis’ (1978) 127 U Pennsylvania L Rev 931. 
72 A Jones, and B Sufrin, EC Competition Law (3rd edn, OUP, Oxford 2008) 12; Whish (n 16) 3- 7. 
73 The study of social norms in law and economics is often attributed to R Ellickson, Order without 
Law: How Neighbours Settle Disputes (Harvard University Press, Harvard 1991).  
74 Some Chicago theorists such as C Sustein, D Kahan, L Lessig and R Pildes (usually called the new 
Chicago school) argue that law should help to reform and change social norms.  McAdams points out 
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brands on consumer commercial behaviour, that there is something fundamental about 
the nature of consumer interaction that is not adequately explained by the extant 
models of human behaviour found in law and economics, in particular the rational-
choice based approach used by Chicago School.75 By stressing the concepts of 
rational individuals and wealth maximisation, the Chicago approach to law and 
economics intentionally or unintentionally exaggerates the role of market forces, and 
thus minimises the need for legal intervention to enforce the quality function under 
trade mark law.  
 
The Chicago quality approach suffers three major drawbacks which deserve further 
scrutiny.  Firstly, the notion that information provided by trade marks in a perfect 
competition system reduces consumer searching costs is not straightforward.  On the 
one hand, there is lack of certainty as what is guaranteed under a trade mark and, on 
the other, there are a few cases where information provided by marks actually 
increases rather than decreases searching costs.  Secondly, are consumers truly 
rational and always interested in maximising their own material wealth as anticipated 
by Chicago economists?  This concept will be tested.  Thirdly, the interests of traders 
to retain the loyalty of consumers by maintaining consistent quality are not static.   
Today’s market provides many examples which indicate that it is very difficult to 
anticipate how individuals (entities) will behave in a given situation.  In the context of 
trader-consumer relationship, this means it is not always possible to link the notion of 
wealth maximisation and quality maintenance.  
5.1 The Interplay between Quality, Information and Search Costs 
 
In this part we ask a question: what information does a trade mark convey to a 
consumer?  According to the TM Directive and the interpretation of the Court of 
Justice, a trade mark serves mainly as a badge of origin.  It therefore relates X product 
to a particular trader who might be held responsible for its quality.76 However, it is 
                                                                                                                                       
that ‘arguably, the most important relationship between law and norms is the ability of law to shape 
norms’… ‘If legal rules sometimes change or create norms, one can not adequately compare an 
existing legal rule with its alternatives without considering how a change in the law rules may affect 
the relevant norms’.  R McAdams, ‘The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms’ (1997) 96 
Michigan L Rev 354. This new approach however was strongly opposed by Posner who described it as 
‘totalitarian’, cited in Mercuro and Medema (n 18) 320. 
75 For information about social norms and law and economics see Ibid, 336- 341. 
76 Chapter two, 64- 66. 
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not possible to pin down what exactly is guaranteed to consumers under the origin 
function.  Some argue that under trade mark law, the origin function provides a 
guarantee to neither a product’s function nor its fitness for purpose.77 After all, these 
goals are already guaranteed under consumer protection law.  The origin function also 
does not guarantee that the product has been made in a particular way or at a 
particular place.   It only provides assurance that the product has been made under the 
authority of a single entity.78 But such authority does not convey too much 
information because there is usually complete separation between those who make 
authorization decisions and those who actually make the product.  It could be argued, 
therefore, that a firm’s responsibility as to the product they make does not necessarily 
have any kind of obligation and confers no rights to consumers under trade mark 
law.79 As one observer points out: ‘to a cynical economist, it seems that the only thing 
guaranteed to the consumer is that the trade mark owner will take a share of the 
profits on the sale of the product’.80 
 
In the case of a mark with a reputation, the informative role of the mark becomes even 
more elusive.  The function of the mark with a reputation is not restricted to indicate 
the origin or quality of a product.  On the contrary, the mark may communicate or 
advertise the product in question.  However, as far as the quality of information is 
concerned the mark with a reputation reveals very little information to consumers.   
Instead, the advertising value of the mark seeks to create an emotional tie.  Creating 
an emotional tie with consumers, however, does not require too much information.   
On the contrary, it is about saying as little as possible in the hope of encouraging 
consumers to create their own positive impression about the product.  In that sense, an 
Apple 3GS phone becomes a must buy item for many consumers despite the fact that 
there are hundreds of other, significantly cheaper handsets, that do exactly what the 
3GS does.  Still it is the image and prestige of this particular handset, not necessarily 
its specifications, that fuels consumers’ imaginations.  
 
                                                
77 Aldred (n 5) 269. 
78 Chapter two, 64- 66. 
79 Aldred (n 5) 269. 
80 Ibid. 
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Further, more information does not necessarily mean less searching costs.  The 
information provided by a mark might be false,81 inaccurate or it might contain 
overestimated claims about the quality of the product that cannot be checked.82 Even 
if the information provided by the mark is very accurate, it can, nonetheless, still 
mislead consumers.  For instance, if the advertised mark concentrates on one piece of 
information or a character of the branded goods that the consumer assumes its 
uniqueness but, in reality, other competing products contain the same character, this 
information misleads the public even where it is quite accurate.83 A good example can 
be found in the digital cameras market where the attention is mostly based on one or 
two aspects of the product, such as how many pixels a camera has despite the fact that 
the pixel is not the most important part of the camera.84 Yet, many camera brands 
stress this point as many consumers believe that the more pixels you have the better 
quality picture you get. 
5.2 When does a Trade Mark Increase Searching Costs? 
 
The notion that a trade mark increases consumer welfare by reducing searching costs 
is not straightforward.  The information provided by the mark does not always reduce 
searching costs.  While consumers feel more satisfied and less confused by using a 
trade mark as a source of information, in many cases, they actually end up making 
poorer purchasing decisions.  An empirical study suggests that increasing the amount 
of information on a package tends to produce dysfunctional consequences in terms of 
the consumers’ ability to select the brand which is best for them.  This is despite the 
fact that the tested consumers felt more satisfied and certain about their choices.  In 
other words, the test reveals that consumers felt better with more information and yet 
they made a poor purchasing decision.85 
 
                                                
81 In this case, Article 3 of the Business Protection from Misleading Marketing Regulations 2008 might 
be invoked (implementing Directive 2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
concerning misleading and comparative advertising [2006] OJ L376/21. 
82 H Rosler, ‘Anti-Counterfeiting in Online Auctions from the Perspective of Consumer’s Interests’ 
(2006) 37 ICC 780. 
83 I Ramsay, Consumer Protection: Text and Materials  (Butterworths, London 1989) 416. 
84 Pixel has to do with the size of printing not the quality of a picture.  The larger the size of the 
photograph, the more pixel you need.  6 Million MP is enough to print up to A4 size.  
85 J Jacoby, D Speller, C Kohn, ‘Brand Choice Behaviour as a Function of Information Load’ (1974) 
11 J Marketing Research 67. 
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What is more, for consumers who have a favoured brand, the impact of the mark in 
reducing searching cost becomes insignificant.  In order for the mark to reduce search 
cost, there must be some sort of brand uncertainty.86 An empirical study concludes 
that although the theory of reducing consumer’s cost makes sense, it does not offer 
much in the way of testable predictions’.87 The study reveals that consumers who 
have some brand preference might stop looking for other competitive alternatives 
which might have a similar or better quality.88 That is, Robert Feinberg questions the 
notion of information and reducing consumer’s search cost.89 He argues that when 
considering the benefit of the trade mark in providing information about the quality 
differentials thus reducing searching costs, one must consider the question of time.   
That is, the price differential between a dominant brand (e.g. Canon) that has more 
than 70 years of experience and was one of the first cameras makers to enter the 
market, and a competitor brand (e.g. Sony) is significant.  However, over time, it is 
likely that the quality differentials between these two cameras makers would narrow.   
The Canon mark nevertheless may continue to perpetuate the original, yet not longer 
accurate, differentials.  This is despite the fact that the information provided by the 
Canon mark might not have the same value when other competitors have improved 
the quality of their products.90 In this case, the continuous reliance on the Canon mark 
might have reverse impact, and thus increase rather than decrease searching costs.   
Thus, as Feinberg puts it:  
The discrepancy between actual and perceived quality would be longer-lived 
and hence more damaging to… [Sony] competitors, the larger the dominant 
brand’s [Canon] share of the market. This follows if experience with… [Sony] 
brands are the mechanism by which perceived quality differentials are 
narrowed.91  
 
In other words, the difference in quality between Canon and Sony cameras might 
become insignificant and, therefore, does not economically justify price differences.   
Yet, Canon’s reputation as cameras marker still enjoys a strong competitive advantage 
                                                
86 S Moorthy, B Ratchford, D Talukdar, ‘Consumer Information Search Revisited: Theory and 
Empirical Analysis’ (1997) 23 J Consumer Research 263- 277. 
87 Ibid, 264. 
88 For more information about  the impact of trade mark in reducing search cost in case of totally 
differentiated, independent priors; partially differentiated, independent priors; homogeneous 
independent priors and homogeneous priors and brands see Ibid, 263- 277, 267- 268. 
89 R Feinberg, ‘Trademarks, Market Power, and Information’ (1985) 2 Rev of Industrial Organization 
376- 385. 
90 Ibid, 376. 
91 Id. 
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against other competitors, hence charging a high price for their products which might 
be similar to much cheaper substitutes already available in the market.  This, in turn, 
means that for consumers who have a brand preference, relying on the trade mark as a 
source of information might actually increase their searching costs.  
 
5.3 Chicago Concept of Rational Consumer Retested 
 
Chicago economists consider consumers rational players able to estimate the likely 
outcomes of uncertain decisions and to select the outcome which maximises their 
welfare at the time the decision is made.  In turn, this assumed rationality means that 
consumers should be held countable for their purchasing decisions.  Hence, if a trader 
reduces the quality of his branded goods, the theory is that consumers will simply 
switch to a different product, but do they? 
 
Today’s markets provide a wealth of evidence that contradicts the Chicago notion of 
consumer rationality.  A close look at the markets reveals that many of the advertised 
aspects of branded products such as colour, shape, image or design are not of a great 
benefit to consumers but still capable of luring their purchasing choices.  This is 
particularly true in the case of luxury products where the reputation of the mark or its 
design might create a false impression of superior quality, the so-called sensation 
transference.92 In an experiment to investigate the impact of design in luring 
consumers’ purchasing decisions, a group of women were given the same cosmetic 
product in two different shape bottles, circular and triangular.  80% of the tested 
women believed that the product with the circle design is of a higher quality than that 
in the triangle.93 This experiment shows that consumers can be easily duped. 
 
The impact of the artificial components of a product in luring consumer purchasing 
decisions however is not limited to luxury goods.  Indeed, contrary to the Chicago 
notion of rational individuals, modern marketing provides significant evidence that 
consumers are not rational and, hence, at least from marketing point of view, it is 
                                                
92 Rosler (n 82) 775- 780. 
93 V Packard, The Hidden Persuaders (Penguin, Harmondsworth 1981) 239.  By stark contrast, 
Chicago economists, including Landes, Posner, Becker and Stigler have claimed that advertising is 
essentially informative rather than manipulative; see chapter three, 40; G Hodgson, ‘The Hidden 
Persuaders: Institutions and Individuals in Economic Theory’ (2003) 27 Cambridge JE 159- 175. 
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dangerous to assume that they will behave in a rational way.94 For instance, in an 
experiment to test the impact of package design for a new detergent in customer 
purchasing decisions, a number of women were given the product in three different 
boxes.95 One box was yellow, the second was blue and the third was blue with 
splashes of yellow.  The tested women were given the impression that they had been 
given different products.  In reality however, the detergent was the same.  When 
reporting back, some women stated that the detergent in the yellow box was too 
strong; in some cases it even ruined their clothes.  By contrast, they complained that 
detergent in the blue box was not strong enough and, in some cases, it actually left 
their clothes dirty.  The overwhelming majority reported that the third box, which 
contained what the tested women felt was an ideal balance of colours in the package 
design, was wonderful.96 In another case, a department store tried an experiment.  The 
manager increased the price of slow-moving items from 14 cents to two for twenty 
nine cents.  Sales immediately increased 30 percent when customers offered the items 
at this ‘bargain’ price.97 
 
The importance of artificial product differentiation in general, and the role of trade 
marks in particular, become very significant where the branded goods are essentially 
alike in physical characteristics.  The greater the similarity between branded products 
is, the less reason to choose one over the other.  With the growth of standardisation, it 
becomes noticeable difficult to rationally differentiate between products 
(differentiation based on the quality of branded goods).  This makes the role of brand 
loyalty in influencing, shaping and directing consumer commercial behaviour very 
crucial indeed.98 To enhance brands loyalty, traders sell varied range of emotional 
components such as security, love, sense of power, sense of roots and so on and so 
forth.99 
5.3.1 The Rational Consumer: What is the Criterion? 
 
                                                
94 V Packard, The Hidden Persuaders (Ig Publishing, New York 2007) 38. 
95 Ibid, 37- 42. 
96 Id. 
97 Ibid, 40. 
98 Ibid, 45, 66. 
99 Ibid, 86- 94. 
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One of the criticisms of game theory discussed early in this chapter is that, unlike 
entities, it is not possible to reasonably differentiate a rational from an irrational 
consumer.  This is because consumer commercial conducts are subjects to a wide 
range of elements that the Chicago concept of rationality does not account for.  For 
instance, how many of you have done your shopping on an empty stomach only to 
end up home with dozens of things that you do not necessarily need?100 How many of 
you have the experience of placing an order by phone for warm clothes on a cold 
night only to discover that what you ordered is unsuitable or does not fit?101 How 
many of you have the experience of joining a gym or health club and barely using 
them?  The answer is possibly many of you.  And the reason for such economically 
unwise behaviour is that when we do our shopping on an empty stomach or order 
warm clothes via phone our purchasing conduct is heavily influenced by our 
emotional state.  When we joined the gym we mainly focused on the benefit of doing 
so rather than on how it feels to get up early in the morning and to exercise very hard 
for an hour or so.102 Vigna and Malmendier explain this phenomenon by suggesting 
that ‘making inferences from observed contract choice under the rational expectation 
hypothesis can lead to biases in the estimation of consumer preferences’.103 The 
conclusion that can be derived from these examples is that when it comes to 
purchasing satisfaction and choosing the correct product, consumers usually are 
unable to choose the best product for themselves.104 Thus, the Chicago notion of 
rational consumer is, at best, unrealistic and it ignores the impact of social norms, 
branding and marketing in shaping consumer purchasing decisions. 
 
5.3.2 The Impact of Wealth Maximisation in Reducing Quality: Rethinking 
Nash’s Equilibrium 
 
As discussed, the concept of the ‘self-enforcing feature’ of a trade mark (coined by 
Landes and Posner) is based on game-theoretic analysis.  The problem however is that 
it is difficult to anticipate a certain outcome all the time depending on game analysis 
                                                
100 R Nisbett, and D Danouse, ‘Obesity, Hunger, and Supermarket Shopping Behaviour’ (1986) 3 
Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association 683. 
101 D Kahneman, and R Thaler, ‘Utility Maximization and Experienced Utility’ (2006) 20 J Economic 
Perspectives 224.  
102 S Vigna, and U Malmendier, ‘Paying Not to Go to the Gym’ (2006) 96 American Economic Rev 
694.  
103 Ibid. 
104 Kahneman and Thaler (n 101) 221.  
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alone.105 This is because contrary to the Chicago concept of wealth maximisation 
under the perfect competition system, a trader’s commercial conduct is subject not 
only to his own interest but also to the dynamic of the market.  Thus, the promise of 
maintaining consistent quality is not solely related to the interest of the trader himself. 
 
 According to the Prisoner’s Dilemma discussed above (the game), the trader and 
consumer (players) work together only because it is in their own interests to do so.  
As such, any change in the position of the players or their interests would lead to a 
completely different result from that anticipated by the Chicago School regarding the 
enforcement of the quality issues.  According to the game, if any of the factors that 
encourage a trader to maintain the quality of his branded goods changes due, for 
instance, to the availability of other cheaper methods to retain the loyalty of 
consumers such as advertising or because of the increase of prices of raw materials, a 
trader, who is assumed rational and always seeks to maximise his own material 
benefits, would have a strong incentive not to maintain the quality of his branded 
goods.  In the same way, a trader may decide that the short-term increase of profits 
results from reducing quality combined with increase in sales outweighs the ‘long-run 
deterioration in reputation and sales once consumers discover that product quality has 
declined’.106 This scenario is plausible and confirmed by Posner himself who points 
out that the notion that a trader has an interest to maintain the quality of his branded 
goods is not true ‘if the producer could withdraw from the market at zero cost.107  
According to this interpretation, trade marks may indeed indicate a certain level of 
quality but they do not necessarily maintain consistency of quality.108 
 
In his study to investigate the equilibrium of price-quality for markets in which buyers 
cannot observe product quality prior to purchase, Carl Shapiro has argued that there is 
an ‘incentive for sellers to reduce quality and take short-run gains before buyers catch 
on’.109 The study maintains that where the product attributes are difficult to observe 
prior to purchase, consumers usually rely on a trade mark reputation as an indication 
of quality (where they can link the pleasant experience of the past buy as an indicator 
                                                
105 Aldred (n 5) 270.  
106 Ibid; Shapiro (n 68) 659- 680. 
107 Posner (n 3). 
108 Similar remarks were made by Aldred (n 5) 270. 
109 Shapiro (n 68) 659. 
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of present or future quality).110 The benefits of producing quality products and 
charging a premium, however, cannot be harvested instantly.  The trade mark owner 
has first to conduct a quality merchandising campaign to build up a reputation before 
being able to achieve any profits.  This is because at the beginning he has to sell the 
products for less or very close to marginal cost if he is to enter the market and to 
establish his reputation.  Whenever the reputation has been established, however, the 
seller can charge a premium for his quality product which represents the return on the 
initial investment in reputation.111 Nonetheless, the ability of the seller to maintain a 
consistent level of quality lies entirely on his ability to charge a premium because 
branded product costs more than unbranded one.112 If he is not able to sell the product 
at a premium price, i.e. due to the increase in the price of raw materials or any other 
competitive factors, the notion of maintaining a consistent level of quality will not be 
an economically sound option.  In this case, the seller might find a fly-by-night 
strategy of quality reduction very appealing.  This is because reducing the level of 
quality provides instant profit in comparison with building a reputation which takes 
time and money.113 This is not to suggest that this is the case for all branded goods.   
Rather the suggestion here is that the risk of reducing the quality of branded goods 
under the concept of the self-enforcing feature of the mark is not only real but also 
appealing. 
 
5.4 Wealth Maximisation and the Question of Quality Maintenance: Lessons 
from the Market 
 
The incentive to maintain a consistent level of quality and therefore the reputation of a 
mark might be related where the decision makers in a firm are interested in future 
profits.  Does that mean traders always maintain consistent quality?  This may not 
always be the case.  This is because the decision to maintain or not to maintain 
consistent quality is influenced by a wide range of competitive factors on the market 
such as the availability of other cheaper substitutes, bonuses and other payment-
related issues.  The current global financial crisis is a revealing testimony on an 
international scale as to how the decision makers in a given market can be more 
                                                
110 Ibid, 659- 680, 659. 




interested in increasing their salaries and bonuses rather than those of the 
shareholders.  As such, sacrificing the firm’s long-term reputation for the sake of very 
high profits in the short term might be seen as a sound option.114 The world has 
witnessed the near collapse of many giant entities once considered by millions of 
customers as the ultimate source of robustness, confidence, reliability and consistency 
in the quality of their goods and services.  Two years ago, one would have thought it 
partially impossible to imagine that entities such as Lehman Brothers and the Royal 
Bank of Scotland would go bankrupt and they would need to be bailed out.   After all, 
these firms are as big and profitable as it gets and they are supposedly long-term 
profit seekers.  So how have these entities come to such a catastrophic economic 
position?  The answer is that, among many other factors, the lack or regulation and 
the level of financial risk that has been taken by the policy makers of these companies 
was very high.115 
 
The lesson that can be derived form the financial crisis is that even when traders may 
be interested in long-term profit, this does not mean that they are going to do the right 
thing for consumers, and thus maintain the quality of their branded goods.  This 
convenient, yet untested, link between wealth maximisation and quality maintenance 
was made by Posner to advance a deregulation policy.116 If history is any indicator 
however, the Chicago deregulation approach can damage the competition system and 
consumers alike.117 
 
                                                
114 OECD, The Financial Crisis: Reform and Exit Strategies (Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, Paris 2010) 25; A Wignall, P Atkinson, and S Lee, ‘The Current Financial Crisis: 
Causes and Policy Issues’, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/26/41942872.pdf> accessed 12 June 
2010; see D Lynch, ‘Commissioners blast 2 former top executives at Citigroup’ (8 April 2010) 
<http://fcic.gov/> accessed 12 June 2010; BBC, ‘Bank of England fears bank risks’ (29 June 2007) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6253752.stm> accessed 12 June 2010; BBC, ‘G20 declaration: 
Full text’ (15 November 2008) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7731741.stm> accessed 12 June 
2010. 
115 G Zalm, ‘The Forgotten Risk: Financial Incentives’ (2009) 157 De Economist 209- 213. 
116 Posner (n 3). 
117 Chicago economists’ adherence to the notion of extreme deregulation is not new.  On the aftermath 
of the Great depression (1929), very few people were interested in the notion that a free market is a 
prefect scientific system, ‘one in which individuals, acting on their own self-interested desires, created 
the maximum benefits for all’.  Accordingly to Klein, Chicago economists used, through an ‘aura of 
scientific impartiality’, their extremely well corporate funded ideology to reaffirm the importance of 
the same deregulation principles that caused the biggest financial catastrophe in the twentieth century 
in the first place; N Klein, The Shock Doctrine (Penguin Group, London 2007) 56. 
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The Chicago notion of wealth maximisation and hence long-term profit seeking may 
encourage traders to maintain consistent quality products.  However, it is not always 
wise to simply rely on market forces and thus the interests of traders to protect the 
interests of consumers without considering all factors that influence consumers and 
traders’ commercial conducts in the first place.  Based on perfect competition, 
Chicago deregulation approach ignores market reality.  It is a simplistic reduction to 
simply summarize quality issues and their complicated implications for both traders 
and consumers by suggesting that traders have an economic interest to maintain the 
quality of their goods and, therefore, do not allow the quality of the product sold 
under their banner to decline, and that this alone ensures consumer’s interest in having 
quality products.  This is because traders perceive the quality function as a vehicle to 
retain the loyalty of consumer only as long as there is no other more profitable ways 
for doing so.118 
 
5.4.1 Do Trade Marks Convey Consistent Quality: The Toyota Example 
 
Perhaps the most revealing example as to the deficiency of Chicago’s key reliance on 
market forces to enforce the maintaining of consistent quality by traders, hence the 
link between long term profit and quality consistency, is Toyota’s latest crisis.   
Toyota is the world’s number one selling carmaker.  In 2009 alone, it sold 7.8 million 
vehicles worldwide.119 Toyota is renowned for its quality and reliability.  Due to a rise 
in raw material costs and the collapse of the auto market in Europe and North 
America on the aftermath of the global financial crisis, Toyota reported a record 
annual loss of $4.4 bn.120 In order to cut costs, some car manufacturers resorted to the 
use of the same components across a range of models.121 This is thought to increase 
the number of recalls. 
 
                                                
118 Chapter three, 37- 41. 
119 R Booth, and J McCurry, ‘Toyota in crisis as Prius admission leads to threat of second recall’ (4 
February 2010) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/feb/04/toyota-crisis-recall-prius-brake> 
accessed 12 June 2010; BBC NEWS, ‘Toyota considers Corolla recall over steering problems’ (17 
February 2010) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8519534.stm> accessed 12 June 2010; Aljazeera 
News, ‘US to probe Toyota brake failure’ 
<http://english.aljazeera.net/business/2010/02/20102420173126205.html> accessed 12 June 2010. 
120 K. Voigt, ‘Toyota posts profits but recall questions loom’, (4 February 2010) 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2010/BUSINESS/02/04/toyota.japan.earnings/> accessed 12 June 2010. 
121 This policy of cutting costs is not new. See BBC NEWS, ‘Toyota to Tackle Quality Control’ (25 
August 2006) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/5285196.stm> accessed 12 June 2010. 
 174 
By 2010 and due to a problem with uncontrolled acceleration, Toyota has recalled 
over 8 million cars worldwide.  Interestingly, it appeared that Toyota was aware of the 
problem as early as the winter of 2008 where there had been reports of a stiff 
accelerator pedal.  When Toyota’s UK spokesman was asked why Toyota did nothing 
to sort the problem out until 2009-10, he pointed out that these concerns ‘were a 
quality rather than a safety issue’.122 The recall is said to cost Toyota $2 billion.123  
As a response to the allegations that Toyota sacrificed the quality of its brand, the 
firm’s president has pledged to create a new global quality committee where Toyota 
will employ new quality control offices.124  
 
Toyota was not the first or the only automaker that recalls vehicles.  In 2003, Nissan 
recalled over 2.5 million cars worldwide,125 Chrysler recalled about 438,000 Jeep 
Liberty SUVs in the same year126 and recently in 2008 Ford Motor Co. called 4.5 
million older-model vehicles because of defective cruise control.127 These are only a 
few examples. 
 
Keeping the Chicago law and economics approach in mind, the Toyota example must 
raise serious cause for concern.  The assumption that individuals (including entities) 
are rational players who always seek to maximise their own long term payoff is not 
always related to quality maintenance.  As we repeatedly mentioned throughout this 
thesis,128 quality maintenance is relevant only when doing so is the cheapest way to 
retain the loyalty of consumers.  This is because, as mentioned before, the interests of 
traders in maintaining consistent quality is affected by the dynamic nature of the 
market which seems to be largely ignored by the Chicago School. 
 
                                                
122 BBC NEWS, ‘Toyota shares fall as woes mount’ (3 February 2010) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8496465.stm> accessed 12 June 2010. 
123 Voigt (n 120). 
124 M Voss, ‘Remarks by TMC President Akio Toyoda Following the Inaugural Meeting of the Special 
Committee for Global Quality’ (2010) < www.toyota.com/recall> accessed 12 June 2010.  
125 <http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news03/nissan_recall.html#ixzz0ko5yBQB3> accessed 12 June 
2010. 
126 <http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news03/jeep_recall.html#ixzz0ko6Rmkxz> accessed 12 June 
2010. 
127 T Krisher, and S Manning, ‘Ford Recalls 4.5 Million Vehicles Over Defective Cruise Control 
Switch’ (13 October 2009) <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/wires/2009/10/13/ford-adds-45m-
vehicles-to_ws_318945.html> accessed 12 June 2010.  
128 Chapter one, 26; Chapter three, 38- 41. 
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What is more, the fact that, after massive global recall, in the United States alone, 
Toyota reported an increase of 35.3 percent in sales in March 2010 over the same 
period last year.129 As a result, despite a previous forecast of a $ 2.2 billion loss this 
year, Toyota projected to end the fiscal year on an $880 million profit.130 Thus, the 
notion that if a trader reduces the quality of his goods he will incur business loss (the 
self-enforcing feature of a trade mark) and this is by itself adequate protection of the 
interests of consumers as to quality issues, is clearly questionable.  In the Toyota case, 
the interests of consumers as to quality issues were actually protected by consumer 
protection law rather than trade mark law.  As noted before, Toyota’s UK spokesman 
admitted that the firm did not move to sort the problem with the uncontrolled 
accelerator until it started to affect the health and safety of customers.  Before that, 
Toyota ignored the issue considering it quality concerns.  
 
Based on the foregoing, one can conclude that, contrary to the Chicago law and 
economics approach: 
1- Toyota’s ambition to achieve long term profit did not seem to prevent it from 
reducing the quality of some of its products.  More importantly, this was not 
the first time that Toyota was forced to recall a number of its vehicles.  In 
2006, the firm recalled over 1.5 million cars and promised to tackle quality 
control.131 
2- Toyota also did not report heavy loss.  Actually, as noted, it managed to 
achieve some profits. 
3- Toyota did not loose too many customers.  In fact, it succeeded in increasing 
its sale figures by 35%.  
4- In the light of the above, it seems reasonable to assume that, if the faulty 
accelerator had not raised safety issues, Toyota would not have had to recall 
any of its cars.  As such, a few immediate questions emerge: Are quality and 
product safety the same thing?  If not: why did Toyota not act until the quality 
issue become a safety issue?  What does Toyota’s failure to respond to the 
concerns of its customers regarding the quality of their cars teach us, keeping 
in mind the Chicago approach that traders have obvious economic interests not 
                                                
129 Z Zeigler, ‘Toyota Reports March and First Quarter Sales’ Toyota Media relations (1st April 2010) 
<http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/news.aspx > accessed 12 June 2010. 
130 Voigt  (n 120). 
131 BBC NEWS, (n 121). 
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to reduce the quality of their goods, and thus there is no need to enforce this 
function under trade mark law?  These questions will be the topic of the last 
chapter of this thesis. 
 
In a nutshell, trade marks may indeed indicate a certain level of quality.  Considering 
Toyota and other related examples however, this does not necessarily mean they 
always indicate consistent quality. 
6. Overview 
 
If the argument of the preceding parts can be accepted, and considering the impact of 
the Chicago School on the enforcement of the quality function, it would appear in 
conclusion, that the very nature of the self-enforcing feature of a trade mark is not 
only questionable but may, in fact, also act to influence the direction of trade mark 
law in undesirable ways.  The concept of the self-enforcing feature of a trade mark 
works in two diametrically opposite ways.  While it might be true that this principle 
enforces a trader to maintain a consistent level of quality under a certain set of 
conditions, this does not always mean that the enforcement of the quality function is 
guaranteed.  
 
There is an urgent need to reconsider the legal attitude towards the enforcement of the 
quality function under trade mark law.  However, before considering that issue, a final 
question must be asked: why does the current legal framework on consumer 
protection law not rectify any unfairness uncovered in the domain of quality 
maintenance, for example, through section 14 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act (as 
amended)?  
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Chapter Five: The Other Side of the Coin: The Rationale of Quality Regulation 
under Consumer Law: Section 14(2) of the Sale of Goods Act as an Example 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
After discussing the limitations of the principle of a self-enforcing feature of a mark 
(the deregulation approach) championed by the Chicago School and having evaluated 
its capacity to encourage traders to maintain consistent quality, in this chapter we 
persist in asking: should the quality guarantee be enforced under trade mark law? 
 
The notion of invoking trade mark law to enforce the quality function of a mark has 
come in for scrutiny on a wide number of occasions, many of which concentrate on 
the difficulty of defining the standard or standards against which the concept of 
quality can be measured, on the one hand, and on the effectiveness of consumer 
protection law in doing exactly that, on the other.  So, why does consumer law not 
sufficiently protect the interests of consumers as to quality issues?  This chapter is 
dedicated to answering this question.  It argues that the rationale of quality regulation 
under trade mark law is different from that under consumer protection law.  For this 
reason, the quality function of the mark should be enforced under trade mark law.   
 
The role of the quality guarantee under trade mark law is to differentiate between 
satisfactory quality goods.  By contrast, the objective of this function under consumer 
law is to discourage the production of substandard goods.1 That is why consumer law 
applies a compulsory measurable minimum quality test.  However, given the fact that 
the quality of satisfactory goods may vary significantly, this test does not adequately 
enhance the production of quality goods nor it does reduce consumer search costs.   
Needless to say, this is not the place to discuss the foundation of quality regulations 
under consumer protection law in detail.  We offer the concept of ‘satisfactory 
quality’ which underpins section 14 of the Sale of Goods Act of 1979 (as amended) as 
a leading example.  This section is chosen because it provides a detail account of what 
does quality mean.  
                                                
1 Balmoral Group Ltd v Borealis (UK) Ltd & Ors [2006] EWHC 1900 (Comm), para 140; Jewson Ltd. 
v. Kelly [2003] EWCA Civ 1030, para 77; J Benjamin, Benjamin’s sale of goods (Sweet &Maxwell, 
London 2008) 29. 
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This chapter will begin by looking at the difference in quality between satisfactory 
goods.  It will point out that the quality of two satisfactory products or services may 
vary significantly.  Part 3 will then look at how section 14 (2) of the Sale of Goods 
Act has been interpreted to discourage the production of substandard goods.  It will 
argue that the manner in which the concept of satisfactory quality has been 
implemented fails to reflect quality diversity between satisfactory goods.   Finally, 
part 4 explains the difficulties of establishing multi-quality standards.  To tackle this 
issue, it will suggest that the quality guarantee of a trade mark should be enforced 
under trade mark law. 
 
2. Satisfactory Quality: How Many Standards are there? 
 
The difference in quality between two satisfactory products can be very noteworthy.   
To clarify this point, we provide two practical examples.   
2.1 Quality Diversity: Example from Academia 
 
According to the UK academic system, both the University of Edinburgh and X 
University are legally recognized and capable of delivering academic services to 
students all over the world.  Does this academic recognition mean that both 
universities provide the same level of quality services?  The answer is perhaps not.   
Yet according to the law, both universities are subjected to the same level of 
eligibility assessments.  However, when it comes to measuring the quality of the 
services provided by these two institutions, much more sophisticated measures are 
used.  For this reason we have, for instance, the so-called Good Universities League 
Table.2 And that is why Edinburgh is ranked somewhere at the top of the table 
meanwhile X is ranked somewhere down the ladder.  But once again, from Edinburgh 
to X, all listed universities are qualified and fit for academic purposes.  This 
recognition however does not mean that the quality of academic services provided by 
all these listed academic institutions is the same. 
                                                
2 The Time Online <http://extras.timesonline.co.uk/tol_gug/gooduniversityguide.php> accessed 4 May 
2010; see also <http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/> accessed 4 May 2010.  
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2.2 Example from the Market 
 
Another example can be found in the electronics market.  Take Canon Pixma MP 
6003 and Hewlett Packard (HP) C4480 printers.4 Both are for sale thus we can assume 
them both of satisfactory quality.  However, there are many elements that make one of 
these products is much better than the other.  For instance, the printing and scanning 
resolution of one of them is double that of the other hence the quality of printing and 
scanning is much better.  One of these printers comes with up to 76 ML of ink in 
comparison with 10 ML with the other.  Thus, from a quality perspective, these two 
printers belong in different league.  That is why a consumer who is looking for a 
better value printer in the long run will be much better off by buying the printer with 
the higher resolution and more ink.  Otherwise he will lose out.  And it is here the role 
of the quality function of a mark comes into play.  It helps the consumer to identify, 
for instance, which one of these two printers provides the best quality for a cheaper 
price.  
 
The same analogy can be applied to almost all saleable goods and services.  This leads 
us to the next question: does the concept of satisfactory quality under section 14 
reflect the quality diversity available in the mark and, if not, why? 
3. Satisfactory Quality: The Law 
 
Section 14 of the SGA of 1979 (as amended) regulates quality matters.  It provides a 
measurable and thus enforceable test of quality.  It reads:  
(2) Where the seller sells goods in the course of a business, there is an implied 
term that the goods supplied under the contract are of satisfactory quality. 
(2A) For the purpose of this Act, goods are of satisfactory quality if they meet 
the standard that a reasonable person would regard as satisfactory, taking 
account of any description of the goods, the price (if relevant) and all the other 
relevant circumstances.5   
 
Section 14 (2B) expands on this by stating that the quality of goods includes:   
                                                
3 <http://www.canon.co.uk/For_Home/Product_Finder/Multifunctionals/Inkjet/PIXMA_MP600/> 
accessed 4 May 2010. 
4<http://search.hp.com/gwukeng/query.html?lang=en&qp=segment%3Ahho&hps=Home+%26+Home
+Office&hpn=Desktops&la=en&cc=uk&charset=utf-8&qt=C4480> accessed 4 May 2010. 
5 In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the implied term of section 14 is a condition.  In Scotland 
however, the effect of breach depends on its materiality. P Atiyah, J Adams, and H MacQueen, The 
Sale of Goods (11th edn, Pearson education, London 2005) 164. 
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Their state and condition and the following (among other) are in appropriate 
cases aspects of the quality of goods- 
(a) fitness for all purposes for which goods of the kind in question are commonly 
supplied; 
(b) appearance and finish; 
(c) freedom form minor defects; 
(d) safety; 
(e) durability.6  
 
When examining whether a product is of satisfactory quality, account has to be taken 
of how a reasonable person would regard the product as satisfactory.7 The test of the 
‘reasonable person’ was discussed by the Court of Appeal in Bramhill v Edwards.8  
The Court, citing Bingaman’s Sale of Goods, pointed out: 
… the reasonable person must be one who is in the position of the buyer, with 
his knowledge; for it would not be appropriate for the test to be that of a 
reasonable third party observer not acquainted with the background of the 
transaction.9 
 
3.1 What does the Concept of Satisfactory Quality Mean? 
 
The term ‘quality’ was defined by the Court of Appeal as ‘the state or condition of the 
goods’.10 Clegg v Andersson was the first substantial case on the new concept of 
‘satisfactory quality’.11 In this case the Court of Appeal was asked whether the yacht 
in question, as delivered, was of satisfactory quality.  To answer this question, the 
Court observed that the quality of the yacht relies  
on the price, the fitness of the Yacht for the purpose blue water ocean sailing 
with access to shallower harbours, the appearance and finish of the overweight 
keel, the existence of many minor defects, and the lack of safety or durability 
of the rig.12 
 
The Court rejected the argument that the yacht as delivered was of satisfactory quality 
despite the fact that it required remedial work costing some £1,680.  The Court 
refused to accept 
                                                
6 For more information see P Atiyah, H MacQueen, and N Adams, Atiyah’s Sale of Goods (12th edn, 
Pearson, London 2010) 143- 191; W Ervine, ‘Satisfactory Quality: What does it Mean’ (2004) 
November JBL 684; J Macleod, Consumer Sales Law (2nd edn, Routledge, London 2007) 495.  
7 R Christou, Sale and Supply of Goods and Services (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2007) 3. 
8 Barry Bramhill, Maureen Bramhill v Mark Edwards, Jane Edwards [2004] EWCA Civ 403. 
9 Ibid, 39. 
10 Niblett v Confectionery’ Materials Co [1921] 3 KB 387, [1921] All ER Rep 459, para 395. 
11 The term satisfactory quality replaced merchantable quality. J. Macleod, Consumer Sales Law (2nd 
edn, Routledge, London 2007) 512. 
12 Clegg v Olle Andersson [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 721, para 48. 
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the submissions of counsel for Mr Andersson. The suggestion that the effect of 
the overweight keel is absorbed into the margin of safety built in to the rig by 
the manufacturers is contrary to the evidence of Mr Saunders (paragraph 37 
above) and the fact that the manufacturers found the increased load to be 
unacceptable, as recorded in paragraph 4 of the agreed statement of the 
experts. Nor is the cost of remedial works any reliable indication of whether 
the defect which requires to be remedied prevented the Yacht as delivered 
from being of satisfactory quality.13 
 
Highlighting the importance of protection provided by section 14, the Court went on 
to say: 
There is an implied term, in English Law a condition, that goods sold in the 
course of a business must be of satisfactory quality: s 14(2) and (6). There are 
no implied terms as to quality in a sale of goods contract other than those 
implied by sections 14(2) and (3) and 15 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (and 
any other enactment). This means that in the great majority of consumer sales 
the buyer has to rely upon section 14. If he does not have a remedy under 
section 14 he has no remedy at all. It so happens that the goods in this case did 
not comply with the express term of the contract that they will be in 
accordance with the manufacturer's specification. But if there had been no 
such term, it would have been a surprising result indeed if the buyer had no 
legal remedy for a state of affairs which the seller himself considered 
unacceptable.14 
 
Section 14 therefore protects the interests of buyers in having satisfactory quality 
goods that comply with any description, price (if relevant).  
3.2 Substandard Goods: The Primary Objective of Section 14 
 
Section 14 (2) is aimed to assure consumers that all saleable products maintain a 
minimum standard of satisfactory quality.  As such, it does not provide any guarantee 
of extra quality neither it does make it legitimate, as a general rule, to introduce 
factors peculiar to the purposes of a particular buyer.15 In Balmoral Group Ltd v 
Borealis (UK) Ltd, the Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial Court) examined the 
objective of section 14 (2).  The Court observed that: 
Section 14(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 is primarily directed towards 
substandard goods.  Although there is an overlap between section 14(2) and 
(3) the function of 14(2) is to establish a general standard which the goods in 
question are required to reach, and not to ensure that they attain some higher 
standard of fitness for a particular purpose made known to the seller. In 
                                                
13 Ibid, 47. 
14 Ibid, 71. 
15 Jewson Ltd. v. Kelly (n 1); Benjamin (n 1). 
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appropriate cases the question as to whether goods are of satisfactory quality 
may be determined by considering whether they are fit for all purposes for 
which goods of the kind in question are commonly supplied section 14(2 B) 
(a).16 (Emphasis added)  
 
 Section 14 (2) therefore establishes only a general quality standard.  Under this 
standard, examining whether a product is of satisfactory quality requires assessing 
whether the product simply meets a certain level of quality and is fit for all purposes 
for which goods of the kind in question are commonly supplied.   
 
The term satisfactory quality is thought to be more favourable to consumers than 
‘merchantable quality’.17 The interpretation of that concept however has proven to be 
easier said than done.  It requires many facts to be balanced against each other.  Even 
after considering all related factors, the result of the test may vary significantly.  The 
gap between goods which are of a quite good quality standard, as an example, is 
different from those which have just made the grade.18 This is a crucial issue given the 
fact that section 14 (2) targets mainly substandard goods, and thus provides only a 
minimum quality standard for all saleable products.  As such, the test of satisfactory 
quality does not reflect the variety of quality between satisfactory products, and 
therefore the potential gain or loss a consumer may endure by buying one satisfactory 
quality product over another.  That is why some argue that that test is not good 
enough and, therefore, goods have to be of ‘good’ or ‘sound quality’ rather than of 
‘satisfactory quality’.  The former terms are thought to be more demanding and better 
for consumers than the latter.19  
3.3 Satisfactory Quality: What is the Test? 
 
When considering the quality of a product, many factors have to be taken into account 
including its description.  The product must always comply with its description.  This 
description affects the standard of quality that can be expected.  Other factors, such as 
price, durability, can only be considered if relevant.20 
 
                                                
16 Balmoral Group Ltd v Borealis (UK) Ltd & Ors (n 1). 
17 G Howells, and S Weatherill, Consumer Protection Law (2nd edn, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hants 
2005)168- 173. 
18 Ibid, 171. 
19 Id. 
20 Ibid, 174. 
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The rigidity of the quality test in the case of a brand new product, therefore, may not 
be the same in case of a second-hand one.  In both cases, however, the products must 
be of satisfactory quality.  Hence, when goods are used before (second-hand), the 
consumer would be expected to put up with some defects which would not be 
satisfactory if found in new goods.21  
3.4 The Interaction between Price and Quality 
 
Price may not always be connected to an obligation as to quality.  This is particularly 
true where the price is reduced to increase or to speed up sales.22 It is also submitted 
that where the price has not been fixed by the seller, such as at an auction where the 
price is usually determined by the ‘weakness of the weaker of the two bidders’, the 
connection between price and quality might not be relevant.23 
 
In other scenarios, however, charging a high price can be interpreted as sending a 
signal as to the quality of goods in question.  In other words, charging a high price 
conjures up a particular set of expectations which exceed the level of satisfactory or 
ordinary quality.24 In Rogers v. Parish (Scarborough) Ltd,25 the Court of Appeal 
observed that price might have a clear impact in raising a consumer’s expectation as 
to the quality of a product.  The Court pointed out the instance of the sale a Range 
Rover: 
The factor of price was also significant. At more than £14,000 this vehicle 
was, if not at the top end of the scale, well above the level of the ordinary 
family saloon, the buyer was entitled to value for his money. 
 
In Clegg v. Andersson, the Court of Appeal took an opportunity to uphold that view 
stating that the purchaser of an expensive brand new ocean-going yacht is duly 
entitled to expect his yacht to be in perfect conditions.26 The Court stated:  
 
                                                
21 Howells and Weatherill (n 17) 174. 
22 Ervine (n 6) 689. 
23 Harvela Investments Ltd v. Royal Trust Company of Canada Ltd [1985] 3 WLR 276, at 230. 
24 This is particularly important in the case of trade marks where, as we have seen in chapter one, 
where quality is a big concern, consumers usually buy branded goods for premium grades, page 18.  
For more information see I Png, and D Reltman, ‘Why are some products branded and others not?’ 
(1995) 38 J L and Economics 221; for general information see B Klein, and K Leffler, ‘The Role of 
Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance’ (1981) 89 J Political Economy 615- 641. 
25 Rogers and Another v Parish (Scarborough) Ltd. and Another [1987] 2 WLR 353, at 944. 
26 Clegg v Olle Andersson (n 12) 72. 
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The test is whether a reasonable person would think the goods satisfactory, 
taking into account their description, the price (if relevant) and all other 
relevant circumstances… In some cases, such as a high priced quality product, 
the customer may be entitled to expect that it is free from even minor defects, 
in other words perfect or nearly so.27 
 
Hence, consumers who pay a high price would expect to receive products well above 
the ordinary level of quality.28 The more expensive the product is, the higher a 
consumer’s expectations about its quality.  The opposite however is not necessarily 
true.29 Keeping the relevance of price in mind, in the above both cases the Court of 
Appeal did not provide any guidance how to differentiate between satisfactory and 
extra quality goods.  This question is yet to be answered.  
3.5 Quality and the Question of Fitness for Purpose 
 
Where goods are sold in the course of business, they must be fit for all of the purposes 
for which goods of that kind in question are commonly supplied.30 This term provides 
consumers with a greater degree of protection since goods might be reasonably 
priced; correspond with their description, and be of satisfactory quality, yet they 
nevertheless might not fit for the purchaser’s purpose.31 This term therefore is directly 
interrelated with the quality test.  The purchaser of high-grade mahogany would 
rightly expect his wood to be suitable to make furniture.  If the wood was not good 
enough to be used to make furniture, the product would not be of a satisfactory 
quality.32 
 
The courts are likely to implement a comprehensive approach when establishing the 
test of fitness for purpose.  In Rogers v. Parish (Scarborough) Ltd,33 the Court of 
Appeal upheld this view by stating:  
Starting with the purpose for which goods of that kind are commonly bought, 
one would include in respect of any passenger vehicle not merely that buyer’s 
purpose of driving the car from one place to another but of doing so with the 
                                                
27 Ibid. 
28 Howells and Weatherill (n 17) 176.  
29 This test however does not apply to services. See M Gabbott, and G Hogg, Consumers and Services 
(John Willey and Sons, Chichester 1998) 109.  
30 Section 14 (2b). 
31 Atiyah, MacQueen, and Adams (n 6) 143; Ervine (n 6) 691.  
32 Howells and Weatherill (n 17) 174. 
33 Rogers and Another v Parish (Scarborough) Ltd. and Another (n 25). 
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appropriate degree of comfort, ease of handling and reliability and, one might 
add, of pride in the vehicles’ outward and interior appearance. 
 
Further, the fitness for purpose condition provides consumers with some protection 
where they have particular demands of the goods which they make known to the seller 
and they rely on the seller’s skills to ensure that the products reach those qualities.34 
 
In order for a product to be fit for its purpose and, therefore, to be of satisfactory 
quality, it should last for a reasonable time.  That is why the issues of durability are 
usually raised in the context of fitness for purpose.35 It is important to recognise that 
the time of assessing satisfactory quality is when goods are supplied.  This is also the 
case in terms of assessing the durability of the product in question.  This is despite the 
fact that consumers cannot evaluate the durability of the purchased product at this 
early stage of purchasing.  Nevertheless, the involved parties can change the date of 
assessing quality.36  
 
In Jewson Ltd. v. Kelly, the Court of Appeal clarified the relationship between 
satisfactory quality and fitness for a particular purpose.37 The facts in this case were 
interesting.  Mr. Kelly was converting a building into 13 self-contained flats for sale.   
Since it was too expensive to extend the gas supply to each of the flats, he decided to 
install electrical boilers.  Kelly approached his local branch of Jewson seeking advice.   
The latter recommended a particular type of electrical boiler which was claimed to 
provide a cost-effective heating alternative to gas-powered boilers which comply with 
all relevant regulations.  Mr. Kelly bought 12 boilers from Jewson and had them 
installed in the flats and they appeared to work well.  However, after the installation 
of the boilers, the Standard Assessment Procedure to establish the energy efficiency 
of residential dwellings (SAP) rated the flats very low.  This made the flats less 
attractive to prospective purchasers.  Mr. Kelly sued Jewson claiming that the boilers 
were neither of satisfactory quality nor fit for his purpose.38 The Court of Appeal 
found that neither Kelly nor Jewson knew of these ratings and it was not until Kelly 
                                                
34 Howells and Weatherill (n 17) 177.  
35 Ibid, 179. 
36 Macleod (n 6) 501; M Bridge, The Sale of Goods (OUP, Oxford 2003) 311; M Bridge, The Sale of 
Goods (2nd edn, OUP, Oxford 2009) 397. 
37 Jewson v. Kelly (n 1). 
38 Ervine (n 6) 684- 703. 
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applied for planning permission when he first learnt that he would have to obtain such 
a rating.  Thus the Court concluded that a ‘buyer’s reliance under section 14 (3) does 
not have to extend to all aspects of the goods’ fitness for the buyer’s particular 
purpose, and that reliance may be partial only’.39 
 
The Court of Appeal emphasized that section 14 (2) is directed principally to the sale 
of ‘substandard goods’.  This, in turn, means that the ‘court’s principal concern is to 
look at their intrinsic quality, using the test indicated in subsection (2A), (2B) and 
(2C)’.40 Therefore, Kelly had made a particular purpose to Jewson and had relied on 
them to supply a product which met that purpose.41 Moreover, the SAP poor rating 
does not render the boilers unsatisfactory in quality and this element was not a 
relevant factor in applying the quality test since the boilers performed as a reasonable 
person would expect.42 Sedley pointed out that section 14 (2) establishes a general 
quality standard, whereas section 14 (3) imposes ‘a particular obligation tailored to 
the particular circumstances of the case’.43 Examining whether a product is of a 
satisfactory quality requires assessing whether the product meets the ‘standard a 
reasonable person would regard as satisfactory, taking account of any decryption of 
the goods, the prince (if relevant) and all the other relevant circumstances’.44 This test 
is flexible and its result may vary from case to case depending of the relevant 
circumstances.  Yet, ‘factors peculiar to the purposes of a particular buyer’ would not 
be relevant for the purpose of section 14 (2).45 Thus, section 14 (2) deals with the 
‘intrinsic’ qualities of the goods.  By contrast, section 14 (3) extends to ‘extrinsic’ 
factors providing that these are made known clearly to the seller.46  
3.6 Appearance, Finish and Freedom from Minor Defects  
 
 Appearance, finish and freedom from minor defects are all related to the quality test.   
The presence of these factors, however, does not necessarily render products 
                                                
39 Jewson. v. Kelly (n 1) 68. 
40 Ibid, 77. 
41Ibid,78- 80; for more information about this point see C Flesner, ‘The relationship between 
satisfactory quality and fitness for purpose’ (2004) 63 Cambridge LJ 22- 24. 
42 Jewson v. Kelly (n 1) 78- 80. 
43 Ibid, 47. 
44 Ibid, 77.   
45 Ibid, 69. 
46 Ibid, 47. 
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unsatisfactory as those facts are only to be considered as part of an overall quality 
assessment test.47 Therefore, minor blemishes or defects in some new products, such 
as pottery or earthenware, does not necessarily mean that the products in question are 
not of a satisfactory quality.  The purchasers of such products should expect some 
inconsistencies.  The lack of uniformity in that case can be justified.48 
4.  The Quality Guarantee versus Section 14:  The Rationale of Quality 
Regulation 
 
There appears to be a clear difference between the role of the quality function under 
trade mark law in comparison with that under section 14.  Under trade mark law, the 
role of this function is to inform consumers about the different specifications of a 
range of similar or identical satisfactory quality goods.49 By contrast, the role of the 
satisfactory quality test under section 14 is mainly to differentiate between 
satisfactory and unsatisfactory quality products.50 Thus, unlike the quality function, 
this test is not mainly intended to reduce consumer searching costs nor it is primarily 
intended to enhance the production of high quality goods.  Rather, it is designed to 
prevent faulty products from entering the market and, if they do, to secure the rights 
of consumers for compensation.51 That is why the law provides a minimum 
measurable quality test. 
 
It is difficult to pin down, with a good level of certainty, the rationale or rationales of 
the test of satisfactory quality within the section 14 framework.  One of the most 
consistent arguments is that regulating quality is mainly intended to protect the health 
and safety of consumers and it would be difficult to justify quality regulation for any 
other reason.52 Another argument can be put forward is that section 14 enhances the 
production of quality goods thus deriving economic efficiency.53 This argument 
however is limited by the fact that section 14 imposes one basic test of quality which, 
by any standard, does not reflect the level of quality diversity available in the market.   
                                                
47 Howells and Weatherill (n 17) 178. 
48 Millars of Falkirk Limited v Turpie [1976] SLT 66, at 68- 69.  
49 Chapter one, 8- 17; chapter two, 9. 
50 Balmoral Group Ltd v Borealis (UK) Ltd & Ors (n 1); Jewson Ltd. v. Kelly (n 1); Benjamin (n 1). 
51 See in general Howells and Weatherill (n 17) 147- 157. 
52 Ibid, 145. 
53 Ibid, 147. 
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Keeping this in mind, it is obvious that this regulatory body (section 14 (2)) is not as 
sophisticated as one might hope. 
 
A possible solution for tackling the deficiency of the satisfactory quality test could be 
to create more diverse standards of quality measurement.  So, why does consumer law 
not enforce more diverse tests of quality?  The problem with this approach is that it is 
partially impossible to standardize quality in the first place.  There is no way to 
tangibly determine whether a product is of satisfactory or extra quality standard.   
Despite the fact that quality issues are easily recognizable, they are neither simply 
describable nor measurable.  For this reason, apart from the case where the public 
might be at risk, consumer law does not enforce specific quality standards.54 This 
raises the question: why it is very difficult to measure, and thus standardise, quality?   
4.1 How to Measure Satisfactory from Extra Quality Goods? 
 
Considering the importance of differentiating satisfactory from high quality goods, an 
urgent question emerges: how can one measure or differentiate between satisfactory 
and excellent quality products?  Enforcing multiple quality standards is neither 
desirable nor legally workable.55 Given the number of products available in the 
market, it would be impossible to set a satisfactory and extra quality standard for 
every product.  It is difficult to figure out the criteria for establishing the standards.  
Who should set these criteria, consumers or traders, and why?  After all, the 
conditions required for producing a good quality computer are not the same for 
producing a good quality wine.  The same applies to software, cars, clothes and 
medicines.  The deficiency of standards to reflect the potential variety of consumer 
criteria or interests was clearly outlined by the Molony Committee’s report.  The 
report states: 
Satisfactory overall quality may be an amalgam of a dozen or more different 
characteristics… Significant questions have to be put in respect of each; they 
may not emerge in definitive form until the drafting has been put in hand, and 
it may be impossible to ensure some of them without further research. 
                                                
54 Ibid, 145. 
55 Generally speaking, standards are used to increase product safety in measurable and enforceable 
way. They are defined as a ‘classical method for regulating industry’s behaviour’; S Breyer, Regulation 
and its Reform (Mass Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1982) 96. Cartwright defines standards as 
‘minimum duties imposed upon traders, and may be enforced through the criminal or civil law’; P 
Cartwright, Consumer Protection and the Criminal Law: Law, Theory, and Policy in the UK (CUP, 
Cambridge 2001) 44. 
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Moreover, there is rarely likely to be an absolute answer to any one of these 
inquires; the quality and durability that can be provided are closely related to 
the price which the buyer is likely to be willing and able to pay, so that at each 
point the answer must be -a compromise which is not only a nice exercise in 
judgment it itself, but must be married with compromise arrived at on every 
other point.56 
 
The difficulty to reflect the potential variety of consumer tests of quality is by no 
means the only problem for establishing a more demanding standard regime.  Another 
much more complicated issue is how to enforce a quality standard in the first place. 
 
[W]henever we have investigated in detail we have unearthed no foundation 
for supposing that more or better standards could be devised to provide 
worthwhile guarantees of overall quality respecting consumer goods. We 
concede that in some few cases it may be possible to devise further standards 
which would be used to give greater assurance about certain characteristics of 
particular lines of goods, assurance of sufficient value to make the production 
and use of those standards of genuine benefit to the consumer. But the scope 
of such development, and the benefits to be derived, are, in our judgment, 
limited.57 
 
Obviously, it is difficult to pin down the exact meaning of quality.  For this reason, 
standards are mainly used to ensure product safety. 
4.2 Could the Enforcement of the Quality Function be the Answer? 
 
One of the reflections of the preceding argument is that there is a recognizable gap 
between products of satisfactory quality and those of excellent quality, the latter being 
regulated under neither consumer law nor trade mark law.  Enforcing the quality 
guarantee under trade mark law therefore could be a plausible solution.  
 
The role of the quality guarantee under trade mark law is much more comprehensive 
and goes much further than the test of satisfactory quality.  As such, the notion that 
                                                
56 Board of Trade, Final Report of the Committee on Consumer Protection. Cmnd 1781 1 962, para 
254. 
57 Ibid, 256; Whenever the required conditions for the production of a given product are set however, it 
is relatively easy to enforce the standard upon the traders who produce that particular product; 
Cartwright (n 55) 46. The advantage however is that such a standard might discourage market and 
social innovation; R Stewart, ‘Regulation, Innovation and Administrative Law: A Conceptual 
Framework’ (1981) 69 California L Rev 1261. That is why the United States, for instance, prohibits the 
use of specification standards in safety regulations and prefers instead performance standards; G 
Howells, Consumer Product Safety (Ashgate Publishing Limited, Dartmouth 1998) 208.  Apart from 
the food industry, the EU’s policy seems leaning towards the same direction; A Ogus, Regulation: 
Legal Form and Economic Theory (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1994) Ch. 4. 
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branded goods are of satisfactory quality is usually assumed.  When a trader brands a 
product, he is saying to consumers that his product is different from those of his 
competitors regardless of whether this statement is genuine or not.58 If the use of the 
mark is intended to send consumers a signal that the quality of all branded products, 
more or less, of satisfactory quality, it would be difficult to justify the act of branding 
goods in the first place.  Consumers use trade marks therefore to differentiate the 
quality of identical or similar quality products rather than to differentiate between 
substandard and satisfactory quality goods.  In other words, the role of the quality 
function under trade mark law starts where it ends under section 14.  The test of 
satisfactory quality helps consumers to differentiate between satisfactory and 
substandard goods.  By contrast, the quality guarantee helps consumers to identify 
differences in quality between satisfactory quality goods.  According to this 
interpretation, the scope of the quality guarantee under trade mark law is different and 
much wider than that under section 14 and thereby can be utilized to highlight quality 
differences between satisfactory goods. 
 
 
Trade marks thrive in a market where goods and services are not of a uniform quality 
and where consumers dignify this fact by using the reputation of the mark as a sign of 
quality.59 This is pretty much the essence of branding goods.  Under this concept, the 
role of the quality guarantee is not to inform consumers that all products are of 
satisfactory quality.  Rather, it is about presenting and informing consumers about the 
variation between the qualities of branded goods, which are assumed to be safe and fit 
for purpose.  Satisfying the minimum quality standards therefore might not be an 
issue for the trader of branded goods.  Exceeding the minimum level of quality is 
what trade mark use is all about.  That is why traders use marks to differentiate the 
quality and excellence of their products from those of their competitors.  This process 
is thought to enhance competition.60 For this reason the role of signs, badge of origin 
and quality, is protected in the first place.61 Had all producers maintained a uniform 
satisfactory level of quality, trade marks would have been made redundant because 
consumers would not have needed to use them in the first place because they would 
                                                
58 Chapter one, 14, 20- 22. 
59 Chapter two, 14. 
60 Chapter one, 20- 22. 
61 Ibid, 14. 
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know that all goods hold, more or less, the same level of quality.  This, however, 
could not be further from the truth.  
 
In other words, the concept of quality under trade mark law does not imply any sort of 
quality uniformity.  On the contrary, the law encourages traders to provide varied 
levels of quality products and, in return, the law rewards them by effectively 
protecting their marks according the level of fame they have acquired.62 The stronger 
the reputation of the mark the more protection it gets and visa versa.63 In the case of 
reputable marks, even the aura of luxury emanating from luxury goods is protected.   
This is because, according to the ECJ, this aura is essential in that it enables 
consumers to distinguish between similar goods.64 That is to say the concept of 
quality under trade mark law conveys, to a great extent, a different message from that 
under section 14. 
 
Based on the above, and counter to mainstream thinking, it seems that trade mark law 
is better placed to dealing with quality issues than section 14 of the SGA of 1979. 
4.2.1 Things to Consider before Enforcing the Quality Function under Trade 
Mark Law 
 
The task of establishing an enforceable quality mechanism that takes into account 
quality diversity between satisfactory goods is easier said than done.  It is still 
possible however to provide a few recommendations as to what any possible solution 
should take into account.  Firstly, the test of satisfactory quality underpins section 14 
has a limited impact in deriving economic efficiency and thus the production of 
quality goods.  As such, it does not properly protect the interests of consumers as 
discussed before.65 There should be other mechanisms that recognise and regulate 
differences between satisfactory quality goods.  Secondly, and closely related to the 
former point, any attempt to do so should not involve standardising quality 
production, thus enforcing traders to maintain a particular level of quality.66 It is not 
                                                
62 Ibid, 15- 17.  
63 Chapter three, 100, 106- 113. 
64 Case C- 59/08 Copad SA v Christian Dior Couture SA [2009] ETMR 40, paras 24- 26; see chapter 
three, 23. 
65 Trade mark protection is said to enhance competition and thus the production of quality goods and 
reduces consumer searching costs. chapter one, 15- 17. 
66 For more information about the implications of enforcing quality standards on social welfare see  
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possible to create measurable and thus enforceable standards that reflect quality 
diversity between satisfactory goods.  There are simply too many subjective factors 
that have to be taken into account. 
 
Thirdly, developing a new mechanism for highlighting quality differences between 
satisfactory goods should not necessarily mean enforcing new rules or changing the 
law.  Even after establishing the limitations of market forces (the deregulation 
approach adhered to by the Chicago School)67 and the deficiency of the test of 
satisfactory quality under section 14, there are still a few important questions which 
have to be raised.  For example, who will benefit and who will pay?  Is there any less 
costly way to solve the problem?68 Thus, a legal intervention in the market to enforce 
the quality function cannot be conducted before paying regard to ‘the motivation 
behind the trader’s activity in the market- is there a genuinely satisfied client base or 
is the trader specifically exploiting a loophole in the law or enforcement’.  As such, it 
is arguable that we should favour solutions that: 
…once introduced, can be sustained by the market over those require ongoing 
intervention. The least invasive initiatives are likely to be those improving 
information flows, although these will not always be sufficient. Regulation 
would be a last resort, only to be used if other approaches cannot succeed.69 
 
In other words, preferably, any suggestion to enforce the quality function under trade 
mark law that, once introduced, can be sustained by the market and does not impose 
extra costs. 
 
Having investigated the concept of satisfactory quality under section 14 of the Sale of 
Goods Act, we now turn out attention to the concluding, and final, part of this thesis. 
                                                                                                                                       
 N Bockstael, ‘The Welfare Implications of Minimum Quality Standards’ (1984) 66 American J 
Agricultural Economics 466. 
67 Chapter four, 159. 
68 M Pertschuk, Revolt Against Regulation, 139 cited in I Ramsay, Consumer Law and Policy: Text and 
Materials on Regulating Consumer Markets (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2007) 55. 
69 Department of Trade and Industry, Extending Competitive Markets: Empowered Consumers, 
Successful Business (2005) <http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file23787.pdf.> accessed 17 February 2009. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusions 
 
 
For consumers and traders alike, trade marks are indispensable commercial tools.1  By 
fostering competition and reducing search costs, trade marks are regarded as crucial 
contributors to the interests of consumers and to the process of competition.  These 
benefits however are only guaranteed where the traders of branded goods maintain 
consistent quality.2 In the case of doing otherwise, the protection of marks could 
enhance artificial product differentiation and thus distort competition and increase 
rather than decrease consumer searching costs.3  The failure to enforce the quality 
guarantee, therefore, could have far reaching results, the most troubling of which are 
linked to a broad conception of enhancing the artificial components of a product, and 
thereby building a trade mark’s selling power or reputation based on a brand rather 
than on the quality of the product to which the mark is attached.  In such a case, 
traders could actively shape consumer purchasing behaviour.  In turn, this will allow 
traders an excessive monopoly.  That is why protection on the basis of a trade mark’s 
selling power or reputation should never be separated from the product to which the 
mark is affixed.4 If the benefits of trade mark protection are to be ensured, the 
protection afforded to the intangible attributes of a trade mark should always be 
balanced against the true value of the product to which the mark is attached.5 
Otherwise, trade mark protection excessively expands the monopoly power of the 
trade mark owner and thus distorts competition.6 It is against this backdrop that this 
thesis investigated and concluded that the quality function should be independently 
recognised and enforced under trade mark law.  
1. Quality Function Enforcement under Article 5(1) of Directive 2008/95 
 
Examining the visibility of the origin-oriented model of trade mark protection 
underpins Article 5 (1) of Directive 2008/95 to achieve the objectives of trade mark 
                                                
1 Chapter one, 14, 20- 22. 






protection, namely promoting competition and reducing consumer searching costs, 
without the need to enforce the quality guarantee of the mark, revealed interesting 
results.  Perceived as an economic function that trade mark law is not equipped to deal 
with, the quality guarantee is not sufficiently protected under Article 5(1).7  Taking 
the economic and legal objectives of trade mark protection into account however, the 
Court of Justice (the Court) enforcement of this function is neither sustainable nor 
consistent.  As discussed in chapter two, the essence of restricting trade mark 
protection to its core function is to prevent the use of trade mark rights to artificially 
partition of markets and price maintenance in the Union.8 It is for this reason that the 
Court has repeatedly emphasised that an important aspect of the origin function is to 
enable the owner of the mark full control over the quality of the products for which he 
should be held accountable.9 The question of how one might effectively reconcile 
tensions between trade mark protection and free movement of goods therefore rests on 
the proper interpretation of the trade mark subject-matter and, more specifically on 
the essential function of the mark.  Once again, from legal and economic standpoints, 
the rationale of identifying the trade mark subject-matter is mainly intended to prevent 
the use of trade mark rights to artificially partition the markets between Member 
States and to reward the manufacturer who consistently produces high quality goods 
and thus stimulate economic progress.10  
 
Thus, by not enforcing the quality guarantee under the trade mark subject-matter 
doctrine, the Court of Justice has failed to put the essential function of the mark into 
its wider legal and economic contexts.  As concluded in chapter one, quality 
inconsistency damages competition and increases consumer search costs regardless of 
whether the failure to do so (maintain quality) is due to the trade mark owner’s fault 
or to a third party.11 In both cases, trade mark protection could enhance artificial 
partitioning of markets and price maintenance, and hence distort competition.  
According to this interpretation, the failure to maintain the quality of goods is likely 
to distort competition even when the essential function of the mark is established.  It 
is difficult to justify the costs of not maintaining quality imposed on consumers under 
                                                
7 Chapter two, 61. 
8 Ibid, 54- 58. 
9 Ibid, 64- 66. 
10 Id. 
11  See (n 1) 28- 33. 
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trade mark law considering the fact that one of the main reasons for protecting marks 
in the first place is to reduce consumer search costs.  The notion of not enforcing the 
quality guarantee therefore does not fit easily with the legal and economic rationale of 
trade mark protection as it is pictured, i.e. a way of promoting competition and thus 
the production of quality products and the reduction of consumer searching costs.12  
 
In the field of international exhaustion, the Court enforcement of the quality guarantee 
revealed a great deal of legal inconsistency.  According to the Court of Justice, trade 
mark protection enhances artificial partitioning of markets and price maintenance if it 
does not contribute to the establishment of the trade mark core function, a badge of 
origin.13 As such, it is legally difficult to justify the prevention of importing genuine 
goods into the Union.  The act of preventing parallel importation from outside the 
Community even where the essential function of the mark is not impaired provides 
traders with a great deal of legal protection against competition from foreign markets. 
This protection however might have the equivalent effect of enhancing artificial price 
maintenance and artificial partitioning of the Community markets from international 
markets.  In this arena, the law is clearly biased towards traders. 
 
As we concluded in chapter two, the Court should adequately emphasise the link 
between the quality and origin function within the boundaries of a trade mark subject-
matter doctrine.  As such, it should recognise a more complicated framework of 
interconnected relations between the origin and the quality which reflects the 
independent nature of the guarantee function.  To this end, the Court of Justice is 
advised to explicit recognise the quality function of the trade mark when shaping the 
scope of trade mark protection.  This recognition should lead to the enforcement of 
that function not only against parallel importers but also against the trade mark 
owners themselves. 
2. Quality Function Enforcement under Article 5(2) of Directive 2008/95 
 
                                                
12 Ibid, 20- 22. 
13  See (n 7) 68; Joined Cases C- 427, 429 & 436/93 Bristol-Myers Squibb and Others v Paranova 
[1996] ETMR 1, para 49. 
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The enforcement of the quality guarantee under the dilution doctrine (Article 5(2)) is 
even more controversial.  The European trade mark law appears to be granting 
reputable marks too much protection, and thus excessive monopoly, in return for too 
little.  From Canon14 to Dior 2009,15 the law has moved gradually towards expanding 
the scope and level of trade mark protection.  This tendency is paralleled by another 
much more troubling attitude towards downgrading the importance of the quality 
function of the mark.  Taking the legal and economic rationale of trade mark 
protection, economic efficiency rather than trade mark efficiency must be the criteria 
against which the level and scope of protection should be measured.  The need to take 
the question of quality seriously under the dilution doctrine is not limited to whether 
or not to enforce the quality function by law.  Rather, it goes to the heart of policies 
underpinning trade mark protection in the first place and whether the law should 
simply react to how traders brand or present their branded goods or whether instead 
the law should seek to actively influence a trader’s commercial behaviour. 
 
As chapter three concluded, the notion of considering the uniqueness of a trade mark 
as ‘the only rational basis for its protection’, and thus expanding protection of the 
reputable mark to non-trade mark subject-matters, such as its selling power or 
reputation, is not always tenable.  The trouble with Schechter’s concept of trade mark 
protection is that it rests on unverified assumptions about how marks work, and, 
because of its assumptions, it might be granting marks with a reputation too great a 
monopoly in return for too little.  The dilution doctrine downplays the significance of 
confusion as a ground for trade mark liability and focuses on the need for the 
protection of the interests of a trade mark owner.16 The main goal is the protection of 
the selling power of the mark.  That is why protecting the interests of consumers as to 
quality issues is not a priority.  However, considering the Court of Justice case-law 
and the rationale for trade mark protection, it is clear that the law protects the 
relationship between a mark with a reputation and a particular product, particularly 
the way consumers perceive that reputation in the context of that relationship: a sign 
                                                
14 Case C- 39/97 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. [1999] 1 CMLR 77, paras 22- 
24. 
15 Case C- 59/08 Copad SA v Christian Dior Couture SA [2009] ETMR 40, paras 24- 26; see also 
L'Oréal v Bellure (n 2) para 44; Case C- 252/07 Intel Corp Inc v CPM United Kingdom Ltd [2009] 
ETMR 13, para 67. 
16 Chapter three, 95. 
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of quality.17 For this reason, the fact that dilution is mainly about protecting the 
investment of the trade mark owner should not make the question of quality 
redundant.   
 
The Court of Justice however appears to agree with Schechter’s notion of protection, 
thus adhering to the argument that protecting the distinctiveness of the mark should be 
the only rational basis for protection.  In Copad v Christian Dior, for instance, the 
ECJ found that the quality of luxury goods results not just from their physical 
characteristics but also from their allure and prestigious image which confer on then 
an aura of luxury.  This aura of luxury emanating from luxury goods is essential in 
that it enables consumers to distinguish them from similar goods.  Hence, any 
impairment to that aura of luxury is likely to affect the actual quality of those goods.18 
 
Keeping the traditional grounds of trade mark protection in mind, this expansion of 
protection seems difficult to defend. The Court of Justice has failed to provide 
adequate explanation in relation to what ‘quality’ means.  This is an extremely 
important point.   There is a tradeoff between the costs and benefits of expanding the 
protection of a reputable mark.  As such, any expansion to the protection of the 
intangible aspects of the trade mark must contribute to the objectives of protection.  
The problem, however, is that by considering the presentation of goods and their 
allure and prestigious image as protectable subject-matters, the Court of Justice might 
be unwittingly encouraging artificial product differentiation.  Presentation, allure and 
the prestigious image of goods (brand values) add very little to the product.  However, 
they severely influence consumer purchasing decisions.19 Bearing this in mind, the 
Court ruling could encourage traders to build a reputation on the brand rather than on 
the product to which it is affixed.  In this case, even if the prestigious image of the 
branded good constitutes its distinctive character or reputation, the protection of such 
economically artificial components does not necessarily enhance the consumers’ 
rational commercial behaviour.20 In the long run, the Court ruling in Dior might 
increase the risk of simply improving the advertising value of branded goods at the 
                                                
17 See (n 7) 64- 66; Case C-349/95 Loendersloot v George Ballantine [1998] ETMR 10, para 22; Case 
C- 10/89 SA Cnl-Sucal v Hag, [1990] 3 CMLR 571, para 13; Case C-427/93 Bristol-Myer Squibb v 
Paranova [1996] ETMR 1, para 43. 
18 See (n 16) 177; Case C-59/08 Copad SA v Christian Dior Couture SA [2009] ETMR 40, paras 24-26. 
19 Ibid, 129- 142. 
20 See (n 1), 28- 33. 
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expense of their quality which is contrary to the legal and economic rationales of trade 
mark protection as explained in chapter one.  The risk becomes very clear in the case 
where the quality of the product sold under the mark is not different from what is 
already available in the market.21 In this case, it is much easier for traders to compete 
by improving the persuasive value of their marks rather than following the more 
expensive path, and thus improving the quality of goods to which the marks are 
attached.  
 
The trend towards granting marks with a reputation more protection is not combined 
with a clear view as to how exactly the protection of brand values contributes to the 
legal and economic objectives of the law.  Given the impact of a trade mark reputation 
on retaining the loyalty of consumers (and thus expanding the monopoly power of a 
trade mark owner), tackling that issue becomes a must.   If built on the brand itself 
rather than on the product to which it is attached, the selling power of the mark or its 
reputation can be formidable anti-competitive weapon.  In this case, the mark’s appeal 
to consumers is independent of the quality or the price of the product in question.  In 
turn, as discussed in chapter one,22 this means that the owner of the mark enjoys an 
excessive level of trade mark monopoly. 
 
Thus, Schechter’s argument that the preservation of the uniqueness of a trade mark 
should constitute the only rational basis for its protection is not sustainable where 
such uniqueness does not contribute to the legal and economic objectives of 
protection.  This can only be achieved if the selling power of the mark or its 
reputation is linked in some shape or form to the specifications of a product and not 
built on a vacuum.  
3. Why should we be Concerned? 
 
Inevitably, our argument that the quality guarantee is not sufficiently protected under 
Article 5(1) and (2) remains incomplete.  It ignores very important question: why the 
quality function is not properly protected?  Is there market failure or traders are 
simply exploiting a loophole in the law or enforcement?   
                                                
21 See (n 16) 129- 142; chapter four, 162- 168. 
22 See (n 1) 28- 33. 
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The lack of need for the enforcement of the quality guarantee of a trade mark is based 
on two major assumptions.  The first is the effectiveness of market forces, or what the 
Chicago School termed a self-enforcing feature of a trade mark, in encouraging 
traders to maintain the quality of their goods.  The second is the availability of a 
substantial body of laws which are intended mainly to protect the interests of 
consumers in having quality products on the other.   
4. The Deficiency of the Chicago Deregulation Approach 
 
As explained in chapter four, the Chicago Economic School argues that traders are 
unable to lower the quality of their branded goods or otherwise try to deceive 
consumers, because when they catch on, the producer may lose his entire 
investment.23 Hence, market forces are sufficient to protect the interest of consumers 
as to the quality issue.  According to this ‘deregulation’ approach, there is no need to 
enforce the quality function within the framework of trade mark law. 
 
As this thesis has shown however, the Chicago approach to law and economics is 
based on one particular controversial approach to economics.  The Chicago model of 
quality enforcement is based on three questionable assumptions: perfect competition, 
individual rationality and wealth maximisation. The Chicago economists seem to 
overstate the role of market forces, and by doing so minimise the need for legal 
intervention to enforce the quality function under trade mark law. 
 
Firstly and as explained in chapter four, it is widely acknowledged that a system of 
perfect competition is unlikely to be observed in practice.  Scholars of competition 
law adhere instead to the idea of workable competition.24 As such, markets may not 
work well in supplying consumers with product information, as assumed by the 
Chicago economists.  Secondly, unlike companies where it is possible to identify 
successful (rational) from unsuccessful (bankrupted) commercial entities, there is no 
criterion against which the concept of individual rationality can be measured.  That is 
why, under the Chicago approach, this concept (individual rationality) is assumed but 
                                                
23 Chapter four, 159. 
24 Ibid, 160. 
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not explained.25 Furthermore, given the advertising and persuasive impact of brands 
on consumer commercial behaviour, the rational-choice based approach used by the 
Chicago School does not adequately explain human behaviour.  The Chicago law and 
economics ignores the role of forces such as social norms on individual purchasing 
decision.26 The inclusion of these norms into the trade mark-consumer relationship 
makes for robust explanations of consumer behaviour and more accurate predictions 
of the effects of legal protection.27  
 
Thirdly, the notion that traders always seek to maximise their long term material 
wealth and this incentive to maintain their own interests, by itself, will encourage 
them not to reduce the quality of their goods, is not always accurate.  As this thesis 
demonstrated in detail, the elements that influence a trader’s decision to maintain the 
quality of his goods are not easily predictable or certain.28  What is certain however is 
that the trader perceives the maintenance of quality as a vehicle to retain the loyalty of 
the consumer only as long as there is no other more profitable ways of doing so.29  
Toyota’s latest crisis proves that while trade marks may indeed indicate a certain level 
of quality, they do not necessarily maintain consistency of quality.30 
 
5. Why is Quality Regulation under Consumer Law not an Adequate Answer? 
 
For many, the availability of a substantial body of laws which are intended mainly to 
protect the interests of consumers in having quality products has made the need to 
enforce the quality issue within the boundaries of  trade mark law redundant.  From 
the outset, it seems perfectly sensible to argue that the implementation of the concept 
of ‘satisfactory quality’, for instance, underpins section 14 of the Sale of Goods Act 
1979 (as amended) guarantees that all saleable goods or services are of a satisfactory 
quality and fit for the purpose, and that there is no need therefore to enforce this issue 
within the framework of trade mark law.  This view has been debated. 
 
                                                
25 Ibid, 154. 
26 Ibid, 165- 167. 
27 Ibid, 161. 
28 Ibid, 160, 168- 174. 
29 See (n 16), 129- 142. 
30 See (n 21) 172. 
 201 
It has been argued that the rationale of quality regulation under trade mark law is 
different from that under consumer protection law.31 Under the former, the main role 
of the quality guarantee is to differentiate between satisfactory quality goods.  By 
contrast, the major objective of this function under consumer law is to discourage the 
production of substandard goods.32 That is why consumer law applies a compulsory 
measurable minimum quality test.  Given the fact that the quality of satisfactory goods 
may vary significantly however, this test does not adequately enhance the production 
of quality goods nor it does reduce consumer searching costs.  As such, contrary to 
mainstream thinking, it seems that trade mark law is better placed to deal with quality 
issues than section 14. 
 
The enforcement of the quality function under trade mark law however is not 
straightforward.  On the one hand, it is not possible to define quality.  As a result, it is 
not possible to create measurable and thus enforceable standards that reflect quality 
diversity between satisfactory goods.33 There are simply too many subjective factors 
that have to be taken into account.  For this reason, the enforcement of the quality 
function under trade mark law must not involve the standardisation of quality 
production, thus enforcing traders to maintain a particular level of quality. On the 
other hand, developing a new mechanism for highlighting quality differences between 
satisfactory goods under trade mark law should not necessarily involve enforcing new 
rules or changing the law.34 A very practical solution would be one that, once 
introduced, can be sustained by the market itself, and thus does not impose extra 
costs. 
6. Forward Thinking 
 
Based on the previous arguments, if trade mark protection is to promote competition 
and to reduce consumer searching costs, the enforcement of the quality guarantee 
must be taken seriously.  To this end, and in order to tackle this loophole in the law 
relateing to the enforcement of the quality guarantee, a possible solution could be a 
new interpretation of the trade mark functions under Article 5 (1) and (2) of Directive 
                                                
31 Chapter five, 176, 186. 
32 Ibid, 180. 
33 Ibid, 187, 190. 
34 Ibid, 190. 
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2008/95 (and Article 9 (1) of Regulation 207/2009) that pays regard to the fact that 
neither market forces nor the concept of satisfactory quality are sufficient to protect 
the interests of consumers as to quality issues.  This solution can be explained by way 
of an example. 
 
Trade marks owners are not required by law to develop a strong reputation.  Those 
who do however are rewarded by granting their marks extra protection.  The more 
reputable the mark the more protection it gets and vice versa.  The legal impact of 
having a reputation is very significant.  The Court of Justice has repeatedly stated that 
when determining the protection of a trade mark, account has to be taken of its 
distinctive character, in particular its reputation.  The greater the reputation of the 
mark, the wider the domain of protection.35 What is more, the more immediately and 
strongly the mark is brought to mind by the sign, the greater the likelihood that the 
current or future use of the sign by a third party will be considered to take unfair 
advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of the mark.36 Developing a strong 
reputation, therefore, not only increases the scope of protection but also loosens the 
burden of proof under Article 5(2).37  
 
Keeping that in mind, traders could be encouraged to maintain and improve the 
quality of their goods if maintaining consistent quality is a precondition for expanding 
trade mark protection. This solution is about rewarding traders who consistently 
maintain high quality standards.  In line with the protection of reputable marks 
however, traders who fail to live up to their quality promises should not be legally 
punished under trade mark law.   The problem with such a solution is that it advocates 
the protection of something indefinable. While the quality gap between two 
satisfactory products might be easily recognizable, the task of describing and hence 
measuring this gap is quiet a delicate matter. 
 
The answer to that question lies in the Chicago law and economics movement.  
According to Chicago economists, traders are much more informed than consumers. 
                                                
35  See (n 16) 106, 113; Case C- 39/97 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. [1999] 1 
CMLR 77, paras 22- 24. 
36 Ibid; C- 487/07 L'Oréal SA v Bellure NV [2009] ETMR 55, para 44; Case C- 252/07 Intel Corp Inc v 
CPM United Kingdom Ltd [2009] ETMR 13, para 67. 
37 Ibid. 
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They are best placed to identify the specifications of their goods and, to some degree, 
those of their competitors.  If maintaining and improving the quality of goods 
becomes a part of trade mark protection in general and, expanding the protection for 
marks with a reputation in particular, traders will have a strong incentive to take 
quality control more seriously.  And if they do not, the quality of their goods will be 
contested by their competitors which will impact the level of protection their marks 
may enjoy.   
 
From the outset, there is no reason to believe that contesting the quality of a given 
product should be much more difficult and thus expensive than establishing that a 
mark has a reputation.  Traders and their competitors are well placed to contest 
whether the quality of a given product is identical, similar or significantly different 
from what is already available in the market and without having to define quality in 
the first place.  This is because according to the Chicago School, regardless of a trade 
mark, traders have full information about the quality of their goods. 
 
Take digital single-lens reflex cameras (DSLR) market as an example.  This is one of 
the most diverse and competitive markets.  Satisfactory overall quality of a given 
DSLR camera may indeed be an amalgam of a dozen of different characteristics such 
as colour, weight or design.  Despite this fact, by analysing its technical performance, 
it is still possible to establish what makes a good or excellent quality DSLR camera.  
This can be done without the need to reveal any secret information or know-how.  For 
instance, cameras which have CMOS image sensors (complimentary metal-oxide 
semiconductor) are faster, sharper and thus capable of producing much better quality 
photos than those which have CCD sensors (charge-coupled device).38 The CMOS 
sensor is better and more flexible because, under this technology, each pixel can be 
read individually.39  Furthermore, optical image stabilization, is better (though more 
expensive) than digital image stabilization.  The former is used to reduce blurring 
associated with the motion of the camera.  This is done by constructing elements 
within the lens which actually moves to compensate for shaky hands.  The latter 
(digital stabilization) does the same thing but differently.  It uses pixels outside the 
                                                
38<http://www.canon.co.uk/For_Home/Product_Finder/Cameras/Digital_SLR/Technologies_Features/
CMOS_Sensor.asp> accessed 12 June 2010; 
<http://www.nikon.com/about/technology/core/optical_e/cmos/index.htm> accessed 12 June 2010. 
39 Ibid. 
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border of the visible frame to provide a buffer for the motion, which in turn, reduces 
distracting vibrations.  The down side however is that the more noise-reduction 
applied, the worse the image will look.40  
 
These are mere examples.  They show that although it might be difficult to reflect the 
potential variety of consumer tests of quality, for a trader and because he is fully 
informed, it is not difficult to understand what makes a good or excellent quality 
product and, thus  to contest the quality of his or his competitor’s goods before a 
court.     
 
Therefore, in the same way legal concepts such as  the test of public confusion, 
identical or similar goods or services, a trade mark reputation, taking unfair advantage 
of or be detrimental to, have been developed by the Court of Justice, the concept of 
quality enforcement can also be build up.  The previous solution is far from perfect.  
Still, it provides a practical and thus workable answer to the question of quality.  It 
neither imposes any extra costs on traders nor does it require traders to maintain a 
certain level of quality.  Recently, the Court itself considered the allure and 
prestigious image of luxury goods as part of their quality but without providing any 
guidance as what quality means.  There is no reason to believe therefore that 
identifying a standard of quality that traders must maintain should be regarded as a 
precondition for enforcing the quality function under trade mark law.   
 
The preceding argument leaves us with a few important questions: must traders fight 
over quality between themselves and in what contest? Put differently, should a 
challenge to quality operate as a defence? How would this work in practice? Traders 
and/or their competitors should be permitted to contest the quality of a branded 
product.  After all, traders and/or competitors have full information and thus are well 
placed to contest the quality of a given product. This  ‘quality’ defence could have a 
very significant impact, particularly under Article 5(2).  This is because, under this 
Article, the scope of trade mark protection is much wider and more extensive than 
that under Article 5(1), and thus the risk of using the trade mark’s persuasive or 
                                                
40 <http://www.nikon.com/about/technology/life/stabilization/index.htm> accessed 12 June 2010; 
<http://www.canon.co.uk/for_home/product_finder/cameras/ef_lenses/image_stabilization_lenses/inde
x.aspx> accessed 12 June 2010. 
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advertising power (reputation) to retain the loyalty of consumers, instead of 
improving the quality of the product to which the mark is attached, can be very high.  
According to this scenario, the owner of a reputable mark would have to take quality 
control much more seriously when seeking to establish that the use of its mark, for 
instance, takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the 
repute of the trade mark.  This is because, amongst other defences, maintaining and 
improving the quality of goods become a precondition for expanding the protection of 
marks with a reputation. A competitor could argue that the quality of the product to 
which the mark with a reputation is attached is not significantly different from what is 
already available in the market.  Expanding the protection of the mark in this case 
could in fact enhance artificial product differentiation which, given the role of trade 
mark reputation in retaining consumers’ loyalty, should not be tolerated under trade 
mark law.    
 
If the previous solution cannot be accepted however, then, we should accept the fact 
that, while the protection of trade mark secures the investment of the trade mark 
owner, this does not necessarily promote the production of quality goods nor does it 
reduce consumer searching costs.41 Hence, the statement that trade mark protection 
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